University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
6-1993

Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base
Fran Ansley

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Frances L Ansley. "Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty and America's Eroding Industrial Base,
81 GEO. L. J. 1757-1896 (1993);" Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 81 Iss. 5 (1993) Available at:
http://works.bepress.com/frances-ansley/30/

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A.
Katz Law Library. It has been accepted for inclusion in UTK Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator
of Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. For more information, please contact
eliza.boles@utk.edu.

University of Tennessee College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Frances Ansley

June, 1993

Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty
and America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO.
L. J. 1757-1896 (1993);
Frances L Ansley

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/frances-ansley/30/

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Jan 6 10:52:00 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding
Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757 (1993).
ALWD 7th ed.
Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding
Industrial Base, 81 Geo. L.J. 1757 (1993).
APA 7th ed.
Ansley, F. (1993). Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base. Georgetown Law Journal, 81(5), 1757-1896.
Chicago 17th ed.
Fran Ansley, "Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding
Industrial Base," Georgetown Law Journal 81, no. 5 (June 1993): 1757-1896
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Fran Ansley, "Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding
Industrial Base" (1993) 81:5 Geo LJ 1757.
AGLC 4th ed.
Fran Ansley, 'Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding
Industrial Base' (1993) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 1757.
MLA 8th ed.
Ansley, Fran. "Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding
Industrial Base." Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 81, no. 5, June 1993, p. 1757-1896.
HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Fran Ansley, 'Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Eroding
Industrial Base' (1993) 81 Geo LJ 1757
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty,
and America's Eroding Industrial Base
FRAN ANSLEY*

I was born and raised at the mouth of Hazard Holler,
Coal cars roarin' and rumblin' past my door;
Now they're standin' rusty, rollin' empty,
And the L and N don't stop here any more.
Jean Ritchie 1

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; A.B., HarvardRadcliffe, 1969; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1979; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1988.
I want to thank the University of Tennessee and the Fund for Labor Relations Studies,
whose financial support permitted me to do much of the travel and research involved in this
project. Adrian Britt, Kelly Bryson, Mary Copeland, Patricia Crotwell, John Goergen, John
Harrington, Tom Mize, Jean Moore, Amy Shehee, and Tammi Simpson provided invaluable
research assistance. Without Lisa Sellers and Tony Greene assisting me with documents, the
project would have been unmanageable. Many other people and organizations helped me
better understand and analyze the issues involved in the article. They are too numerous to
mention, but they know who they are.
Finally, I have had the good fortune to meet and work with a number of individual workers
from Tennessee and Texas (some displaced and some still employed in industries that are
either restructuring or moving off-shore or both) and to meet also with workers who are
receiving some of the jobs now flowing like a river from the United States to the Mexican
border. The stamina and heart with which many of these people-mostly women-are trying
to understand and affect the powerful forces that are so disrupting their lives, and the
sharpness of their insight into the process of corporate decisionmaking, have been instructive and inspiring. My special thanks go to each of them and to their supportive friends and
families.
1. Jean Ritchie, The L and N Don't Stop Here Anymore, reprinted in PETE SEEGER & BOB
REISER, CARRY IT ON:

A HISTORY IN SONG AND PICTURE OF WORKING MEN AND WOMEN

OF AMERICA 192 (1985). Some of the verses are:
I used to think my daddy was a black man
With scrip enough to buy the company store,
But now he goes downtown with empty pockets
And his face as white as February snow.
I never thought I'd live to learn to love the coal dust;
Never thought I'd pray to hear the tipple roar.
But, Lord, how I wish that grass could turn to money,
Them greenbacks fill my pockets once more!
Id. at 191-92. The song dates from a severe slump in the Appalachian coal industry during
the 1950s. That recession sent thousands of hillbillies northward on a search for jobs. The
lyrics stand as a reminder that American workers and communities have suffered before
from sudden infusions and withdrawals of industrial capital. Appalachia bears special scars
in this regard, being subject to the particularly uncushioned boom and bust of extractive
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These plants, these maquilas, they come in here from the other side,
and they give us work. And we are glad to have the work. We need the
work. But they don't treat us like human beings. They treat us like
something you can throw away. Sometimes these plants can make you
feel very small, like an ant on the ground, like Lupe said. And you think,
"What can I do against something so big and so rich and so powerful as
that shiny new plant full of shiny new machines?" But we are human
beings. We are not ants. And one day they will have to listen to us.
Elena

2

Many signs indicate that we in the United States are living in a period of
profound economic restructuring. While not discontinuous with earlier
phases of our economic life,3 the breakneck rate of change and the depth
and breadth of the transformation seem to herald something new. The
increasingly familiar spectacle of U.S. plant closings has become an important feature of this change, as companies display increased willingness to
cast-off or destroy productive capacity, workers, families, land, and whole
communities. 4
industry.

See generally JOHN GAVENTA,

POWER AND POWERLESSNESS:

QUIESCENCE AND

REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980). For a recent and disturbing assessment, see
RICHARD A. COUTO, COMMISSION ON RELIGION IN APPALACHIA, BEYOND DISTRESS: NEW
MEASURES OF ECONOMIC NEED IN APPALACHIA (1992) (summarizing recent data on poverty

and economic decline in Appalachia). That the dislocations are spreading beyond what the
United States has seen before will be the subject of some discussion below.
2. "Elena," Pseudonym of maquiladora plant worker in a U.S.-owned electronics factory
in Reynosa, Mexico, from a personal interview in Miguel Alem~in, Mex. (July 1991).
3. We might remind ourselves, for instance, that annual growth in the gross national
product between the years of 1870 and 1910 was truly dizzying, or we might remember (or try
to imagine) how it felt when the nation hurtled into the Great Depression or mobilized for
World War II. For that matter, geographic rather than chronological travel might give
perspective. We could try to envision life in Nicaragua in 1988 with a 20,000% annual
inflation rate or today along the Mexican border, the fastest growing industrial area in the
world. For more on border development and the pathological boom of the "maquiladora"
economy, see infra notes 31 & 46.
4. The literature on plant closings is vast and growing. For a compilation, see HAROLD
WAY & CARLA WEISS,

PLANT CLOSINGS:

A SELECTED BIOGRAPHY OF MATERIALS PUB-

LISHED THROUGH 1985 (1987). For assorted windows onto the subject from worker and
community-based perspectives, see COMMUNITY AND CAPITAL IN CONFLICT: PLANT CLOSINGS AND JOB Loss (John Raines et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COMMUNITY AND CAPITAL IN
CONFLICT]; GILDA HAAS & PLANT CLOSURES PROJECT, PLANT CLOSURES: MYTHS, REALITIES AND RESPONSES (Holly Sklar ed., 1985); STAUGHTON LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST
SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL CLOSINGS (1982); ERIC MANN, TAKING ON GENERAL MOTORS: A CASE STUDY OF THE CAMPAIGN TO KEEP GM VAN NUYs OPEN (1987);

Barry Yeoman, Factory Clearance: Three Years after the Largest Layoff in City History,
Durham Workers Still Struggle to Make Ends Meet, S. EXPOSURE, Fall 1990, at 21; or Michael
Moore's wickedly funny and sad feature documentary, ROGER AND ME (Dog Eat Dog Films

1990). For a window onto the scene from the perspective of business owners and managers,
see RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, FUGITIVE INDUSTRY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION (1984); PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES? (Richard B.
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Advocates and observers have begun to realize that plant closings are
only one of the more acute symptoms of a deeper restructuring that affects
not only factory workers and organized labor, but also the fight against
poverty and the fight for race and gender equity. If the problems of
poverty looked tough to solve before, the post-industrial, global, "new
American economy" threatens to stratify American society as never before, and to open gulfs ever more difficult to bridge between those in the
lower tiers of society and those in the top.5
In the past, industrial jobs have been a vital part of our economy.
Industrial workers have formed the backbone of the labor movement. In
many sectors, and during important phases of our history, and for those
who could gain access to them, blue-collar industrial jobs have provided
ballast for individuals and families, translating not only into wages, but
also into other vital and stabilizing benefits such as health insurance and
retirement income. 6 These jobs have represented a bulwark against poverty for some Americans and a way out of poverty for others. Further,
with employment discrimination laws in force after the mid-sixties, bluecollar jobs once seemed to offer the best hope for changing the disproportionate race and gender demographics of the poor.7
McKenzie ed., 1984). For an examination of the role of local governments in plant closing
episodes, see JOHN PORTZ, THE POLITICS OF PLANT CLOSINGS (1990); G. Pascal Zachary &
Bob Ortega, Workplace Revolution Boosts Productivity at Cost of Job Security: Globalization,
Automation and Shrinking Industries Spread the Fearof Firing, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 10, 1993, at
Al.
5. See, e.g., Paul E. Lee, A New World Order in New Jack City: Strategies for Remedying
Economic Discrimination, 23 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 79, 80-88 (1992) (arguing that the great
disparity in economic conditions between the rich and the poor is discrimination caused by
lack of control over the political process by the poor); Sylvia Nasar, However You Slice the
Data the Richest Did Get Richer, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at Cl (noting that the majority of
overall gains in income during the 1980s were concentrated in the top one percent of
families, making the gap between rich and poor even greater). For some observations by the
Secretary of Labor on the growing rift, see Robert Reich, The Secession of the Successful,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 16.
6. Industrial jobs do not "naturally" provide a living family wage or the various kinds of
benefits mentioned above. Returns earned by workers for their labor have varied greatly
over the years and have been in large part the uneven and unstable outcome of vigorous
social struggles. Meanwhile strong patterns of race and gender segregation in the paid and
unpaid work force have meant that whatever returns workers did enjoy were unevenly
distributed among them. The blue-collar work force is deeply stratified in America.
7. After passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, traditionally excluded groups obtained
relief in broad, aggressive litigation that for a time characterized the new era of antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 834 (5th Cir.
1975) (Secretary of Labor and EEOC proceeded under Title VII of the Act to force nine
steel companies employing 300,000 workers to end patterns of hiring and job discrimination
based on race, sex, and national origin), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); EEOC v. AT&T,
419 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (EEOC proceeded under Title VII of the Act to
achieve system-wide affirmative action plan at AT&T for minorities and women), aff'd, 556
F.2d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). These kinds of cases, in which
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It is easy to see, then, why the erosion of the industrial base has had
such a profound impact on poverty. As the wages that industrial unions
fought so hard to achieve for the primarily white and male upper strata of
the blue-collar work force continue to wane, many families face a serious
crisis. 8 Some take up the slack by putting two wage earners in harness.
This solution, of course, is unavailable to single-parent families, which are
overwhelmingly headed by women and are dramatically on the rise. Minorities in particular are struggling as their economic foundation in our great
industrial cities is evaporating. Continuing patterns of residential segrega-

tion by race and class make physical access to jobs beyond the inner city
difficult for many people of color.9
Meanwhile the service jobs that are increasing as industrial jobs continue to decline do not constitute an adequate alternative. Most often

activist federal agencies assertively worked to pry open thousands of previously inaccessible
jobs, seemed to presage a real opening of the gates for traditionally excluded groups-a
significant migration of the "previously poor" into what had been almost exclusively white
male job enclaves. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979)
(upholding affirmative action plan as permissible means of opening up employment opportunities for minorities in occupations traditionally closed to them). Some such migration has,
in fact, occurred as a result of both antidiscrimination law and affirmative action. See, e.g.,
Does Affirmative Action Work? An Institute Report, S. EXPOSURE, Spring 1992, at 8. But the
scale of overall progress made, and the amount of race and gender stratification still
remaining are both serious disappointments. The economic developments discussed in this
article are, in my view, no small part of the reason that progress has been so meager.
8. On the erosion of blue collar wages, see Minimum Wages: The New Economy, (PBS
television broadcast, Jan. 9-10, 1992). For background on race and the union movement,
see, e.g., PHILIP S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER 1619-1973 (1974)
(examining the history of exclusion of black workers from organized labor and exploring the
exceptions when black-white unity was established in the labor movement); WILLIAM B.
GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS:

JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES

(1977) (examining the law and reality of employment discrimination with emphasis on race
and labor unions and the actual impact of government efforts to eliminate discrimination);
Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1159-84 (1991) (examining past exclusion of women from maledominated labor unions and their inability to effectively organize to pursue gender equality
using labor laws); Michael Jordan, The NLRB Racial Discrimination Decisions, 1935-1964:
The Empiric Process of Administration and the Inner Eye of Racism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 55,
63-96 (1991) (analyzing the effect of the Wagner Act on race relations; asserting that the
race-neutral Act institutionalized racism); Janelle M. Rettler, Women's Work: Finding New
Meaning through a Feminist Concept of Unionization, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 751,
772-76 (1992) (arguing that male-created structures of labor relations are inadequate to
confront women's needs in traditionally female-dominated fields such as nursing in which
relationships are nonadversarial, and that women's needs go beyond traditional wages and
employment).
9. Even public transportation becomes a racial issue in a society as highly charged with
and divided by race as ours. White friends of mine in Atlanta, for instance, report that it is
commonplace to hear resistance to the extension of new public transportation routes into
white suburban enclaves on the grounds that such routes will lead to an influx of people of
color. See also Andy Banks & Guillermo Grenier, Apartheid In Miami, LAB. RES. REV.,
Spring 1987, at 47, 56-57 (describing racial patterns in Miami's public transportation grid).
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they offer lower wages, fewer benefits, and less job security than the jobs
they are replacing, a fact all too painfully obvious to, say, a welfare mother
trying to decide whether it is worth giving up her Medicaid card in order to
make a long-term shift to the payroll at her local McDonald's, nursing
home, or luxury hotel. While many defenders of state-sanctioned capital
mobility have argued that the United States will rise above these job losses
into a new world of high-tech, high-skilled, specialized, and flexible enterprise, such visions seem fanciful when checked against the state of education in most of our inner cities, poor rural areas, and even blue-collar
suburbs.
The somber cast of these developments, combined with the social violence and economic shortsightedness that have characterized a number of
specific factory shutdowns,' ° has led to heated debate in communities,
union locals, churches," Congress, academia, presidential campaigns,12
and elsewhere about the impact of deindustrialization on the U.S. econ-

10. Of course, the judgment that a plant closing represents social violence or shortsightedness is highly value-laden. Proponents of maximum capital mobility would contest the
characterization. As Richard McKenzie observes:
As some firms go under, they release their resources to other, more cost-effective
firms that offer consumers more of what they want at more attractive prices. Many
proponents of [plant closing] restrictions cry "foul": such a process is still unfair to
the losers. In fact, however, the process offers everyone an equal opportunity to
compete, survive, and win.
Many people lose their jobs when plants are closed, but their loss does not
necessarily mean that they are somehow worse off. Workers unemployed because
their plants close are also beneficiaries of the competitive process (involving closings and openings) in other markets, which yields higher quality goods at lower
prices.
McKENZIE, supra note 4, at 86-87.
11. For excerpts from the Catholic Bishops' letter, "A New American Experiment Collaborating to Shape the Economy," see Concern Growing for Workers Affected by Plant Closings,
Monsignor Says, 247 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A3 (Dec. 24, 1984) [hereinafter Monsignor
Says].
12. The recent presidential campaign had a dramatic effect on public perception of these
matters. Bill Clinton and Ross Perot both voiced urgent concern about the erosion of the
U.S. manufacturing base, and provoked a roar of approval from the American electorate for
doing so. See, e.g., John Dillin, Perot Puts Spotlight on Free Trade Issue, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 3, 1992, at 1; Stephen Robinson, Clinton Taunts Bush Refusal to Debate,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 23, 1992, at 9. Not so long ago, many people whom I encountered
wanted to argue about whether there was in fact any meaningful trend toward deindustrialization. Today most people I talk to take that trend as a given, and believe that it is a harmful
one for the American economy. Disagreement centers around what to do about it. But see
Donald Lambro, U.S. Trade Policy Clouded by Myths, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at E4
("Despite the myth of deindustrialization, which was aggressively promoted by Bill Clinton
and Ross Perot in their 1992 Campaigns, U.S. manufacturing output increased by 40 percent
between 1980 and 1990.").
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omy and its people. 3 There is unusually explicit discussion regarding the
role that law should play in expanding, contracting, or maintaining the
freedom of those who control productive property to withdraw and relocate their capital investments at will. This debate and the rapid economic
change that is sweeping not just this country, but the rest of the world as
well, provide a unique opportunity for a reexamination of our assumptions
about corporations and the powers, freedoms, and responsibilities assigned to them in our economic system.
This article will not attempt to deal with these trends in all their
complexity and breadth. Instead, it will focus on plant closings as one
specific manifestation of the larger story. The effort throughout will be to
examine problems from the perspective of workers and communities most
directly affected by the plant-closing phenomenon.14
Part I provides a description of the changing economic context within
which plant closings are occurring. Part II discusses a number of legal
avenues that have been explored by workers and communities adversely
affected by plant closings. This discussion reveals that most U.S. workers
and communities have thus far been able to achieve only the slenderest of
13. For information about the human impact of plant closings, see Lee Hamilton et al.,
Hard Times and Vulnerable People: Initial Effects of Plant Closings on Autoworkers' Mental
Health, 31 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 123 (1990); Kenneth Labich, The New Unemployed,
FORTUNE, Mar. 8, 1993, at 40.
14. I am a partisan beyond these pages as well, in ways that warrant disclosure. For
instance, I serve on the board of directors of the Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network
(TIRN), a coalition of community, church, and labor organizations that came together to
respond to the plant-closing crisis in Tennessee. I recently have made a pro bono appearance on TIRN's behalf in Burnette v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., No. 3-91-526 (E.D. Tenn.
filed Sept. 9, 1991), a case brought under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (1988) (see discussion at Part 1l.D.) in
which TIRN, a nonparty to the lawsuit, was served with a subpoena duces tecum in pretrial
discovery.
I am aware, of course, that some of my ablest colleagues are committed to the pursuit of
objectivity and neutrality in their scholarship, and that my open announcement of a chosen
stance in the text may trouble them. My own belief is, however, that an "unperspectived"
view is impossible. In fact, I have come to believe that it is precisely the points of view we
perceive as "neutral" or "bias-free" that often contain the most powerful unexamined
assumptions and blindnesses of all. See, e.g., Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511, 1528-32, 1554-56, 1578-83 (1991) (commenting
on the question of objectivity in curriculum design and teaching); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was
Blind, But Now I See". White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory
Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993) (discussing the "transparency" of whiteness for white
people); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 11-17, 31-70
(1987) (describing how "objectivity" is inherently viewpoint based).
For present purposes let me say only that I believe it is important for scholars in particular
and people in general to discover and acknowledge their own perspectives, and to recognize
and listen to those different from their own. This article will endeavor to cite and reason
widely enough that readers are alerted to a range of viewpoints and given sufficient
information to pursue further inquiries.
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legal leverage on these problems. Part III concludes with a discussion of
possible directions that the law may take with regard to issues of capital
deployment and economic development, and with my own reflections
about which of these would best serve the needs of the poor, and the
majority of people, both in this country and abroad.
I.

THE CHANGING ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Plant closings are not a new phenomenon. Businesses fail and relocate
all the time; such is and has been a normal and expected fact of life in our
economic
system. Old jobs disappear. New and different ones replace
15
them.
The recent spate of plant closings, however, is both quantitatively and
qualitatively different. The number and size of closings, as well as their
frequency (what some have called the "velocity" of change)16 have all
increased rapidly. Further, there are disturbing patterns in the types of
jobs lost and the types of jobs gained. These trends and a number of other
potent interrelated characteristics distinguish today's plant closings from
those of the past. 17
A.

INCREASING CAPITAL MOBILITY

First, new technologies and information systems, coupled with the increasingly concentrated and transnational character of many business enterprises, have resulted in an astonishing level of global interconnection and
interdependence. Corporate management can oversee far-flung opera-

15. One opponent of legislative limits on capital mobility observes with gusto, "Although
the competitive market process is admittedly by its very nature destructive, the destruction is
'creative destruction'..... McKENZIE, supra note 4, at 85. "Indeed," he later remarks,
"the history of progress is a history of the destruction of jobs and businesses." Id. at 176
(emphasis omitted).
16. See, e.g., James M. Cline, A Legal, Economic and Normative Analysis of National Plant
Closing Legislation, 11 J. LEGIS. 348, 368-69 (1984) (describing how plant closings and
relocations can be measured in terms of "capital velocity" to determine the optimal rate of
new investment a community can absorb).
17. See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE GREAT U-TURN (1988);
Diane E. Herz, Worker Displacement Still Common in the Late 1980's, Displaced Workers,
1985-89, BUR. LAB. STATS. (1991). It has become commonplace across a broad political
spectrum to describe and decry many of these developments. It is harder to forge solutions.
See William B. Gould, IV, The Employment Relationship Under Siege: A Look at Recent
Developments and Suggestionsfor Change, 22 STETSON L. REV. 15 (1992) (describing declining fortunes of the American worker); Peter T. Kilborn, Unions at a Loss to Reverse Falling
Fortunes of Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1991, at Al (describing declining standard of living
for union workers as the political power of union leaders declines over the conflict with
Democratic members of Congress on trade policy); Louis Uchitelle, America Isn't Creating
Enough Jobs and No One Seems to Know Why, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, at D1 (describing
shortage of good jobs, even for the educated, and bleak expectations for future growth).
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tions and stay in close touch with outposts that are only a fax away.
Investments can be altered, and capital redirected, with an ease and
dispatch that was barely thinkable only a few years ago. 1 8 Meanwhile, the
long-term trend toward greater concentration of corporate ownership has
continued and accelerated. One report noted, "By 1980 more than 70
percent of all private economic activity was controlled and operated by
eight hundred conglomerate firms, while the remaining 30 percent was
shared by 14 million firms."' 9
Along with the ability to move capital fast and far has come the will to
do so. A powerful tendency has emerged for managers and investors to
seek the highest possible short-term returns on investment, and to display
less and less commitment to any underlying product, place, or group of
employees. 2 ° Many plants are closed not because they fail to make a
profit, but because they fail to make enough profit to hold the decisionmaker's interest when compared to some other marginally more profitable
opportunity. When management fails to reinvest and modernize, productivity and profit margins most often do decline, thereby reinforcing the initial,
casual decisions whose rhetoric often either places blame at the feet of
labor, or speaks of these developments as if they constituted some natural
and inevitable evolutionary path beyond anyone's control.2 1
Fueling and being fueled by this trend is the related explosion of
mergers and acquisitions, many of which are quickly followed by downsizings, mass layoffs, and plant closings.2 2 More profit can often be made in
18. See generally Glenn H. Reynolds, United States Telecommunications Trade Policy:
Critique and Suggestions, 58 TENN. L. REV. 573 (1991).
19. Edward M. Bergman & Harvey A. Goldstein, Dynamics, Structural Change and Economic Development Paths, in LOCAL ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: POLICY REALITIES &
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIALS 84, 88 (Edward M. Bergman ed., 1986).

20. One near legendary formulation by a steel executive that captures this ethic in all its
utter reasonableness and perversity goes something like this: "We are not in this business to
make steel. We're in it to make money." It has proven difficult to track this remark with
certainty. Some have attributed a version of it to David Roderick, then Chairman of the
Board of U.S. Steel. See Monsignor Says, supra note 11. Another source attributed a version
of the remark to Ed Klein of National Steel. Steelyard Blues, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1984,

at 86 ("Anyone who thinks we're in this business to make steel is crazy ...We're in this
business to make money for our stockholders."). During this period, U.S. Steel renamed
itself "U.S.X.," certainly an appropriate new moniker, if it does have a somewhat ominous
ring. See USX Corporation, in ADELE HAST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF COMPANY HISTORIES, 572-74 (Vol. IV 1991).
21. See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES:
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT (1980); BARRY BLUESTONE ET
AL., CORPORATE FLIGHT: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC DISLOCATION

(1981).
22. See, e.g., Susan Faludi, The Reckoning: Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profits but Exacts a
Heavy Human Toll, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1990, at Al (describing 1986 Safeway leveraged

buyout, which produced 63,000 layoffs; although many workers were rehired, most returned
in lower-wage positions). Some maintain that takeovers have caused massive job loss while
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less time by orchestrating a leveraged buyout than by managing the concrete manufacture of an actual product. The managerial culture of this
merger "frenzy," with its emphasis on deal-driven profits over productivity
or equity,2 3 has been noted with dismay and alarm by observers as diverse
as the presidents of the United Auto Workers2 4 andof Harvard University. 2
While there are signs that the frenzy may have slowed somewhat, concern
and debate about its significance continue.26
B. DEINDUSTRIALIZATION

Another new feature of the wave of present plant closings that distinguishes it from closings of the past is direction. The nature of economic
investment and activity within the United States has dramatically shifted
away from industrial production and toward service-based enterprises.2

others claim they have helped the economy in general and employment rates in particular.
Still others say that empirical data is insufficient to draw a conclusion one way or the other at
present. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991)
(summarizing arguments on both sides).
23. States have made some attempt to cool the frenzy through antitakeover statutes. See,
e.g, E. Norman Beasey et al., The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and
Comparisons, 43 Bus. L. 865, 868-75 (1988) (analyzing effects of § 203 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, which regulates second-step transactions after, rather than
before, stock acquisition); Thomas L. Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second
and Third Generations, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 77, 78-88, 111-20 (1988) (surveying state
control share and best price statutes designed to protect companies against hostile takeovers).
These statutes are not particularly tailored for takeovers that cause plant closings, and to the
extent the measures save jobs, they may be aimed more at management jobs than hourly
ones. But see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 149, § 183(b) (1988) (providing for lump sum payment to
any employee discharged within two years of a takeover).
In addition, "stakeholder statutes" passed in many states give directors more discretion to
defend against hostile takeovers by allowing them to take into account interests broader than
the wealth maximization interests of shareholders.
24. Owen Beiber, ForAmerican Workers American Government Is Not Working Well At All:
De-Industrializationand the Perversionof Basic Worker Rights, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 475, 475-78
(1986) (noting that industries deindustrialize in favor of a low wage service economy without
concern for the cost of the transition).
25. Then president Derek Bok of Harvard University decried in his 1988 commencement
address the fact that college graduates increasingly were going into careers as lawyers and
external consultants and were declining to go into teaching, politics, or vocations in which
they would be responsible for ongoing leadership of institutions or for the actual manufacture of useful physical objects.
26. See, e.g., Tim Wise, What Did the Buyouts Buy? A Fast Buck and a Dim Future,
DOLLARS & SENSE, May 1990, at 6 (reporting on a National Science Foundation survey
regarding corporate debt incurred during 1980s "buyout binge").
27. See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION

OF AMERICA (1982). Since the publication of this pathbreaking book, the evidence and the
reporting have mounted. The phenomenon is not restricted to the American "industrial
heartland" or the "rust belt." See COMMUNITIES IN ECONOMIC CRISIS: APPALACHIA AND
THE SOUTH (John Gaventa et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter COMMUNITIES IN ECONOMIC CRISIS]
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The pool of blue-collar jobs in traditionally unionized sectors is shrinking,
while the pool of white-collar and service jobs is expanding. Union membership has declined from a postwar high of nearly forty percent in the
mid-1950s, to its present startling level close to fifteen percent, leaving the

vast majority of the U.S. work force unorganized.28 One projection has
U.S. union membership falling to five percent by the year 2000.29

(surveying effects of deindustrialization in Appalachia and the South); John Gaventa et al.,
Disposable Communities: Picking Up the Pieces After the Company Leaves Town, DOLLARS &
SENSE, Mar. 1992, at 12 (reporting on industrial decline in Appalachian South); Southern
Millhands Becoming Mall Workers, Study Shows, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 1990,
at D2 (reporting that retail and service sectors account for nearly half of all employment in
the South). Finding and interpreting "the facts" is, of course, a difficult and value-laden
enterprise; its results are strongly influenced by the initial assumptions of those observing,
counting, and analyzing. While Republican administrations celebrated the many new jobs
that were being created by the U.S. economy, critics argued that most of the new jobs were
lower paying, less unionized, less skilled, and less secure than the jobs lost. These discrepancies surfaced during the 1988 presidential campaign:
Dukakis... charges that the Reagan Administration has ... replace[d] high-wage
manufacturing jobs with lower-paying "hamburger" jobs ....
Meanwhile ... Vice President George Bush, is boasting that the Administration
he served has created 17 million new jobs over the past six years-the best
performance in the industrialized world. Bush contends that most of these jobs
have been in high-wage managerial and technological fields ....
Art Pine, Dukakis, Bush TailorJobs Statistics to Suit Their Needs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1988, § 4,
at 1.
28. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 9-10 (1990). The decline in union strength has been the subject of much
attention. See, e.g., MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE
UNITED STATES (1987) (exploring the reasons behind the falling strength of the unions in the
United States); Jules Bernstein, Union-Busting: From Benign Neglect to Malignant Growth, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 3, 17-36 (1980) (surveying "union busting" industry that has evolved to
operate on the margins of current labor laws to defeat union organization); Colloquium: The
Labor Movement at the Crossroads, 311 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1983) (colloquium
on the changing nature of the labor movement and the particular challenges brought about
by postwar changes in labor-management relations); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer:
Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American Labor Laws," 1990 WiS. L. REV.
1, 98-117 (describing how post-World War II American labor law weakened union strength
by fragmenting existing organized workers through highly particularized bargaining strategies and discouraging new organization by keeping costs of organizing high); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, The Legacy of IndustrialPluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment
Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 578-620 (1992)
(noting that § 301 preemption of state individual employment rights with NLRA collective
bargaining rights has led to decline in strength of unions as employees opt for broader
individual protections).
29. Stephen G. Broners & Donald R. Deere, Union Organizing Activity and Union
Coverage 1973-1988, Paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Labor Markets in the 1990s, Cambridge, Mass. (Dec. 7-8, 1989), cited in Morgan 0.
Reynolds, The Creative Destruction of Unionism, FORUM FOR

Winter 1990, at 57.

APPLIED RES.
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Entire regions of the country whose economic and cultural personalities
had been identified with particular industries for decades have stood in
shock while owners shut down and pulled out.3 ° Social activist and labor
attorney Staughton Lynd recalls the aftermath of the massive steel mill
closings in Ohio and Pennsylvania:
The collapse of the steel industry in Youngstown, Pittsburgh and other
communities of the industrial heartland disrupted the implicit social
contract that had existed in these towns for a generation.... The [union]
vice-president.., said: "Most people couldn't believe it. It was so huge
and had operated so long and so many people depended on it for their
livelihood." More than one steelworker in Youngstown indicated
that
31
the only thing they had experienced like it was Pearl Harbor.
This pattern of national deindustrialization leads to a more severe
impact of today's plant closings upon both workers and communities, than
if the closings took place in an environment of continued industrial vigor.3 2
30. Images of urban factories are relevant here, but do not tell the whole story. For
instance, the wood products industry in the Pacific forests has displayed a pattern of
increasing concentration and disinvestment (in the form of the rejection of sustained yield
forestry practices and the shifting of investments to the southern United States or overseas),
with a resulting impact on many small, isolated, single-industry towns in the Pacific Northwest.
See, e.g., Leslie Kay & Kevin Griffin, Plant Closures: Assessing the Victims' Remedies, 19
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 199, 206-09 (1983) (analyzing disinvestment in Oregon wood products
industry); R. Jeffrey Lustig, The Politics of Shutdown: Community, Property, Corporatism, 19
J. ECON. ISSUES 123, 128-29passim (1985) (analyzing causes of decline of timber industry of
California's north coast).
31. Staughton Lynd, Towards a Not-For-ProfitEconomy: Public Development Authorities
for Acquisition and Use of Industrial Property, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 13, 16-17 (1987)
(footnotes omitted). The use of images of war and violence to describe the effects of plant
closings is pervasive. I was startled to find such images disorientingly called to mind when I
visited the maquiladora region of northern Mexico in June 1990, July 1991, and July 1992.
This is a region that is being courted by capital, not abandoned by it, and yet many of the
areas where maquiladora workers live look like nothing so much as aerial bombing sites.
When I remarked to a U.S. factory worker who was on the 1991 trip that I could not get the
word "violence" out of my mind, she said that the word she kept thinking of was "rape."
For a journalistic glimpse into the maquiladora region, see photographs and text of Sandy
Tolan, The Border Boom: Hope and Heartbreak, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at
17. For a partial account of the trip I accompanied in July 1991, see Frances L. Ansley,
North American Free Trade Agreement: The Public Debate, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 329,
388 (1992) [hereinafter Ansley, Public Debate] (reprinting testimony of Frances Ansley,
Luvernel Clark, Diana Petty, and Shirley Reinhardt before the Trade Staff Policy Committee
of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative); Frances L. Ansley, U.S.-Mexico Free Trade
from the Bottom: A Postcardfrom the Border, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 193 (1992). For film
footage of certain parts of the trip, see Made in America (PBS television broadcast, May 26 &
27, 1992).
32. Some argue that U.S. industrial vigor is undiminished, and that the prophets of
deindustrialization are overstating the case. Philip Burgess, Manufacturing's Death Gasp
Seen as Greatly Exaggerated, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, July 19, 1992, at D3; Explosion of
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If entire occupations and industries are disappearing, then finding a new
job or revitalizing a local tax base after a plant closing become risky
propositions at best.3 3 Thus, present economic trends work both to increase the number of plant closings and to make their impact on workers
and communities more severe.
C. THE GROWTH OF THE CONTINGENT WORK FORCE

A third feature of current economic developments that affects the
impact and meaning of plant closings is the growth of what some observers
are calling the "contingent work force." 34 Increasing numbers of workers
do not enjoy the relatively thick and stable set of obligations and expectations that we have come to associate with a "regular job" in this society.
Although such relationships have never been available to all workers, it is
fair to say that the presumed workplace norm for white male wage earners
has been full-time, relatively long-term, and accompanied by a cluster of
inadequate, but still quite meaningful, protections.3 5 Some of these protections, such as unemployment and workers' compensation, pension regulation, health and safety standards, and antidiscrimination rules, were
mandated by law. Others, such as good cause requirements for termination, seniority benefits, and retirement, were generally won through collective bargaining. General market and societal pressures yielded still other

Low-Paying Service Jobs a 'Myth' Brock Says, WOMEN & WORK, Apr. 1987 (Secretary of Labor
says "[Tihe notion that America's high-paying industrial jobs are being rapidly replaced by
low-paying service work is a 'myth.' "). But see U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, MAKING
THINGS BETTER (1990) ("American manufacturing has never been in more trouble than it is
now."). As noted supra note 12, the fall 1992 presidential campaign marked, and helped to
create, a real change in the consensus on this issue.
33. If these occupations and industries are being replaced by other occupations and
enterprises that are as good or better there should be no cause for either nostalgia or alarm.
Many analysts argue, however, that the move away from manufacturing may be dangerous.
See John Miller & Ramon Castellblanch, Does Manufacturing Matter, DOLLARS & SENSE,
Oct. 1988, at 6 (advocating adoption of an industrial policy based on the promotion of
industries that have high productivity, a competitive global position, potential for unionization, linkages to other industries, and social utility).
34. See GAO Finds Greater Use of Contingent Workers, Warns of Strains on Income Protection System, 59 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-7 (Mar. 27, 1991) (labeling part-time,
temporary, and other nontraditional workers as "contingent workers").
35. Statutory schemes and collective bargaining agreements alike left out many workers,
and the exclusions had a disproportionate race and gender impact. For instance, agricultural laborers were expressly excluded from the National Labor Relations Act even at its
progressive inception. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988); see also ROBERT GORMAN, LABOR LAW
31-33 (1976) (noting that workers primarily connected with agricultural, as opposed to
commercial, activity are excluded from NLRA protection). In similar fashion, though they
are not categorically excluded from Title VII, few domestic workers are part of an employee
complement large enough to claim its coverage. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (restricting
coverage of the Act to employers with 15 or more employees).
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protections (such as sick leave and vacation, certain weaker forms of
seniority, and health insurance) even at unorganized job sites.
Shifts in the economy and management strategies have begun to throw
into question whether traditional notions of "a steady job" accurately
describe most workers' relationship to paid employment today. Even
ignoring those who are unemployed, the proportion of workers who have
what we might call a "core" employment relationship to their employer
has significantly declined in recent years.3 6 At the same time, the proportion of those involved in part-time work,37 temporary work,38 employee
36. See generally RICHARD BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE
TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (1989).
37. See Peter Kilborn, Part-time Hirings Bring Deep Changes in U.S. Workplaces, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1991, at Al (describing 121% increase in the number of involuntary
part-time employees between 1970 and 1990, due in part to the fact that employers do not
have to pay for benefits for part-time employees). The part-time work force has been
disproportionately composed of women. Many interpret this demographic fact as "freely
chosen" by women who are said to "prefer" the flexibility such arrangements afford.
Though few would maintain that the low pay and benefits in themselves are freely chosen,
the theory is that women choose the trade-off because of their own preferences for flexibility
and the like. Such an analysis accepts as given the present gendered division of labor in
child care and other work in the home, as well as the present organization of paid work life
around the assumption that employees do not have significant domestic responsibilities
beyond bringing home the bacon.
The free choice theorists also ignore the fact that large numbers of employers explicitly
structure their workplace arrangements to prevent the achievement of a 40-hour week by
their employees, whose entitlements might otherwise increase, and who are often hungry for
full-time work. See Fast-Food Women (PBS television broadcast, Aug. 10, 1992). For an
insightful discussion of free choice as a factor in gender segregation in the work force,
including an innovative analysis of a specific data set of employment discrimination cases,
see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1750-94 (1990). Vicki Schultz & Stephen Patterson, Race, Gender,
Work and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases
ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992).
That increased use of involuntary part-time work is taking place side-by-side with a
stress-filled upswing in hours of required work per year for many full-time employees is a
curiosity worth exploring. See generally JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE
UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991) (exploring reasons that Americans are spending
more time at work and consequently losing leisure time).
38. See Adam Feuerstein, Work a Day Blues, S. EXPOSURE, Fall 1990, at 25 (noting that
temporary manual labor pools are multimillion dollar industry); June Lapidus, Just to Make
Ends Meet, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov. 1986, at 11; 9 TO 5, NAT'L ASS'N OF WORKING WOMEN,
WORKING AT THE MARGINS:

PART-TIME & TEMPORARY WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1986); Linda Yount & Susan Williams, Temporary in Tennessee: CATS for Stable Jobs, LAB.
RES. REV., Spring 1990, at 73 (discussing effect of temporary employment in Tennessee town
and efforts of citizens' coalition to help workers adjust to trend toward temporary jobs); see
also Rising Use of Part-Time and Temporary Workers: Who Benefits and Who Loses?: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (examining rising use of part-time workers);
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRY WAGE SURVEY: TEMPORARY HELP SUPPLY

1987;

Harry S. Williams, What Temporary Workers Earn: Finding From New BLS Survey, MONTHLY
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leasing arrangements," and independent contracting relationships4 ° is on
the rise.4 1 Whether this trend is good or bad for the U.S. economy is

subject to dispute. Some see it as providing a desirable flexibility for
REV., Mar. 1989, at 3 (surveying wages and benefits earned by temporary employees).
39. See Jeff Day, Rent-a-Staff." A New Lease on Work, ACROSS THE BOARD, July-Aug. 1987,
at 54 (discussing how leasing employees started through a legal loophole that allowed small
business to take advantage of the system); Lease, Don't Hire: Leasing Employees Becomes
More Popular, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1993, at 1 (listing examples of firms who substitute
leased employees for permanent hires).
40. Some industries are structured in such a way that the major work of the enterprise is
conducted by persons not defined as employees, but rather as "independent contractors."
The phrase always recalls for me a visit I made in the early seventies to pulpwood-growing
areas of Mississippi, where black and white pulpwood cutters were attempting to organize a
union. I interviewed woodcutters there. Many were living below the poverty line, qualifying
to receive pinto beans and dried milk under Mississippi's "commodity" program. They
explained that they were paid as independent contractors by the companies that bought the
timber they cut and hauled. This arrangement relieved the companies from any worries
about minimum wages and hours, occupational health and safety, workers' compensation, or
unemployment insurance, as well as maintenance and insurance on vehicles and equipment
the men used. Because most of the workers had few employment alternatives and were
heavily in debt to the company for chainsaws, trucks, fuel, etc., they reported that they did
not actually feel any too "independent."
For a discussion of independent contractors, see generally GORMAN, supra note 35, at
28-31. Marc Linder has been exploring this question from different angles for some time.
LAB.

See MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: AN HISTOR-

ICAL PERSPECTIVE 239-41 (1989) (noting that interpretation of coverage under various
statutes is contingent on diverse definitions of employee); Marc Linder, Toward Universal
Worker Coverage Under the National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled
Employees, Dependent Contractors, and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 555
(1989) (arguing that because independent contractors are not covered by the NLRA, a new
category of workers should be created to prevent employers from excluding workers classified as independent contractors); Marc Linder, Wat Is an Employee? Why It Does, But
Should Not, Matter, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 155 (1989) (discussing historical perspective on
different classifications of employees and reasons that they are covered or excluded by
federal legislation).
Other enterprises are involved in independent contracting in a different way. They have
begun increasingly to "contract out" part of the work that used to be done by company
employees. Sometimes work is sent off premises, other times another company's work crews
are brought on site. But the other entity's employees do not have a direct employment
relationship to the company contracting out the work. They are not members of the
collective bargaining unit for that facility, if it is organized. See generally Contracting Out in
the Private Sector, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1990, at 61-99 (series of articles on strategies and
tactics unions have developed to fight contracting-out in both the public and private sectors).
Cost-cutting moves at my own university led several years ago to the contracting-out of
janitorial work, with a significant negative impact on work quality, turnover, safety and
security for regular employees, and on the wages and working conditions of the "outside"
workers brought in to do the job.
41. Of course, the United States is not the only country in which this issue is a live one.
Cf. Ann Numhauser-Henning, Temporary Employment: A Critical Study of the Swedish
Regulations Covering Categories of Employment and Their Functions, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 36,
62-63 (1988) (discussing the impact of Swedish regulations governing categories of employment on Sweden's economy). Japan is a particularly interesting example, in light of the
widespread impression in the United States that Japanese workers enjoy assurances of
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employers and employees alike. Others are highly critical, pointing to
security for employees and to a general
decreased benefits, wages, and job
42
deterioration in the social fabric.
Another important segment of the contingent work force is made up of
undocumented workers, a group whose outlines are defined by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). 43 Although examination of
that statute is well beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting
IRCA's role in creating a new subclass of undocumented workers, starkly
unprotected and excluded on most fronts from the norms of aboveground
employment relationships. Such employees often lack even the most rudimentary understanding of their legal rights, are vulnerable to exploitation,
and are all but invisible to most of the citizenry. 4 Moreover, the group
"lifetime employment." What is seldom appreciated is the fact that this assurance is
available to less than 25% of the Japanese work force. A much larger percentage of
employees in Japan are "temporary" workers. A Japanese labor law professor explains that
this category includes "part-timers, dispatched workers, subcontract workers, temporary
workers, seasonal workers, day workers and side-job workers," and that the temporary
workers have fewer protections from dismissal and receive lower benefits than do permanent
workers. Fumito Komiya, Dismissal Proceduresand Termination Benefits in Japan, 12 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 151, 152 (1991) (footnote omitted). Komiya also notes a survey that found that
"87.9% of all labor unions had no part-timers as members." Id. at 160 n.128; see also
SATOSHI KAMATA,

JAPAN IN THE PASSING LANE:

AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF LIFE IN A

JAPANESE AUTO FACTORY (1982) (first-person narrative by free-lance journalist who took
job as seasonal worker at Toyota).
42. For an assortment of views on the topic, see Clare Ansberry, Workers Are Forced to
Take More Jobs with Few Benefits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1993, at A9; supra notes 34, 36,
37-40. For a discussion of the problems facing temporary workers, see Garth Mangum et al.,
The Temporary Help Industry: A Response to the Dual Internal Labor Market, 38 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 599, 599-600 (1985) (noting that temporary-help industry prevents employers from forming attachments to a group of employees leading to a high turnover); Camille

Colatosti, A Job Without a Future: Temporary Workers and Contract Workers Battle Permanent
Insecurity, DOLLARS & SENSE, May 1992, at 9 (examining plight of temporary workers);
Adam Feuerstein, Work a Day Blues, S. EXPOSURE, Fall 1990, at 25, 26 (criticizing temporary
labor pools that exploit workers who earn low wages and receive no benefits).
43. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 11 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7, 18, 20, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); see also ALEX WILKINSON, BIG SUGAR: SEASONS IN THE CANE
FIELDS OF FLORIDA (1989) (describing the H-2A program, which allows temporary entry of
foreign workers into the United States, and its impact upon Jamaican and other Caribbean
workers in the Florida sugar cane fields); H-2 WORKER (First Run Features 1990) (documentary film by Stephanie Black describing H-2A program in Florida sugar cane fields).

44. See generally Kitty Calavita, The Contradictionsof Immigrant Lawmaking: The Immigration & ControlAct of 1986, 11 LAW & POL'Y 17 (1989); Colloquium on Immigration Reform:
Rights for America's Undocumented, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1987-88); Peter
Marguilies, Stranger and Afraid: Undocumented Aliens and Federal Employment Law, 38
DEPAUL L. REV. 553 (1989); Aaron Schwabach, Employer Sanctions and Discrimination: The
Case for Repeal of the Employer Sanctions Provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, 4 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1991); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION (1990) (reviewing findings of General Accounting Office reports on IRCA-related discrimination and
making legislative recommendations). In my own part of the country, new streams of
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represents one more element in the growing group of workers who are
given a place not quite inside the employment circle, but rather in the
anterooms, the kitchens, the backyards, the bordellos, the shanty towns,
the hideouts of the fringe.
D.

THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM

A fourth distinctive feature of the economic environment that surrounds
plant closings today is the high degree of competition and division that
exists among different workers struggling for jobs or for enhanced job
security, and among different governmental bodies struggling for a more
stable and prosperous economic base. As prior foundations of economic
security erode, and managers call for increased management flexibility and
mobility, workers and communities that want to keep or attract jobs are
told they must compete with fellow workers next door and halfway around
the world, as well as compete with other towns, counties, or nations.4 5
Many other reform efforts directed at corporate behavior are met with the
same threat.4 6

migrants and other Latino workers have begun percolating into our communities along
occupational fault lines. Many Anglos are entirely unaware of their new, highly contingent
neighbors. Interview with Jack Kramer, Director of Hispanic Ministry of Catholic Social
Services for the Diocese of East Tennessee, in Knoxville, Tenn. (Apr. 15, 1993).
45. The threat to withhold or withdraw jobs arises in all sorts of interactions. It is a theme
in bargaining between labor and management. It is a theme in negotiations between state
economic development people and corporate decisionmakers. It is heard often in legislative
arenas as a reason why restrictions on capital or insistence on corporate accountability to
political bodies would be counterproductive. The president of the Pennsylvania Chamber of
Business and Industry, for instance, observes that plant closing legislation would be a clear
signal to companies to open their plants "anywhere but here." Clifford L. Jones, Plant
Closings: The Business View, 26 DuQ. L. REV. 419, 420 (1988) (plant closing "legislation, in
fact, could actually deter offers from the commonwealth who might otherwise locate in
Pennsylvania"). See generally infra text accompanying notes 520 & 525.
46. Debates about environmental regulation are representative, and have led one pair of
environmental activists to observe:
This is job blackmail. It is a tactic used by business and government leaders to
manipulate public opinion on issues as varied as military spending, civil rights, tax
reform, urban development and public health. Whenever national investment
priorities are debated, the public is warned that policies restricting corporate
freedom or profits will cost jobs.
RICHARD KAZIS & RICHARD GROSSMAN, FEAR AT WORK: JOB BLACKMAIL, LABOR AND THE
ENVIRONMENT ix (1982). Although a discussion of the interface between the environment
and deindustrialization is beyond the scope of this paper, the connections are many. They
may be drawn in political terms, focusing on the accountability of corporate decisionmakers,
or in economic terms, focusing on the proper internalization of environmental and human
costs of production. But in either case the links between industrial policy and environmental
policy are clear.
The drastic environmental degradation taking place on the U.S.-Mexico border, as U.S.
jobs and investment flow chaotically into the region, is only one vivid example of the
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Although the legal ability to move investments at will has value in its
own right for management, in the current climate it also is fast becoming a
powerful source of leverage in employers' dealings with employees and
communities on a whole range of issues.4 7 For instance, the threat of plant
shutdowns has become one of the hottest tools in management's arsenal of
employment relations strategies.4" It can serve as a club to force concessions from an established union,49 or the bugaboo with which to chill and
inseparability of jobs issues and environmental issues. See generally
RICHARD LOWERRE,

TEXAS CTR.

TEXAS-MEXICAN BORDER:
TIAL LEGAL REMEDIES

FOR

POL'Y STUD.,

MARY

E.

KELLY

THE MAQUILADORA BOOM

&

ON THE

ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS AND POTEN-

(1990) (booklet published by the Texas Center for Policy Studies,

Austin); LESLIE KOCHAN, AFL-CIO, THE MAQUILADORAS AND ToxICs: THE HIDDEN COSTS
OF PRODUCTION SOUTH OF THE BORDER (1989) (booklet published by the AFL-CIO);

Ansley, Public Debate, supra note 31, at 357, 361 & 414 (reprinting testimony of environmentalists Peter Emerson, Mary Kelly, and joint testimony of Lori Wallach and John Audley,
before the Trade Staff Policy Committee of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative);
Daniel Basurto Gonzalez & Elaine Flud Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects of Maquiladora
Operations: A Note of Cautionfor U.S. Parent Corporations,22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 659 (1991);
Elizabeth Rose, TransboundaryHarm: Hazardous Waste Management Problems and Mexico's
Maquiladoras, 23 INT'L LAW. 223 (1989); Roberto Sanchez, Health and Environmental Risks
of the Maquiladora in Mexicali, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163 (1990); June Juffer, Dump at the
Border, PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1988, at 24; Craig Phelon, Don't Drink the Water, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov. 26, 1989, at 16; Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 6, 1991, at 33; Tony Vindell, Maquiladora Wastes Create Problems,
BROWNSVILLE HERALD, May 18, 1988, at 1A. New environmental problems are created at
the target end of capital flight and old ones are left orphaned behind. See discussions of
brownfield development versus greenfield development infra notes 318-322.
47. One observer is of the view that deindustrialization and legal rules have had a
synergistic and unfortunate effect on labor-management relations generally: "By mishandling the fundamental change in the labor-management balance wrought by plant closings,
both the NLRB and the courts have allowed the congressionally mandated balance to be
overturned." David A. Tykulsker, For a Reformed Labor Law to Limit Plant Closings, 12
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 205, 205 (1980-81).
48. One union-side labor lawyer remarked during a 1982 meeting:
In the past year, we... have been confronted with a veritable flood of plant
closings presenting a spectrum of legal problems and union busting techniques of
chilling boldness. The state of the economy, the masses of unemployed workers
ready to sacrifice hard won gains for any sort of job, the Reagan administration's
actual or perceived support for employer techniques to get rid of unions so as to
lower labor costs, the welcome reception which employers expect to receive from
the newly constituted Reagan Labor Board and the increasingly conservative, newly
appointed Court of Appeals judges, have combined to produce an atmosphere in
which some employers even seem to feel that they may be embarrassed if they fail
to seek roll backs through use of threats of plant closings and plant transfers.
Peggy Hillman, Evolution of Legal Theories Concerning Plant Closings and Plant Transfers:
Can Union Lawyers Lessen the Impact of Massive Layoffs?, Paper Presented Before the
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union Attorneys' Conference 1 (Sept.
14, 1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
49. See, e.g., Laura Simmons, Union, Philips Agree: Jobs Stay in ET [East Tennessee]:
Mexico Transfer Averted, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, July 5, 1992, at D1 (describing union
concessions when management considered shifting production to Mexico).
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In today's economy, such threats are often not idle ones. Given the
relative openness of the U.S. economy, American corporations are under

pressure from competitors (both foreign and domestic) 51 who are taking
advantage of low-cost labor in other countries. Workers are well aware of
the real possibility of capital redeployment. Fear and grudging subservience are often the result.
The threat of a plant closing sometimes pits workers at one of the
company's plants against fellow workers at another in a race to see which
is able to concede the most or increase productivity the fastest in order to
avoid a shutdown. 5 2 Whether or not management actually bases its even-

50. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1976) (permitting
management to fire employees when they disrupted management's antiunion speeches);
Wex-Tex of Headland, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1006 (1978) (permitting management to
make antiunion speeches prior to vote on unionization at plant). The factual settings of
both these cases, rooted as they are in the textile industry, should serve to remind readers
concerned about poverty that union elections happen not only in the kinds of industrial jobs
associated with the family wage, but also in factories and industries populated largely by the
working poor. Plants are closing (and threats of plant closings are therefore often effective)
in places where workers make $20 an hour and also in places where they are making $5 an
hour.
The practice of threatening to close a plant to defeat union organization is surveyed in
John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Employer's Statements, During Union OrganizationalCampaign, to Effect that Plant or Business Will Close or Relocate if Union Is Successful As Unfair
Labor Practice Under 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a)(1),(c), 93 A.L.R. FED. 335 (1989). The dates on
some of the cases cited in this annotation clearly show that the threat of closing is hardly a
brand new practice. See id. at 335 (citing NLRB v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 108 F.2d 288 (4th
Cir. 1939) and NLRB v. George P. Piling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941)). The global
scope of the stage on which such threats are played out, and the greater number of industries
affected, are of more recent vintage.
51. Just who is actually competing with whom is often hard to say. See Keith Bradsher,
Smith Corona PlantMexico Bound, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at Dll ("American" manufacturer, with a British corporation holding almost half its stock, and with plants already
operating in Malaysia and Singapore, announces that it will move assembly operation from
Courtland, New York to Mexico, citing the refusal of the Bush Administration to help it in
its efforts to impose antidumping penalties on a "Japanese" company producing typewriters
in Bartlett, Tennessee, from partly imported components).
52. See Amy Harmon, GM Overhaul Leaves UAWReadyingfor Battle, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1991, at D5 ("GM's announcement ... that it will choose 21 of its 35 plants to close in the
coming year has wrought havoc with the notion of worker solidarity, as United Auto Workers
locals across the country scramble to persuade the world's largest auto maker that theirs is
the superior work force."); David Morrow, Ypsi. Texas Town in GM Survival Duel; Jobs $100
Million Plant Hinge on Outcome, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 21, 1991, at Al (" 'We feel
betrayed by our Arlington UAW brothers and sisters,' said ... a Willow Run union
rep[resentative]," referring to competition between GM unions at plants in Texas and
Michigan to remain open by offering concessions to GM). On the notion that worker
solidarity is a good that the National Labor Relations Act was intended to and should
protect, see David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor
Law: Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1268, 1273 (1988).
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tual closing decision on the concessions won during this hotbox phase, it is
usually happy to reap the benefits of the dynamic.53 On other occasions, a
company may move (or threaten to move) work to a nonunion plant, thus
pitting union workers against nonunion workers and making the implicit
statement that the union should stop representing its members so aggressively.5 4 In still other instances, the workers who are pitted against each
other are from different countries. 55 The contradictions and inequities of
the global division of labor and resources come home to roost as American
workers are told they must compete against employees receiving third
world wages or fail to make the grade and lose the work. 56
In all these situations, the relative immobility of workers and unions as
compared with the increasing mobility of capital5 7 puts workers at a severe
53. A telling account of how this process can work in practice is Eric Mann's closelytextured story of GM's efforts to "whipsaw" UAW locals against each other through the
threat of plant closings. MANN, supra note 4. On the same fight, see also TIGER BY THE
TALE (video available from the Labor/Community Strategy Center, Van Nuys, CA).
54. See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, Blue Collar Compromises in Pursuit of Job Security, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1992, at Al, A18 ("[A] truce between the company and the.., union has
evolved over seven years-stemming from Rubbermaid's demonstrated readiness, despite its
long history in Wooster, to forgo expansion here in favor of its 23 other lower cost,
non-union factories.").
One observer claims that America is reindustrializing more than deindustrializing, that
there has been a "redistribution of the U.S. manufacturing base" due in part to "an effort by
firms to avoid unions in reallocating production resources." Michael H. LeRoy, Bargaining
Plant Closings: Dubuque Packing and the Reindustrialization of America 5 (Oct. 1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
55. A student of mine recounted that a strike in her hometown (in a depressed area of
East Tennessee) was brought to a conclusion overnight by rumors that the employer would
move its operations to Mexico if the strike was not resolved shortly. The student said she
had it on the best authority that the threats were in earnest. Personal Conversation with
Student, in Knoxville, Tenn. (Oct. 1989); see also Simmons, supra note 49.
56. See generally RACHEL KAMEL, THE GLOBAL FACTORY (1990).
57. Workers, of course, at least unskilled workers, are immobile in the sense that they are
legally restrained from moving across national boundaries. One of the many ironies associated with the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement is that it strives to maximize
free movement of goods and free movement of capital, while its main selling points revolve
around a competitiveness based largely on wage differentials that are fundamentally rooted
in restraining the free movement of workers. See generally Brian Adler & Beth Jarrett,
Comment, Capital vs. Labor: Who Wins and Who Loses Under the Immigration Act of 1990?,
23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 789, 820-21 (1992) (positing "an overall trend in the U.S.,
wherein the free movement of goods, technology, and capital is valued over the free
movement of people" and arguing "protectionist policies ensure a captive, stagnant labor
pool for capitalists"); Ansley, Public Debate, supra note 31, at 364.
Unions are immobile in the sense that they do not automatically follow capital when it
moves to a new location. Often they are not even able to "follow" capital when it stays in
the same place but is taken over by new owners. Many workers face job loss today as a result
of, or at least in association with, some change in the structure or identity of the corporation
that employs them. A union does not necessarily maintain its status as recognized bargaining agent when an employing entity disappears in a takeover or restructuring, any more than
it has an automatic right to accompany transferred jobs to a new region or country.
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disadvantage, a disadvantage that management has been quick to exploit.
Such corporate behavior can, of course, be characterized in different ways.
What some see as brutal and destructive greed, others see as a necessary,
even desperate, response to competitive pressure, and still others would
characterize as a welcome, rational set of decisions that will help to move
the economy toward a freer and more efficient market.
In addition to workers and their organizations, governments as well are
often pressured to join a race to the bottom in order to hold or attract
industrial investment. 58 Governmental actors at the federal level worry
about economic competition with other jurisdictions and demonstrate
concern about holding and attracting investment capital within geopolitical
boundaries. For instance, during debates on the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN),59 which requires employers to give sixty days advance notice of plant closings under certain
circumstances, 60 opponents of mandatory notice argued that it was important to maintain a national "proinvestment" climate in order to keep and
increase investment in the United States. Interestingly, these opponents
must have presumed that our "peers" in this competition for capital are

A complex and not always very predictable body of law has grown up around the question
of when and to what extent successor corporations have a duty to recognize unions that were
recognized by their predecessors. However unpredictable the law may be in this regard, its
general drift has been such that two representatives of management can remark with evident
equanimity, "Fortunately for employers, the law of successorship recognizes the importance
to the economy of giving employers broad freedom to restructure or dispose of their
Raymond Wheeler & Patricia Murray, Mergers, Acquisitions & Takeovers:
businesses."
Labor Relations Consequences of Corporate Transactions, 7 LAB. LAW. 111, 134 (1991). See
generally Wilbur Daniels & Seth Kupferberg, Sale of Assets, Mergers and Acquisitions: A
Union View, in LABOR LAW & BUSINESS CHANGE 185 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel Collins
eds., 1988) [hereinafter LABOR LAW & BUSINESS CHANGE]; Marvin Dicker, Sale of Assets,
Mergers and Acquisition: A Management View, in LABOR LAW & BUSINESS CHANGE, supra, at
169.
58. See, e.g., Greg Gardner et al., Cities Battle to Keep Plants from GM Cuts; Incentives to
Carmakers Considered; Texas Workers Discuss Rule Changes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 20,
1991, at Al ("The bidding wars broke out Thursday as desperate communities scrambled to
Despite
preserve General Motors Corp. assembly plants that could be closed down ....
Stempel's assertion that he is not whipsawing plants against one another, the perception in
the plant communities is quite different."); Morrow, supra note 52, at Al ("It's the townspeople of Ypsilanti, Mich., versus the city folks from Arlington, Texas.... Both are determined
to win, with tax breaks and other concessions."). For later developments in the Ypsilanti
story, see infra notes 519-525. But see Bruce Nissen & Lynn Feekin, For the Public Good,
LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1992, at 19-20 (Labor and community groups successful in convincing
mayor of nearby town to refuse to offer an inducement package: "I can't see us offering
incentives for them to come here because I wouldn't want that to happen to any of our
companies.").
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (1988).
60. Id. § 2102.
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third world countries, because other industrialized nations have overwhelmingly embraced the mandatory notice idea. 6
The picture at the federal level is made more complex by the fact that
federal government actors pursue political and military foreign policy
objectives, not just economic ones. The United States assumption of the
role of international superpower, with the accompanying pressure for it to
play a stabilizing role in the global economy, and the associated blurring of
"national" and "global" interests, has complicated the calculus. Federal
decisionmakers must take more into account in policy development than
the health of the domestic economy.6 2
There is the further complication that many U.S. companies now function multinationally and are no longer tied to the fortunes of any particular
nation, although they are nevertheless interested in "their" government's
aid in pursuing extraterritorial investment on favorable terms. Numerous
federal statutes and regulations function to allow and sometimes reward
U.S. investment outside the United States. 63 These programs are some61. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Comparative Perspectives, in LABOR LAW & BUSINESS CHANGE,
supra note 57, at 139, 139-40 (comparing how changes in employment relations are handled
in Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, and Japan); Benjamin Aaron, Plant Closings: American
and Comparative Perspectives, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 941, 964 (1983) (arguing that U.S.
government should become more involved in regulating labor as is done in many foreign
countries); Donald Melville, The High Cost of Closing Operations in Europe, 8 DIRECTORS &
BOARDS 14, 15 (1983) (noting that Europe's labor laws require the payment of high
personnel indemnities when employees are laid off); Gerhard Picot, Closure of Plants and
Other Operational Companies in Western Germany, 16 INT'L Bus. LAW. 59, 59 (1988) (describing the many statutory requirements that West German law imposes on entrepreneurs
before permitting plants to close); Frances Raday, Individual and Collective Dismissal: A Job
Security Dichotomy, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 121, 132-33 (1989) (describing how the International
Labour Organisation and Europe consider job security a fundamental right and require
employer to show "just cause" or "fair reason" for an employee's dismissal); Library of
Congress, Foreign Factory Closings Legislation, Mar. 1987 (on file with author) (surveying
factory closing legislation in numerous industrialized and industrializing nations); see also
Bennett Harrison, The InternationalMovement for Prenotificationof Plant Closures, 23 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 387, 388 (1984) (noting that workers in Europe have the right to expect private
companies to act responsibly toward them). For a comparison of French and U.S. responses
to proposed plant closing legislation, see LAWRENCE ROTHSTEIN, PLANT CLOSINGS: POWER
POLITICS AND WORKERS

(1986).

62. See FRED BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER 140 (1977);
ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 365 (1987).
63. One example of a U.S. incentive program for off-shore investment is the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), which
authorizes the President to grant duty-free treatment for certain articles from eligible
countries in the Caribbean, thereby encouraging investment in Caribbean industries that
produce articles for export to the United States. See Richard Rothstein, Foreign Aid
Undercuts U.S. Jobs: Apparel Workers Lose Out to Assisted CaribbeanFactories, L.A. TIMES,
June 25, 1989, § V, at 5. Another example is the Puerto Rico and Possessions Tax Credit, 26
U.S.C. § 936 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990), which in proper circumstances grants U.S. corporations
a 100% tax credit on profits made in Puerto Rico and U.S. possessions. This tax provision is
credited with inducing a number of high-profit, capital intensive industries (most notably
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times defended as benevolence toward underdeveloped nations; at other
times they may be depicted as part of a strategy for enhancing the competitiveness of "our" corporations. The Bush Administration received much
criticism on this issue during the recent presidential campaign.6 4
The federal government displays a similar schizophrenia with regard to
direct foreign investment in the United States. On the one hand, leaders

are hungry for investment capital, regardless of its source. On the other
hand, many are queasy about the potential impact on national sovereignty.
The extent to which direct foreign investment by multinationals headquartered abroad is significantly different from investment by multinationals
headquartered in the United States is a question that has only begun to be
explored.65 Although the federal government's role in the international

competition to attract investment capital is in some ways analogous to the

drug manufacturers) to set up shop in Puerto Rico. For discussion of legal action surrounding the decision of one such manufacturer to shut down its Indiana plant, see infra text
accompanying note 397. For a strongly-voiced reminder that Puerto Rico stands in a
different relationship to the United States than independent sovereign nations, and that the
policy behind § 936 should be read in that light, see Rafael Herndndez Col6n, HurricaneBill
Threatens San Juan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1993, § 1, at 19.
64. See Keith Bradsher, Conferees Set to Rein in Foreign Aid Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1992, at A21 (reporting that House-Senate committee limited A.I.D.'s activities in promoting overseas relocation of U.S. companies); Michael Hinds, Workers Say U.S. Program Took
Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1992, at A8 (reporting that federal government provided
subsidies for U.S. factory to move from Decaturville, Tennessee to El Salvador); Barbara
Noble, Mapping Offshore Migration of Jobs: Is a FederalAgency Making It Easierfor American
Companies to Leave?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at F25 (reporting that researchers who
developed bogus company found that AID's policies encouraged them to set up plants
overseas); Richard Powelson, Sasser Lashes Bush Over Plant's Move: Tennessee Operation
Goes to El Salvador with Government Aid, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 1992, at Al
(reporting that Senator Sasser asked President Bush to explain why U.S. dollars helped
Decaturville factory move to El Salvador). Controversy over U.S. aid to off-shore investment
grew particularly fierce in the wake of a September 1992 report by the union-funded
National Labor Committee Education Fund in Support of Worker & Human Rights in
Central America. The report startled many U.S. readers by reproducing a 1991 advertisement from "Bobbin," an apparel trade publication, that announced: "Rosa Martinez
produces apparel for U.S. markets on her sewing machine in El Salvador. You can hire her
for 33-cents an hour." NATIONAL LABOR COMMITTEE EDUCATION FUND IN SUPPORT OF
WORKER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PAYING TO LOSE OUR JOBS 11 (1992).

It invited interested manufacturers to contact FUSADES, a "private, non-profit and nonpartisan organization promoting social and economic development in El Salvador." The
report went on to note that: (1) FUSADES was funded by grants from the U.S. Agency for
International Development and (2) the wages being touted were sufficient to cover only 15%
of the basic survival needs of a Salvadoran family. Id. at 11-15.
65. See Tim Wise, Is America for Sale? The Global Economy Hits Home, DOLLARS &
SENSE, Oct. 1990, at 6 (analyzing effect of foreign investment in United States). Compare
Robert B. Reich, Who Is Us? HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53 (Secretary of Labor
sets out a rationale for favoring foreign investment) with Candace Hawes, Transplants No
Cure: It's Time to Regulate Foreign Investment, DOLLARS & SENSE, July-Aug. 1991, at 16
(economist offers less sanguine view about foreign investment).
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role of state and local governments in the national competition for plants,
there are differences as well.
State and local governments are subject to severe competitive pressures
in the struggle to attract and retain capital investment. The "globalization"
of the economy coupled with a precipitously declining role in development
activities by the federal government 6 6 has left states and municipalities
unshielded and unfettered on a stage that is increasingly international.6 7
As one commentator has observed, "State, county and municipal governments increasingly are on their own in assisting ...local economies to
compete directly in the world economy. Regions of the United States used
to see themselves in competition with other regions of the country. Now,
they are also in competition with regions throughout the world." 6 8
This competition can be fierce whether it is across municipal, state, or
national boundaries. As state and local governments have scrambled to
join the "development" game, many of them have struggled to outbid each
other in making attractive offers to industry.69 Governments typically are
authorized by statute to assemble incentive packages, which may include

66. The trend away from federal help with economic development has been noted by
those primarily interested in developmental equity issues, as well as by those focusing on the
simple promotion of development. Two equity-oriented analysts remark, for instance, that
"[i]n light of growing federal budget deficits and general antagonism to expanded federal
economic efforts, state and local policies will become more important avenues [for racial
equity demands] for the future." John M. Jeffries & Richard McGahey, Equity, Growth and
SocioEconomic Change: Anti-DiscriminationPolicy in an Era of Economic Transformation, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 233, 272 (1984-85).
Similarly, a member of the development community observes: "Through the 1960s and
70s, states and localities have played an increasingly active role in economic development
activities, often with the lively encouragement and financial support of the federal government.
The 1980s, however, brought a new environment: federal participation in such programs
went into decline." John Peterson, Foreword to EDWARD V. REGAN, GOVERNMENT FIN.
RES. CTR., GOVERNMENT, INC.:

CREATING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMS V (1988).
67. See MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA 33-67 (1988) (discussing experience of states and municipalities in competing for foreign investment).
68. R. Scott Fosler, NATIONAL ASS'N OF COUNTIES, THE FUTURE ECONOMIC ROLE OF
COUNTIES 13 (1988) (report prepared for the Nat'l Ass'n of Counties, on file with author). A
few years ago the notion of "municipal foreign policy" surely would have sounded more like
a contrived oxymoron than anything else. Nowadays there is a Bulletin of MunicipalForeign
Policy, available from the Local Elected Officials Project of the Center for Innovative
Diplomacy in Irvine, California.
69. See, e.g., Winning the Game of 'Global Smokestack Chasing,' N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992,
at D6 [hereinafter Smokestacks] (quoting executive vice-president of the South Carolina
Chamber of Commerce, S. Hunter Howard, Jr., reporting that in his state, "We've reduced
the corporate income tax rate from 6 to 5 percent, the lowest rate in the Southeast and one
of the lowest in the country .... ); see also Ferdinand Protzman, South Carolina Plant Is
Planned for BMW, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at D1 (reporting that BMW investment in
South Carolina spurred by state legislature's offer of $150 million in tax breaks and
investment inducements).
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tax breaks, industrial development bonds, infrastructure improvements,
and more.7 ° The volume of such public contributions to corporate welfare
has been on the rise, 7 even while their effectiveness at generating or
maintaining employment has been challenged with increasing sophistication from within and without the development establishment.7 2
The most flamboyant examples of local competition for economic development involve the public 73 courtship of a large out-of-state or out-ofcountry7 4 manufacturer. 7 If the courting is successful, then with much
fanfare and hoopla the lucky governmental winner of the bidding war
70. See, e.g., Smokestacks, supra note 69 ("[I]ncentives known to have been offered [to
BMW by South Carolina] total $145 million," including tax law changes and cash outlays to
purchase the factory site.). Incentives may be offered to hold onto production as well as to
attract them. See John Berger, New York State Is Making Last Minute Incentive Offer in Effort
to Save G.M. Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1993, at B1.
71. See Jeffries & McGahey, supra note 66, at 272 (citing Urban Institute study for fact
that $19.3 billion in new industrial revenue bonds were issued as long ago as 1981).
72. One observer of state and local governments recounts: "At first, counties relied on
the traditional 'economic development' tools of financial incentives, tax abatements, and
promotional activities to attract new firms. But over the past decade, the most effective
jurisdictions have learned that attracting new business is a limited and frequently inefficient
way to strengthen local economies." Fosler, supra note 68, at 9.
73. It is probably important to qualify what I mean by "public" in this context. There is a
great deal of publicity surrounding certain aspects of the economic development process, but
significant silence and secrecy at other junctures. For instance, in Tennessee the records of
the Department of Economic and Community Development were not declared to be subject
to "the principle of open records" until 1988. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-730(a) (1991).
Gaping holes in the principle remain. For example, the statute provides an exemption for a
record "of such a sensitive nature that its disclosure or release would seriously harm the
ability of this state to compete ...

for economic . . . development."

Id. § 4-3-730(b)(c)(1).

Pressure for secrecy in economic development activities generally remains strong. See, e.g,
Michael O'Connor, 1988's Development Groups: More Sophisticated Services, Increased Assistance and Ironclad Confidentiality, in INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT & SITE SELECTION HANDBOOK 294 passim (1988). Calls for confidentiality are based in part on legitimate concerns

such as the avoidance of costly episodes in land speculation. On the other hand, members of
the public have a strong interest in access to information about their own state and local
government's economic-development activities, and government should assume their right to
participate in public discussion about development alternatives.
74. The New York Times recently described the growing importance of foreign auto
makers' "transplant" factories in the United States, observing that the trend has "unleashed
fierce competition among states to lure transplant operations with financial incentives."
Dovon P. Levin, 'Transplant' CarMakers Redefine the Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at
D7.
75. The process has been known to produce such unseemly spectacles as the Phil Donahue broadcast that featured six nattily dressed governors of six great states of the union,
each making his own personal teleplea to General Motors and explaining why GM should
locate its Saturn plant in his state. Phil Donahue Show: Governors and G.M. 's Saturn Project
(nationally syndicated broadcast, Feb. 26, 1985). Readers can treat themselves to photos of
this memorable event in John Russo, Saturn's Rings: What GM's Saturn Project Is Really
About, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1986, at 66, 66-75, which also quotes from one of the 200,000
begging letters sent by residents and school children of the Youngstown-Warren area to
Roger B. Smith, then Chairman of General Motors.

1993]

LAW, POVERTY, AND AMERICA'S ERODING INDUSTRIAL BASE

1781

ushers the corporate bridegroom into its new home, amid rosy promises of
future employment and economic growth, and with ample photo opportunities for the players who count.76 After the honeymoon, many localities
unfortunately find the marriage falls short of their original hopes and
expectations. 7 7
Too many states and localities are currently engaged in the "race to the
bottom." They are competing for how much they can arrange for their
local citizens to give away in subsidies, lower wages, and damage to the
environment, not how much they can be sure of gaining in return; they are
competing for how fearful and meagerly paid, not how skilled and secure,
the work force of their state or area is going to be.7 8 Admittedly, local
76. The lure of this publicity has a tendency to distort the decisionmaking process, even
within the goals and value systems of most state economic developers. The short-sightedness
of its appeal is what seems to render Edward Regan, Comptroller of the State of New York,
for instance, unable to resist repeated acid references to "ribbon cutting" as the mode of the
day. REGAN, supra note 66, at 6. For one of Mr. Regan's suggestions for remedies, see supra
text accompanying note 425.
For one example of a group of people who found that they most emphatically did not
count at ribbon-cutting and photo-opportunity time, see POLETOWN LIVES! (Information
Factory Inc., Detroit, Michigan, 1983) (film showing use of eminent domain against a Polish
neighborhood in Detroit to make way for a GM factory). Because the Poletown saga
involved use of Detroit's eminent domain power to assemble a factory site for General
Motors, it occasioned substantial legal commentary. See, e.g., David Aladjem, Public Use and
Treatment as an Equal: An Essay on Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671 (1988); John Bukowczyx, The
Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs. G.M. and the City of Detroit, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (1984); Laura Mansnerus, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial
Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409 (1983); Peter Millspaugh, Eminent
Domain: Is It Getting Out of Hand?, 11 REAL EST. L.J. 99 (1982-83); Emily Lewis, Comment,
Corporate Prerogative, "Public Use" and a People's Plight: Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 907. For further discussion of eminent domain as a
response to threatened plant closings, see infra at 276.
77. See, e.g., Carter Garber, Saturn: Tomorrow's Jobs, Yesterday's Myths, in COMMUNITIES
IN ECONOMIC CRISIS 175, 182-84 (John Gaventa et al. eds., 1990) (describing "miscalculated"
benefits to Spring Hill, Tennessee when it recruited Saturn plant).
78. The Corporation for Enterprise Development is constructing an interesting tool to
combat what it sees as the short-sightedness of the typical "smokestack-chasing" approach.
This group has developed a rating system designed to function as a critique of and alternative to the widely-recognized Grant Thornton index, which annually rates the "business
climate" of each U.S. state. In THE CORPORATION FOR ENTERPRISE DEV., MAKING THE
GRADE: THE DEVELOPMENT REPORT CARD FOR THE STATES

(1987), the Corporation makes

the point that the old business climate formula, built around tax breaks, lax health and safety
standards, low wages, and minimal worker benefits, results in
an economy based heavily on industries at the very tail end of the product cycle, where ... education and skill requirements are low, and where least-cost production, determined primarily by tax and wage rates, is the primary goal. What you get is the Koreanization of industry.
What you get is the economy of Singapore. Or Taiwan. Scoring high on an index based
upon this formula is a public declaration that you have a Third World economy. Indexes that
emphasize these factors are not indexes of economic attractiveness, they are indexes of
economic impoverishment.
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governments are often responding to forces over which they have little
control. 79 Nevertheless, even within current parameters, a more democratic and egalitarian understanding of development, both as a goal and as
a process, would suggest a very different approach.8"
E. THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The changes taking place in our national and global economies are
open-ended and fraught with possibilities. Traditional American economic dominance and popular isolationism are being challenged in new
and powerful ways, and such challenges can sometimes produce ugly
results. Given the increased hate group activity and xenophobia that exist,
it is not fanciful to worry that deindustrialization might feed a backlash
against those pushing for more opportunities for the poor; more access for
the excluded; and other changes in racial, ethnic, and gender hierarchies.
The recent rise in violence directed against various target groups is
well-documented."1 Such outbreaks frequently track in time and place the
declining economic fortunes of working class whites, as well as other

Id. at 7. The Corporation has developed a more complex formula that stresses job quality, a
highly educated work force, vigorous antidiscrimination and affirmative action norms, flexible entrepreneurship, rapid development and deployment of new technologies, finding
market niches, and custom crafting products and services. Id. at 9-12. In practical terms,
the results of these two approaches are vastly different. For instance, a state like Tennessee
would tend to do well on the Grant Thornton index, while a state like Minnesota would tend
to do poorly. By contrast, Tennessee got a flunking grade on each of the four indices
developed by the Corporation for Enterprise Development in its 1987 report card, while
Minnesota got an A in three categories and a B in the fourth. Id. at 14, 24, 36, 48. (By 1990,
Tennessee had improved itself to three D's and one A. See Tennessee Officials Dispute Their
Economic Report Card, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 1990, at C5.).
79. For a view that the federal government could take meaningful steps to reduce this
local and regional bidding war, see Dan Swinney, Economic Development Wars and a Lack of
Leadership, CHI. TRIB., July 5, 1989, § 1, at 13.
80. See, e.g., GITA SEN & CAREN GROWN, DEVELOPMENT, CRISES, & ALTERNATIVE VISIONS:
THIRD WORLD WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES 78-96 (1987) (proposing "alternative visions, strategies, and methods").
81. See JAMES RIDGEWAY, BLOOD IN THE FACE: THE Ku KLUX KLAN, ARYAN NATIONS,
NAZI SKINHEADS, & THE RISE OF A NEW WHITE CULTURE (1991) (discussing the evolution of
the racist right); Elinor Langer, The American Neo-Nazi Movement Today, THE NATION, July
16-23, 1990, at 82 (discussing modern manifestations of racial tension, including "skinheads"
and various white supremacist groups); see also KATHLEEN M. BLEE, WOMEN AND THE KLAN:
RACISM AND GENDER IN THE 1920's (1992) (discussing women's participation and roles in
the Ku Klux Klan).
These developments are not confined to the United States. Recent stories of violence
directed at perceived outsiders by economically distressed Europeans sound an ominous
note. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, Rumormongers in Calais Mirror a Demonic Time, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1992, at A3 (describing disturbances in housing project in France, triggered by
rumors of Tunisian man's misconduct); Stephen Kinzer, German Violence Worries Investors,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1993, at A3 (describing effects of neo-Nazis on investors' concerns).
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cultural and economic shifts that cause people to feel threatened by forces
that seem beyond their control. The epidemic of family violence directed
primarily against women and children also seems to bear at least some
significant relationship to the economic climate. 2
Despite the dangers, the changes in our national and global economies
also open up opportunities. A global economy creates all kinds of opportunity for greater understanding and solidarity across many boundaries of
race, gender, language, culture, and geography. American and Third
World workers are increasingly employed by the same entities, confronted
with the same explanations for the hardships they experience in daily life,
and are in a position to see more clearly than ever before their common
83
problems and interests.
Interpenetrations are occurring on many levels. American capital flows
abroad.8 4 Foreign investments flow into the United States. 5 American

82. A professor at East Tennessee State University reports on a series of studies of family
violence in southwest Virginia. She notes that the father's employment status is a powerful
variable. "Thirty-four percent of the unemployed group reported abuse in comparison to 19
percent when father was employed." Peggy Cantrell, Victims of Their Families, Now &
THEN: THE APPALACHIAN MAGAZINE, Summer 1991, at 6, 7.
83. Two labor publications have devoted entire issues to this theme. See generally Midwest Center for Labor Research, Solidarity Across Borders, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1989;
BEYOND BORDERS: A FORUM FOR LABOR IN ACTION AROUND THE GLOBE,

Winter 1992.

84. Worldwide Trends in Foreign Direct Investment, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992) (statement of Karl Sauvant, Chief of the Research and Policy Analysis Branch
in the Transnational Corporations and Management Division of the U.N. Dep't. of Economic and Social Development) (unpublished testimony, on file with The Georgetown Law
Journal). Sauvant estimates a 1991 outflow of direct foreign investment from the U.S. of $29
billion. Id. at 4, tbl. 2. He also notes that "direct production [abroad] by TNC's [transnational corporations] is by far a more important means of serving overseas markets than trade."
Id. at 14. John Kline offered testimony at the same hearings to the effect that "foreign
investment is the most important force shaping the world economy that will take us into the
twenty-first century," that "foreign direct investment flows grew two and one-half times
faster than exports," and that the "U.S. national interest now encompasses the concerns of
being both the world's largest home and host country to foreign direct investment." Id. at 1
(statement of John M. Kline, Deputy Director, Karl F. Landegger Program in Int'l Business
Diplomacy, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service); see also Robert Blecker &
William Spriggs, Manufacturing Employment in North America: Where the Jobs Have
Gone (1992) (briefing paper prepared for the Economic Policy Institute, on file with
author).
85. This influx has caused no small sense of alarm. One commentator is worried about the
impact of foreign investment and the lack of a strong federal policy to limit it: "[T]he states
now lead the nation in shaping foreign investment policy-unimpeded and quietly encouraged by the federal government .... As a group, the governors have brushed aside warnings
that the growing level of foreign investment may restrict domestic production ...national
interests can expect to remain secondary .... TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 67, at 34,
48; see also supra note 84 (discussing debate on direct foreign investment in U.S.).
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jobs go to super-exploited Third World workers. 86 Super-exploited Third
World workers come to American jobs.8 7 These kinds of changes are
disorienting and can produce fearful reactions, but may also create new
friends. Much will depend on whether those interested in the welfare of
poor and working people can develop and communicate an effective critique of economic arrangements and policies, and can convincingly articulate an alternative to them. The text that follows will describe a number of
legal responses to plant closings, first offering an account of the background rules that govern the employment relation. Although the picture
that emerges from this description is not a cheerful one for workers or for
communities immediately dependent on manufacturing, it is my hope that
implicit in the picture will be elements of a collaborative critique and
alternative vision that could help turn some of the threats posed by this
8
fluid and volatile time into opportunities for greater economic justice.
86. I intend "super-exploited" to serve as a descriptive term here, not an epithet. For a
demonstration that the low levels of third world wages do not correspond to low levels of
productivity, see WALTER R. MEAD, THE Low WAGE CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL GROWTH:
THE LABOR-COST-PRODUCTIVITY IMBALANCE IN NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 14-21

(1990) (a publication of the Economic Policy Institute in Washington, D.C.). The gap
between productivity and wages, so much larger in newly industrializing countries than in the
northern countries, is influenced by two factors. First, the high unemployment rates and the
large traditional sectors that characterize newly industrializing economies exert a strong and
persistent drag on wages there. Second, repressive practices by governments and employers
alike, often violative of internationally recognized standards of worker rights, are distressingly widespread. See INTERNATIONAL LAB. RTS. EDUC. & RES. FUND, TRADE'S HIDDEN

(1988) (noting "substandard,
and in some cases subhuman," workers' conditions in much of the Third World); DAN
COSTS: WORKER RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 28
LABOTZ, MASK OF DEMOCRACY:

LABOR SUPPRESSION IN MEXICO TODAY (1992) (discussing

poor working conditions in Mexico); Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the
International Economy: Clarifying Policies and Interests, 31 B.C. L. REv. 31 (1989) (noting
"the virtual absence of regulations protecting workers" in developing countries); Susan
Chira, Motorola's Labor War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1989, at C1 (discussing working conditions in South Korea); Rebecca Greenwald et al., Labor Rights Activists at Risk, WORKER
RTS. NEWS, Summer 1992, at 6 (discussing conditions in El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, China,
etc.); Haiti: Can Justice Reclaim the Agenda? BEYOND BORDERS, Winter 1992, at 10
(discussing conditions in Haiti); Richard Rothstein, Malay-Away Plan, L.A. WEEKLY, July
19-25, 1991, at 14, 15 (discussing conditions in Malaysia).
87. See, e.g., Gary Moore, Labor Daze: The Global Labor Pool Comes to Memphis,
Speaking Spanish and Working Like Hell, MEMPHIS FLYER, June 11-17, 1992, at 9.
88. I do not mean to suggest that the alternative vision is fully elaborated. Far from it. If
unrestricted capital mobility is a social evil, as I believe it is, it does not follow that
mandatory capital immobility is a social good. Clearly the health of the world economy and
the quality of life of the world's people depend in important part on the movement of capital
and the exchange of goods and services. So the argument here is not for a command
economy. The argument will suggest, however, that achieving democratic political controls
over capital is of crucial significance. The extent of those controls, the degree to which they
are made an open subject of political discourse, their substantive content, and the ways in
which different groups of people can participate in shaping and evaluating them are very
much in question. I claim no blueprint. It is my intention here to tell stories, raise
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LEGAL RESPONSES TO PLANT CLOSINGS

People hit by plant closings have searched for effective ways to respond.
Although not all reactions have involved direct recourse to law,8 9 many of
the responses have been "legal" ones, in that they have attempted to
invoke the power of the state. These responses have called on the state in
two ways: first, to limit the freedom of employers to withdraw productive
resources from workers and communities, and second, to gain participation rights for workers and communities in decisions involving major
productive resources.
A.

BACKGROUND RULES

The legal responses to plant closings have taken place against a remarkably unfavorable backdrop. The prevailing rules that governed employment in the era of deindustrialization offered few protections to workers
facing mass layoffs, and displayed an ideological orientation that was
notably hostile to notions of managerial accountability to, or participation
in, decisionmaking by employees or communities.
The background rules are multifaceted. Common-law, statutory, and
administrative schemes overlap, complement, and sometimes contradict
each other, and most are capable of being altered by specific contractual
deals between and among particular players. Despite this complexity, the
overall pattern of these rules sets much of the tone of employer-employee
debates and is a major determinant of the bargaining strength of the
respective parties. The background rules thereby help to determine not
only the outcome of formal legal disputes, but also the substance of
specific deals that are struck outside of court by "private" parties.
Each of the schemes-common-law, statutory, and administrative-is
changing over time, has its own dynamic, and is affected by changes in the
national and international economy. Commentators have insightfully and
convincingly demonstrated the open texture of labor and employment law,
the existence and persistence of contradictory impulses and possibilities
within it, and the availability of traditions and concepts that could provide
radically greater power and protection to workers and communities in
problems, and suggest solutions that will be of interest to a group of readers whose views on
this matter range fairly widely. There is plenty of room for concern and debates on grounds
that include equity, liberation, environmental protection, efficiency, and more about the
resources currently being wasted, the valuable networks being dismantled, the knowledge
and skills being unplugged from any productive outlet.
89. By this I mean that many responses have consisted of public campaigns and direct
action of various kinds. But all the responses have been "legal" in the sense of being
mediated in important ways by the surrounding legal rules, and all of them have been
"nonlegal" in the sense of having important components that depended more on public
support, organization, and the political climate than on the text of some case or statute.
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conflict with those who own or manage productive resources.9" Despite
their open texture, however, most of this background law, at least as
interpreted and enforced, is extraordinarily unfriendly or indifferent to
workers and communities facing plant closings.
The common law of the employment relationship illustrates the point.
The employment-at-will doctrine gave "employer and employee alike"'"
the freedom to terminate the relationship at will.92 Boiled down to memorable aphorism, the doctrine has meant that an employee hired for' 9 3an indefinite
at all. "
term could be fired for "good cause, bad cause, or no cause
The common law, of course, is not the whole story. In the early twentieth century, state legislative reforms sought to establish a limited and
uneven statutory "floor" of workplace rights, which would be guaranteed
irrespective of individual bargains between employers and employees. At
an early stage, however, many of these reforms were successfully challenged by employers as unconstitutionally destructive of the freedom of
and employees to make or reject individual deals as they
employers
"chose." 9 4 Lochner v. New York95 led a series of cases in which the

90. For an analysis of available traditions in property law that could support greater
worker and community leverage in plant-closing situations, see Joseph Singer, The Reliance
Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). For an analysis of the National Labor
Relations Act's potential to have served as an instrument of industrial democracy (along
with part of the history that at least until now appears to have blocked that potential) see
Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
91. This particular touted symmetry reveals much about the difficulties with the law's
aspirations to "neutrality." In case some readers are not familiar with Anatole France's
memorable aphorism on this subject, I cannot resist invoking it here: "The law, in its
majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets, and to steal bread." JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 548 (4th ed. 1990) (quoting Anatole France, Le Lys Rouge, ch. 7 (1894)).
92. Employment-at-will was the rule at one time in Europe as well, but began eroding
there much sooner than in the United States. In France, for instance, legislation recognized
as early as 1890 that some unilateral dismissals might lead to damage claims. Roland
Voize-Valayre, The French Law of Unjust Dismissals, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 519, 524
(1991). Since 1973, by statute in France, an employer must show "genuine and serious
cause" ("le caractrre reel et srrieux des motifs invoqurs par l'employeur"). Id. at 543 n.118.
For a view that levels of worker militancy and union politicization are important explanations for the differences between the plant closing laws of the two countries, see LAWRENCE
ROTHSTEIN, PLANT CLOSINGS: POWER, POLITICS AND WORKERS 167-85 (1986). For a review
of Rothstein's book challenging these conclusions, see Mary Ann Glendon, Book Review, 9
COMP. LAB. L.J. 336-42 (1988).
93. See Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Ctr., 784 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tenn. 1990) (rejecting public policy exception to at-will doctrine).
94. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) ("[T]he employer and the employ6
have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interfer" (quoting Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174
ence with the liberty of contract ....
(1908))).
95. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Supreme Court struck down a range of state statutory reforms, such as
maximum hour 96 and minimum wage 97 legislation as violative of the constitutional rights' 9 8of employers and employees to contract "free" of
"interference. "
Congressional efforts at the federal level at first fared no better: The
Child Labor Act, aimed at limiting the age and hours of working children,
was struck down as an unwarranted federal interference in matters of local
authority. 99 The National Industrial Recovery Act, passed in the early
years of the Depression, suffered a similar fate.100 A changed complement
of justices, however, sitting in the midst of the nation's most severe
economic depression altered course. The Court eventually made it clear
that it would no longer invalidate such statutes, and that the New Dealthe most far-reaching experiment in welfare and labor law reform since
Reconstruction-could proceed without entrenched judicial resistance.1 " 1
The Supreme Court's move away from its earlier view that government
could not constitutionally "intrude" into the presumptively free and natural world of employer-employee bargains was a watershed constitutional
event, whose meaning is still hotly contested.10 2 The present vigor of "free

96. Id. at 61 (invalidating statute limiting the hours of bakers to 10 hours a day or 60 hours
a week "as an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and
employ6s, to make contracts.., upon such terms as they may think best").
97. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 566 (1923).
98. These cases were accompanied by others that made exceptions for those whom the
Court held were either too specially endangered or too inherently weak to be able to bargain
effectively for themselves. Thus, in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), the Court refused
to strike down protective legislation covering workers in mines, smelters, and refineries in
which extreme occupational hazards implicated public health norms in an unusual way that
could justify otherwise impermissible interference with the master-servant relationship. Id.
at 395. Similarly, in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), the Court upheld a statute that
imposed maximum hours for women workers on the grounds that women's biological
make-up rendered them abnormally weak and vulnerable. Id. at 421-23. A few years later in
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), the Court even upheld a gender-neutral limitation
on certain factory hours, failing to cite or distinguish Lochner. But in 1923 Adkins, 261 U.S.
525, ringingly reaffirmed Lochner and also held that despite Miller, women's "difference" in
that instance was insufficient reason to justify a minimum wage for women, given the other
principles at stake. Id. at 553.
99. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918).
100. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935).
101. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act, whose very fabric embraced and protected collective bargaining, in some ways the antithesis of the kind of individual "freedom of contract" so vociferously defended in cases like Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937), the Court signaled the end of the Lochner-Adkins era by
upholding a Washington statute that set a minimum wage for women.
102. For an introduction to this contest, and an argument that the Court's rejection of
Lochner is best (but not most often) interpreted as a substantive and not merely procedural
one, see Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1830 (1987). The recent
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market" ideology indicates that these issues are still live ones. The ReaganBush era made it clear that the meaning of the repudiation of Lochner and
its siblings was forcefully back on our collective agenda.1 0 3 As Karl Klare
has observed, "Contemporary free marketeers have launched what is in
essence a pre-Realist attack on New Deal market reconstruction."' 4 Free
market purists took something of a beating in the 1992 presidential election.
As public discussions of government economic policy increase in quantity
and in sophistication, 0 5 the claim that U.S. business and the U.S. government are distinct entities inhabiting separate spheres should seem even
more implausible at present. Nevertheless, an influx of industrial policy
wonks in Washington is unlikely to end the argument, or the power of free
market imagery in our political discourse.10 6
In some ways, recent international developments have strengthened the
old free market religion and given it a new field on which to play. The
economy is going global in a world no longer divided into capitalist and
socialist blocs, a world in which the breathtaking sweep of multinational
investment faces few barriers. Trends toward privatization, deregulation,
and transnational mobility of investment capital are accelerating. Many of
the fundamental assumptions and images embedded in cases like Lochner
are now showing themselves to be particularly potent in an arena where

landmark abortion case certainly treats Lochner and the story of its demise as canonical on

the issue of stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992).
103. For a sweeping challenge to many post-Lochner assumptions, see generally Richard
A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983).
104. Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy and Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal
Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1988).

105. President Clinton has made it clear thus far, through events like his pre-Inaugural
two-day televised economics discussion, that he wants at least to air and display something of

the complexity of the issues facing the private and governmental managers of the economy.
See Clinton's Economic Summit in Little Rock, Arkansas, (C-Span television broadcast, Dec.
14 & 15, 1992).

106. Kenneth Casebeer points out that the vision of the "natural" employment relationship in cases like Lochner and Coppage was never really rejected or transcended even during
the New Deal and its aftermath, despite changing views about the permissible scope of
regulation. Kenneth M. Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and
At-Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 767 (1985) ("[T]he Coppage image of

the organization of the labor market continues to influence both common law doctrines and
statutory interpretation governing employment, even though the case is anathema within our
ordinary constitutional jurisprudence."); see also James B. Atleson, Management Prerogatives,
Plant Closings and the NLRA, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 83 (1982-83) ("[Ilmplicit

values ... found in common law decisions... suggest[] that as far as judges are concerned,
the revolution of the 1930s ... accomplished much less than is usually believed"); Morton J.
Horwitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427 (1982)

("No advanced legal thinker of [1940], I am certain, would have predicted that forty years
later the public/private dichotomy would still be alive and, if anything, growing in influence.").
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capital has overshadowed national sovereignty and "free trade" is seen by
many as the ticket to a golden future."17
Nonetheless, however contested their genesis, and however uneven the
social consensus that emerged about their justification and legitimacy,
legislative schemes of the New Deal and since have greatly altered common law rules regarding the employer's ability to discharge workers. The
Wagner Act, °8 for instance, made it illegal for an employer to fire an
employee for engaging in collective bargaining or other "concerted activity"
for mutual aid or protection or for belonging to a labor union. 9 Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964110 made it illegal for covered employers to

fire a worker because of her race, gender, national origin, or religion.' 1 '
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)11 2 made it illegal to fire
an employee for asserting her right to complain about and seek remediation of workplace hazards." 3 Perhaps most importantly, the National

Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' 14 in guaranteeing the right of unions to
bargain collectively over terms and conditions of employment,1 15 made it
possible for workers to seek and obtain rules whereby an employer could
dismiss an employee only for good cause. This foundational protection
from arbitrary job loss, retaliation, and employer favoritism is indispensable to any enjoyment of personal security, civil rights, or civil liberties in
the workplace. Good cause limitation on dismissal is a virtually universal

107. Questions of international trade and economic development are intimately related to
deindustrialization in the advanced economies of the North, and are likely to have a big
impact on poverty around the world in the coming decades. They are, however, beyond the
scope of this article. Some critical references include: AN NGO GUIDE TO TRADE AND
FINANCE IN THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM (Michael McCoy ed., 1989); KIM MOODY & MARY
MCGINN, UNIONS AND FREE TRADE: SOLIDARITY VS. COMPETITION (1992); TRADING FREEDOM: How FREE TRADE AFFECTS OUR LIVES, WORK AND ENVIRONMENT (John Cavanagh et
al. eds., 1992); CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY ROUND
AND THE THIRD WORLD (1990); North American Congress on Latin America, The New
Gospel: North American Free Trade, REP. ON THE AMERICAS, May 1991, at 9. For a more
celebratory treatment, see GARY HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992). For a thought-provoking collection of

essays in which a group of economists-with virtually no explicit reference to law or legal
ideology-debates the efficacy of labor standards for developing countries, see U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Stephen Herzenberg & Jorge Perez-Lopez eds., 1990).

108. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
109. Id. §§ 157, 158(a)(1).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
111. Id. § 2000e-2.
112. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).

113. Id. § 651.
114. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
115. Id. §§ 157, 158(a)(5).
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feature of collective bargaining agreements today.'1 6 Thus, the statutory
regimes and contractual and customary practices of the New Deal began

to offer greater (though still far from universal) protection for employees
from arbitrary discharge than the common law afforded.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the judge-made background rules began to
change in ways that brought them into closer alignment with the rules
governing "neighboring" statutory schemes. This movement was in part a
response to the pressure of the compelling fairness-in-discharge norms of
adjacent regimes like OSHA, Title VII, and contracts negotiated under
the NLRA. It was likely affected by actual industrial practice and more
diffuse social attitudes as well. 11 7 The employment-at-will doctrine began
eroding in many jurisdictions in favor of rulings that protected workers on
common law tort or contract theories, at least in the minimal exercise of
statutory rights and publicly sanctioned obligations. 1 8 In some jurisdictions, courts imposed good faith requirements on employers who discharged employees, at least in the proper circumstances, such as a longterm relationship, with justifiable reliance by the employee.11 9

116. It is worth noting that in other Western industrialized countries comparable protection is afforded to all employees by the statute. See supra note 61.
117. Many scholars did what they could to encourage these developments. See, e.g.,
Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) (arguing for tort remedy for
abusive discharges of at-will employees). But see Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract
at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (suggesting the usefulness of contracts at will in
certain areas of contract resolution).
118. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal. 1980) (finding
tort action existed when employee fired for failing to participate in an illegal price fixing
scheme); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 441 (Tenn. 1984) (finding a common
law cause of action for retaliatory discharge when employee fired for exercising rights under
the state's workers' compensation law). Evolution of Tennessee's new cause of action since
Clanton has been uneven. Compare Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Ctr., 784 S.W.2d 921,
922-23 (Tenn. 1990) (refusing to extend Clanton to cover employee fired for giving testimony
at administrative hearing regarding a fellow-employee's claim for unemployment compensation) with Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn. 1992) (upholding award of
punitive damages to employee fired as a result of jury service, despite existence of more
limited statutory remedies under legislation enacted after Clanton decision) and Moskal v.
First Tennessee Bank, 815 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (finding cause of action for
employee who refused to forge documents and was fired for her refusal), appeal denied,
(June 10, 1991).
119. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329 (1981) (finding breach of
contract action existed when length of employment and other circumstances gave rise to an
implied promise requiring good cause for termination); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); cf. Randolph v. Dominion Bank, 826 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991) (refusing to find an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract
for employment-at-will despite recently announced judge-made remedy for retaliatory discharge in Tennessee). For an argument in favor of broad employee protection from at-will
dismissal, see Cornelius J. Peck, PenetratingDoctrinal Camouflage: Understandingthe Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge,66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 772-73 (1991).
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These common-law protections could reach more broadly than the
patchwork statutory schemes.120 The latter were limited, for instance, in
the number of employers they covered, in the classes of workers they
protected, and in the types of arbitrariness or favoritism they forbade. 2 '
On the other hand, the common-law protections were weaker in that they
displayed a marked tendency to protect privileged workers more effectively
than less privileged ones.1 22 In many cases the new protections were
premised on express or implied promises more likely to be extended to
those in the higher than in the lower ranks of the work force. Further,
because of the pay-based remedies involved and the lack of statutory
attorney fees in common law actions, there was much greater incentive for
lawyers to take cases involving recoveries for high-salary executives than
for low-wage workers.
All of the worker protections, whether statutorily imposed, 123 won
through collective bargaining, or born in the continuing evolution of the
common law, were of negligible help to employees faced with plant closings, 1 24 because they were aimed primarily at individual job lOSS. 125 The

120. For a schematic overview of the status of employment-at-will in various jurisdictions
in 1992, see Employment at Will: State Rulings Chart, [Individual Employees Rights Manual]
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) Tab 505, at 51-52 (1992). It should be noted that in recent years
some of the more expansive rulings have been reined in. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
254 Cal. Rptr. (1988) (restricting prior case law and declaring that tort damages are not
available for breach of implied covenant in employment setting).
121. Nevertheless, common-law protections developed quite narrowly in some jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Harney, 784 S.W.2d, at 921-23 (refusing to find common-law cause of action for
retaliatory discharge when at-will employee was discharged after giving testimony unfavorable to her employer at an administrative hearing).
122. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 467 (1992) ("[A]II but middle and upper
income employees are largely foreclosed from any access to a remedy for wrongful dismissal.").
123. In a number of jurisdictions, statutory solutions have been proposed in the wake of
common law developments. A persuasive case has been made for the proposition that such
statutory proposals evolved as much to contain and rationalize the future development of
such remedies in the interest of employers as to guarantee such remedies to employees. See
Alan Kreuger, The Evolution of Unjust-DismissalLegislation in the United States, 44 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 644 (1991) (discussing legislation passed in Montana and proposed in
several other states). Of course, statutes vary widely, as do their supporters, and proposals
for unjust dismissal statutes have come from various quarters. See Gary Minda & Katie R.
Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137 (1989)
(arguing that New York common law of employment at will has not changed and that a
statute is therefore needed); Summers, supra note 122, at 459-60 (discussing state and
federal wrongful dismissal statutes); Clyde W. Summers, IndividualProtection against Unjust
Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484 (1976) (suggesting statute governing
dismissal practice that would cover employees not included in collective agreements).
124. Summers, supra note 122, at 471.
125. For observers on the right, an individualist bent may well be a sign of superiority.
Charles Fried, for instance, argues that the NLRA, with its collectivist cast, is outmoded.
Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current
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antidiscrimination and antiretaliation principles embedded in various rules
were geared primarily to protect individuals. 26 The development of
"wrongful discharge" as an actionable workplace tort or contractual breach
127
also focused on the rights of individual workers.
State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1037 (1984). On the other
hand, David Dominguez cogently criticizes the highly individualistic cast of many current
approaches to just-cause job protection, and proposes a statutory solution more sensitive to
the need for collective job security. David Dominguez, Just Cause Protection: Will the
Demise of Employment at Will Breathe New Life Into Collective Job Security, 28 IDAHO L.
REV. 283 (1991-92).

126. Of course, to the extent that protection of individual workers from discriminatory
treatment empowers them to function as more effective leaders of the larger group, the
distinction between individual antidiscrimination norms and collective empowerment norms
is a false one. It may be easiest to see this in the context of the National Labor Relations
Act, which is so often invoked to protect against firings carried out during organizing
campaigns, but it is also important to remember the group ferment out of which the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was born, and the collective shop floor agitation that has often been part
of the story in individual race discrimination cases, though these issues may get relegated to
the status of a "background matter" in the reported opinion. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (when black applicant claimed that he was not hired
because of his race, employer claimed that denial was based on applicant's illegal activity
directed at employer as part of large-scale collective protest against employer's alleged
discrimination). Much in our national history would suggest that putting an end to discrimination against nonwhite individuals would go a long way toward ensuring more power for
workers as a whole, because it would deprive employers of an instrument of division and
control that has been wielded with great success against American workers in the past.
Winning either popular or judicial recognition of such a view is, however, another matter.
See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975)
(holding that the NLRA does not protect concerted activity by minority employees to
bargain with their employer over discrimination issues because such concerted activity
bypasses their bargaining representative).
127. One group of dislocated workers has attempted to expand an individual wrongful
discharge scheme to cover a mass layoff. When garment workers in San Antonio became
convinced that their plant had been targeted for layoffs in part because of the high incidence
of workers' compensation claims generated from their facility, they claimed that their
employer had violated a Texas statute that forbade the firing of an employee in retaliation
for filing a workers' compensation claim. The Fifth Circuit upheld dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint, Fuerza Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs have
requested rehearing. Fuerza Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. 92-5544 (5th Cir. filed Apr. 9,
1993) (appellants' petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en banc).
It appears that plaintiffs are attempting to extend a statutory wrongful discharge action
that was almost certainly conceived in individualist terms, to cover a case beyond its
originally intended reach. As the federal district court noted in its order:
[I]f an employer violated [the anti-retaliation statute] by closing a plant due to costs
which, in part, include the cost of workers' compensation benefits, then no employer in Texas would be able to make any economic decision without exposure to
[statutory] liability; the statue [sic] was designed to protect individual employees
from discrimination, not to hamstring employers from making nondiscriminatory,
across-the-board decisions that are influenced by workers' compensation costs.
Fuerza Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. SA-90-CA-0480, at 26 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 27,
1992) (report and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge). The Fifth
Circuit opined in turn that plaintiff's reading of the Texas statute "would virtually prohibit
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If the background law of the employment relationship was ill-suited to
protect workers from plant-closings associated with deindustrialization,
the law of the corporation was even less hospitable to worker or community claims. The traditional view of the corporation pictures shareholders
as "owners," but casts employees as external to the firm, simply contracting with it to receive wages in exchange for labor. Managers owe a duty to
shareholders to maximize their return on investment, but they owe no duty
to employees other than what is embodied in the employment contract or
required by employment law. Theories have emerged in recent years that
are (or could be made to be) more consistent with the notion of broader
corporate accountability to nonshareholders. The work of reenvisioning
corporate relationships, structures, and obligations is an important one for
the long-term. For now, however, these new views of the firm have not
resulted in any significant enlargement of rights and remedies available to
128
actual workers and communities affected by actual plant closures.
plant closings in Texas." 986 F.2d at 978. Even if the plaintiffs win a rehearing and are
ultimately successful at trial, their claim will still be based on a type of "singling out" theory;
rather than a singled-out person, they point to a singled-out plant.
The plaintiffs' theory in the case deserves attention, however. It is not at all uncommon
for some plants within the same company to produce many more injuries than others. In the
garment industry such results often come from poor engineering and process design. A
group of garment workers in my own area, for instance, once described the "bloom" of
repetitive motion injuries that followed their employer's decision to switch to cloth heavier
than the women's machines were designed to handle. Surely there should somehow be
protection for employees whose work for an employer causes them to suffer a disproportionate number of disabling workplace injuries, and who are then punished for that fact by the
same employer when it decides to close the plant due to disproportionate injury patterns
occurring there.
Meanwhile, observers have begun to realize that it is not uncommon for a plant closing to
be followed by a surge in workers' compensation filings. Management tends to view the
surge as evidence of vengefully and opportunistically inflated claims, while worker advocates
see evidence of long-accumulated trauma, surfacing at last because the threat of job loss
loses its in terrorem effect once it is realized. Some unions and plant-closing groups have
organized occupational injury screenings in the aftermath of plant closings, specifically in
order to discover unasserted claims and to offer assistance to workers in filing them should
they so desire. Interview with Jonathan Lang, Organizer for Alliance for a Better Tomorrow, in Knoxville, Tenn. (Aug. 1989). See generally Peter Kerr, The High Cost of Job Injury
Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at C1, C7.
128. Various scholars have critiqued the old picture of the corporation and are energetically at work advancing a new "nexus of contracts" model. See, e.g., William Bratton, The
"Nexus of Contracts Corporation" A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989);
Steven Cheung, the Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Lynne Dallas,
Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 19
(1988); Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986).
Recently a few commentators have begun arguing for job security rights from the nexus of
contracts theory. They cast employee-employer behavior as an implied contractual exchange, in which the worker agrees to accept lower wages in return for job security, which
then become a form of deferred compensation. From this vantage point it can convincingly
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Even the NLRA protections from discharge for engaging in collective
activity were designed to prevent or punish episodic dismissals of individuals or groups of individuals who had been singled out by management as
troublemakers when other employees were still at work. Well before the
current crisis, the Supreme Court construed the NLRA to offer only
limited protection to workers dislocated by plant closings. In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington ManufacturingCo., 29 the Court addressed whether
a business closing violated the NLRA."3 ° It soundly rejected any notion
that the liquidation of the entire business of a free-standing employer
might constitute an unfair labor practice, even in a case in which the
closing was clearly motivated by antiunion animus.13 The Court charactera single businessman cannot
ized as "startling" the "proposition that 132
choose to go out of business if he wants to."
The Court distinguished such a case, however, from a "discriminatory
partial closing" 133 intended to discourage union membership in other parts
of the same or related enterprise, which would constitute a violation of the
NLRA. 134 In this respect, Darlington was a legal victory for the union:

be claimed that the recent rash of takeovers or plant closings that result in uncompensated
layoffs has worked an expropriation, an opportunistic transfer of wealth from employees to
shareholders. See, e.g., John Coffee, Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986) (focusing only on takeovers and restricting his theory to
managerial employees).
129. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
130. After its workers voted to join a union, a South Carolina textile firm decided to
liquidate itself. The union claimed that the closing violated § 8(a)(1) because it interfered
with the exercise of its members' rights under the Act, § 8(a)(3) because it was discriminatory treatment intended to discourage union membership, and § 8(a)(5) because the company had refused to bargain about the closing. Id. at 266-67. Darlington's membership in a
larger family complex of textile companies gave the Board several routes for finding an entity
still in existence that could appropriately be held liable for an unfair labor practice. The
Board found a § 8(a)(3) violation based on the company's antiunion animus. Id. at 267.
The Court of Appeals reversed, saying a company was free under the Act "to close out a part
or all of its business regardless of antiunion motives." Id. at 268.
131. Id. at 269-70.
132. Id. at 270. The use of the phrase "single businessman" and the pronoun "he" is
quite interesting. The Court's apparently unself-conscious casting of employers as individual
male persons works to strengthen the notion that such an employer's "right" to certain kinds
of freedom should be jealously guarded. I am indebted to Cornelius Peck for turning such a
revealing light on this widespread judicial habit. See Cornelius Peck, The Meanings of
Employer: Consequences for the NationalLabor Relations Act, 11 Miss. C. L. REV. 309, 310-15
(1991) (discussing Supreme Court assumption that employers are individuals); see also
Linzer, supra note 128, at 369-75 (arguing that the definitions and terms used in private
contract, property, and tort law are not broad enough to cover employee rights).
133. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 274-75.
134. Id. at 275. Later experience has amply demonstrated the problems facing workers
even in the runaway shop and partial closing situations. Establishing liability and fashioning
effective remedies are both difficult. See, e.g., Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483,
491 (1982) (deferring to company's decision to close branch after union victory, while
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Darlington was part of the Deering Milliken family textile empire, which
could not claim the immunity of an entire shutdown, and the company was
eventually held liable on remand. 3 5 The partial closing scenario identified
as a violation by Darlington protects more workers and unions than final
closings by lone independent employers, because partial closings of this
kind are more common than outright terminations.
Nevertheless, Darlington's lasting message represented a victory for employers. The memorable phrasing that characterized a plant closing as
"peculiarly [a] matter[] of management prerogative," 136 revealed a hard
line of judicial protection for management freedom, which foreshadowed
other decisions still to come. Workers were left to enjoy statutory security
only in cases where antiunion discrimination could be proved, cold com137
fort when economic restructuring is afoot.
Another feature of the background rules of the NLRA relevant for
workers seeking job security is the body of law related to the practice of
' 138
"contracting out.'

FibreboardPaperProducts Corp. v. NLRB,'139 involved

a challenge to the contracting out of the employer's plant maintenance
work to an outside company whose employees were to perform the work
previously done by union members. 4 ° At issue was whether the company
continuing to operate other branch plants in nearby locations, as an economic decision "for
management, not for the Board or this Court, to make"); Local 57, ILGWU v. NLRB
(Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295 (1965) (refusing to order company to reopen its New York
facilities or to bargain with its new employees in Florida despite proof of runaway shop and
clear evidence of antiunion animus, and restricting remedy to modest backpay award), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
135. Law teachers, like law students, can easily fall into a simplistic focus on formal
liability, a mistake that would be especially unfortunate and unrealistic in the labor law
context. It was an outrageous quarter century before the workers in Darlington received
even a portion of their back pay in a settlement designed to avoid further delay. For some
details of the story, see H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1977) (describing
Darlington as one of the "low water marks" in the history of NLRA enforcement); Hearings
on S. 1883 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 249-61 (1977) (stories of Thelma Swann, Louise Buck, and Ruth
Carnes); Textile Concern Offers Back Pay to Resolve a 1956 Labor Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1980, at A93 (describing offer of backpay made to employees).
136. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 269.
137. For insight into ways an employer can avoid a finding of antiunion animus, see Peter
G. Nash & Scott W. Schattenfield, Plant Closings, Relocations and Transfers of Unit Work: A
Management View, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE 207 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel
G. Collins eds., 1988) [hereinafter LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE].
138. See supra note 40 (discussing contracting out as an aspect of the new "contingent
work force").
139. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
140. Id. at 206. Though the plant did not shutdown or move away, the company ceased
having its own employees perform the work they had been hired to do, fired them, and then
refused to bargain, taking the position that there were no more employees in the maintenance union, therefore no more bargaining unit and no more duty to bargain. Id. at 207.
This kind of contracting out scenario is in many ways like a partial closing case.
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had a duty to bargain with the union over its economically motivated
decision to contract out the work."' The Court held that such a decision

involved the "terms and conditions of employment" under section 8(d) of
the NLRA, about which the parties are required to bargain, and over
which employees could wage a strike that qualified for protection under
the Act.' 4 2 In explaining its decision the Court pointed out that termination of employment, a necessary result of the contracting out, could hardly
be more central to "the terms and conditions of employment." It observed
that requiring the parties to bargain about such a decision would fall
squarely within the aims of the Act "by bringing a problem of vital concern

141. Id. at 209. The distinction important to the Court was that the decision was
prompted by a desire to save money, not by an antiunion, discriminatory intent. Id. at
213-14.
142. Id. at 211. The NLRA does not require that the employer and the union reach
agreement. Section 8(d) requires only that they bargain "in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
Since the case of NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), the
Court has recognized a distinction between matters that are "mandatory" subjects of
bargaining and those that are merely "permissive." Failure to bargain in good faith over a
mandatory subject constitutes a punishable "unfair labor practice." For a critique of the
distinction and reflections on its application in the partial closing situation, see Michael C.
Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of
Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1500-03 (1982) (concluding that the distinction
places too much authority in the hands of judges and Board members, and suggesting that a
distinction based on the category of product market decisions would be a more principled
basis of decisionmaking).
One more distinction is worth pointing out in the present context. There has been little or
no dispute over an employer's well-settled duty to bargain over the impact of a decision to
close a factory. An employer closing a unionized plant must bargain, for instance, about a
severance package for laid-off employees. This is "effects bargaining," thought to be
conceptually distinct from "decisional bargaining." Id.
In a plant-closing setting with a unionized shop, then, the employer will have an obligation
to bargain over the terms of the severance. Issues that may arise at such a juncture include
extended health benefits, pension participation, accrued vacation and holidays, access to
health and accident information, funding for personal and vocational counseling and retraining, transfer rights, and the disposition of excess monies in over-funded pensions. See
Burton F. Boltuch, Workplace Closures and Company Reorganizations: Enforcing NLRB,
Contract and Noncontract Claims and Obligations, 7 LAB. LAW. 53, 54 (1991) (analyzing the
imbalance of bargaining power in a plant closing in favor of the employer and suggesting
ways to remedy this problem); see also Nanci S. Snow, Employees' Rights to EmployerContributed Pension Benefits After a Plant Shutdown, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 807, 807 (examining
employees' right to recover pension funds when they are laid off because of reductions in the
work force before pension rights have vested); R. David Strickland & Linda K. Dickert,
Worker's Compensation: Vacation Pay When the Plant Closes, TENN. LAW. J.,Summer 1984,
at 16, 16-18 (describing theories under which displaced workers may be entitled to pro rata
vacation pay upon lay-off). All these matters are of great importance at the hour of crisis for
jobless workers, but at bottom, they comprise a salvage operation after the real battle has
been lost.
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to labor and management within the framework established by Congress as
most conducive to industrial peace." '4 3
Justice Stewart wrote a concurring opinion to highlight the conflict
between the consultative constraints necessarily implied in a system of
collective bargaining and the managerial freedom-the "prerogatives of
private business management"-that he characterized as central to the
"traditional principles of a free enterprise economy."1 44 Attempting to
narrow the majority's interpretation of the scope of the NLRA, Stewart
stressed, "The Court most assuredly does not decide that every managerial
decision which necessarily terminates an individual's employment is subject to the duty to bargain."14' 5 He maintained that the decision at issue in
Fibreboard fell "short of such larger entrepreneurial questions as what
invested in fixed assets, or what the
shall be produced, how capital shall be146
basic scope of the enterprise shall be."7

Just as Darlington's dicta on partial plant closings may have spoken
louder than its concrete result, so the views expressed in Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Fibreboard are recounted more often than those of the
majority. 47 The result was a body of law in which both management and
workers could find at least strands of legal support and ideological comfort.
No doctrinal gimmick could plausibly resolve the underlying conflict between security for workers and freedom for managers and owners, between
the notion of collective bargaining and the notion of entrepreneurial
control, because the contradictory impulses at issue are firmly embedded
in both the Act and its legislative and interpretive history.
Nevertheless, as the trend toward deindustrialization began, the strands
of existing NLRA law that protected employer prerogative in plant closing
situations were often easier to see and call upon than those providing
security for workers. As workers and unions began attempting to use the
Act to protect them in plant closing situations, as they began trying to
expand the vision embedded in the Fibreboard majority opinion and to
concurconstrict the competing vision represented by Stewart's Darlington
148
pronounced.
more
become
only
would
pattern
rence, this
This survey of the common law and the statutory frameworks demonstrates the inhospitable terrain upon which workers and communities were

143. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 211.
144. Id. at 226.
145. Id. at 218.
146. Id. at 225.
147. I do not want to overstate the case. It would be a distortion to characterize the
majority opinion in Fibreboardas a coherent polar opposite to Stewart's defense of management's sole prerogative. Nevertheless, the contrast is striking.
148. See infra text accompanying note 174 for a discussion of developments under the
NLRA since Darlingtonand Fibreboard.
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forced to begin their fight to hold corporations accountable as the era of
deindustrialization dawned. 4 9 Although there had been an erosion of the
common-law employment-at-will doctrine and a corresponding increase in
protection afforded to some individual workers from arbitrary individual
discharge, the existing law had little to offer workers affected by mass
layoffs, and was of little efficacy even in individual layoff cases for workers
employed in the lower tiers of a company. Meanwhile, the NLRA had
been interpreted so as to preclude any real participation in or serious
worker leverage over capital redeployment decisions. 5 0
Furthermore, even those few substantive protections granted by the
NLRA' 5 ' were becoming less and less significant as union membership
continued to decline.' 5 2 A mutually reinforcing dynamic of reduced union
strength and antilabor rulings and policies took hold. The judicial and
administrative decisionmakers responsible for enforcing and interpreting
the federal labor laws were, after all, appointed by presidents who were
not only openly hostile to unions,' 5 3 but were also put in office by an
electorate in which organized labor played a decreasing role.' 5 4

149. Regional deindustrialization and capital flight were already known phenomena, of
course. "Between 1960 and 1975, national manufacturing employment rose by 8.3%. While
manufacturing jobs increased by 43.3% in the Southeast and 67% in the Southwest, they
declined by 9.9% in New England and 13.7% in the Mideast." Staughton Lynd, Investment
Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 397 (1979) (citing
JEREMY RIFKIN & RANDY BARBAR, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN: PENSIONS, POLITICS AND
POWER IN THE 1980s, at 30, 33 (1978)) (footnote omitted).
150. See generally Peter F. Munger et al., Plant Closures and Relocations Under the NLRA,
35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 77 (1988).
151. Such protections include the requirement that employers bargain over effects of a
closing and the sanctions imposed on shutdowns that are demonstrably animated by antiunion animus and that might chill the union activities of other employees of the employer.
See supra note 130.
152. As deindustrialization continued, the sectors that were shrinking were the most
heavily unionized, while the service and white collar jobs that were growing were the least
so. Fewer and fewer American workers were employed at job sites that were covered by
collective bargaining agreements. Those who were, found themselves represented by unions
whose bargaining strength was increasingly compromised by declining membership and past
concessions. See supra note 28.
153. The emblematic indicator of Ronald Reagan's well-armed hostility to organized
labor was his aggressive leadership in breaking the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization strike. See generally Special Project-PATCO, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 275 (1982).
154. Some of labor's weakness sprang also from its own internal problems: its toofrequently antidemocratic and hierarchical structure; its failure to meaningfully incorporate
nonwhite, nonmale, and unemployed sectors of the work force into its activities, decisions,
and plans; and the relative narrowness of mission it had come to accept as either appropriate
or irresistible. Although these matters are clearly relevant to the issues under discussion,
they are beyond the scope of this paper. For two among many views on the subject, see
STAUGHTON LYND, SOLIDARITY UNIONISM (1992); William Forbath, The Shaping of the
American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1989); see also supra note 8.

1993]

LAW, POVERTY, AND AMERICA'S ERODING INDUSTRIAL BASE

1799

Nevertheless, workers, unions, and communities faced with plant closing
emergencies, and the attorneys who represented them, continued to look
for legal tools. The next sections highlight a few of the many avenues thus
far explored.
B.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES

The specific tools and strategies that workers have used in responding to
plant closings cannot be properly understood without some appreciation of
the hands that wield them. If a plant is unionized, then some of the kinds
of networks, structures, resource and information pipelines minimally
necessary for decisionmaking and action are already in place. If not, then
the workers are in the position of trying to swing into a rapid response with
no existing recognized leadership or history of cooperative effort, and
usually with no bilaterally controlled channels of information exchange
between themselves and management. The difficulties for workers are
great in either case, but practically crushing with no union.15 5
In addition to their generally disorganized state, nonunion workers are
also likely to be without legal representation. They will, of course, lack any
of the "in-house" legal help that a district or international union may be
able to offer, even if at a distance. Nor are they likely to have an
established relationship of trust and mutual knowledge with a local attorney who knows something of their situation. In smaller cities and rural
areas, the problem is significantly compounded by the absence of attorneys
familiar with or experienced even in general labor or employment law
matters from the labor side. Even organized workers and the unions that
represent them have often found themselves bewildered in these new
settings, which require new factual and legal information and new skills.
They also often call for resources adequate to mount creative and vigorous

155. Unorganized sectors of the work force disproportionately include women, people of
color, immigrants, and low-wage workers. These sectors also have a regional tilt. Given the
historically and presently lower levels of unionization in the South, southern workers are
particularly likely to face shutdowns without the extra buffer and advantage that comes with
union membership. Their low rate of unionization was precisely their source of attractiveness to business for decades. Industries often moved South to shed or to avoid the burdens
and obligations on employers that accompanied higher rates of unionization in the North. A
number of factors, including the existence of right-to-work laws, and the divisiveness of
racism, have contributed to the continuing low rates of unionization in the Southeast. These
rates, however, have not proved to be enough to hold capital in the southern United States
in the new environment of the global economy. The southern hemisphere of the world now
beckons more alluringly than the southern region of the nation. See MEAD, supra note 86, at
7-13. For a look at one industry still actively using a southern U.S. strategy, see Mike
Nielson & Eric Bates, Bright Lights, Low Wages: More and More Films Are Being Shot in the
South, Taking Advantage of Cheap Labor and Anti-Union Laws, S. EXPOSURE, Winter 1992, at
22.
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responses, just when declining membership has resulted in shrinking union
treasuries.
Organized labor has, of course, attempted to devise response strategies,
and the union-side labor bar has scrambled to find legal handholds on the
array of situations that locals have found themselves confronting. 156 In
addition, a number of new independent advocacy groups have formed.
These are not labor unions, although some of them are supported by labor
unions, include representatives from organized labor on their boards, or
utilize volunteers who are union members or union staff. Some of these
groups function in a public interest, technical advisory capacity.' 5 7 Others
have worked to build grass-roots, rank-and-file membership organizations
Other groups that
in the context of preventing specific plant closings.'
organizing and
direct
of a hybrid between
have emerged are something
59
assistance.
technical
Many of these organizations have sprung up in the ferment and aftermath of particular closings when prevention efforts failed.1 60 For example,
156. For a helpful overview of strategies used and problems encountered by lawyers
representing labor unions in closures and reorganizations, see Burt Boltuch, Workplace
Closures and Company Reorganizations: Enforcing NLRB, Contract and Noncontract Claims
and Obligations, 7 LAB. LAW. 53 (1991). For a speech by an embattled labor lawyer to fellow
labor advocates that gives something of the flavor of these struggles from a union point of
view, see Hillman, supra note 48.
157. The Midwest Center for Labor Research, for instance, has functioned in this way on
a national, regional, and local level, offering technical assistance for workers and communities confronted with plant closings. The Center is located in Chicago and publishes a
semiannual journal, the Labor Research Review.
158. Prevention is a tall order and is deserving of much greater attention than this article
gives it. Because so many factors, both legal and nonlegal, presently favor those who own
and control productive resources, the chances of holding a major corporation in a community against its own desires for very long are slim. The best treatment to date of a preventive
strategy aimed at keeping a reluctant employer in a community is Mann, supra note 53,
which tells the story of the Labor/Community Coalition fight to keep GM-Van Nuys open.
This strategy succeeded for a remarkably long time. Despite earlier threats to close the
plant, extensive organizing and pressure kept it open much longer than predicted.
Some groups have been successful in preventing a plant closure by finding an alternative
owner and/or manager, or by arranging for a joint worker and community buy-out; thus,
although the former employer left or ceased to exist, the jobs remained. See infra text
accompanying note 282. One such provisional success is reported in Bruce Nissen & Lynn
Feekin, For the Public Good: Calumet Project Organizes for Labor and Community-Based
Economic Development, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1992, at 16 (describing system of plant
monitoring by union leaders to watch for warning signs of shutdowns and reporting one
successful campaign to change a company's mind about moving).
159. The Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network (TIRN), for instance, headquartered in
Knoxville, Tennessee, provides technical assistance and networking for existing labor, community, and religious groups. It also works directly to organize the unorganized, particularly in
nonunion shutdown situations. See TIRN TAKING CHARGE: A HANDS-ON GUIDE TO DEALING WITH THE THREAT OF PLANT CLOSINGS AND SUPPORTING LAID-OFF WORKERS (1991)

(looseleaf manual, on file with author).
160. For discussion of one such group, the Coalition of Religious, Union, Community, and
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Fuerza Unida (United Force) was formed when Levi Strauss announced it
would close its San Antonio, Texas plant and move it to Costa Rica. This
group, composed of the plant's predominantly Latina and previously unorganized work force, filed lawsuits, staged hunger strikes, and organized a
boycott of Levi products. At the same time, it pursued a relentless public
relations campaign demanding a company-financed feasibility study of the
future of the garment industry in Texas, access to the company pension
plan, additional severance pay, and other innovative proposals. 6 '
The largely African-American work force at Schlage Lock in Rocky
Mount, N.C., mobilized a strong response to that plant's closure in 1988.
The company had announced a "phase-down" two years earlier, explaining that production would be moved from Rocky Mount to other Schlage
facilities in Colorado and in Tecate, Mexico. The plant was not unionized,
but workers turned to local church leaders, to the North Carolina based
Black Workers for Justice, and to Southerners for Economic Justice for
help and support. Eventually they formed the Committee Against Schlage
Lock Plant Closing and, later, the broadly based Citizens' Commission on
Plant Closings and began a vigorous campaign. They conducted health
screenings among plant workers that revealed a number of ailments associated with chemical exposures. They discovered and publicized ground and
groundwater contamination and inadequate labeling and handling of hazardous waste at the factory site. They picketed and rallied, obtained
Trade Readjustment Act benefits, and succeeded in winning severance pay
in the form of a paid training program.' 6 2 Since the plant closed, the
workers' committee has continued to meet, but now works on a variety of
issues in conjunction with Black Workers for Justice. One of the dislocated Schlage employees has since visited the Schlage facility in Tecate,
Mexico, across the border from San Diego, and spoke with workers there
about chemical exposures that might explain the rashes and other symptoms they were experiencing.' 6 3
Another independent organization was spawned to continue representing workers whose formal ties to their union were dissolved upon Green
University Leaders (CRUCUL) which arose in response to a partial plant closing, see
Lawrence G. Flood, Union-Community Relations in Buffalo: A Preliminary Assessment, 39

L. REV. 445, 456-60 (1991).
161. Interviews with Margie Castro, Lupe Galvfn, Irene Reyna, displaced Levi workers
and leaders of Fuerza Unida, and Rub6n Solis, organizer with Fuerza Unida, in San
Antonio, Tex. (July 16, 1991); The Struggle Continues: What Levi's Owes Its Workers, UNITY
(Fuerza Unida, San Antonio, Tex.), Apr. 1992, at 3 (informal newsletter, on file with
author).
162. SOUTHERNERS FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: STORIES OF WORKING
NORTH CAROLINIANS 64-66 (1989).
163. Telephone interview with Joan Sharpe, Ex-Schlage Worker and Member of Black
Workers for Justice, Rocky Mount, N.C. (Apr. 26, 1993).
BUFF.
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Giant Foods' relocation of their production from Watsonville, California
to Irapuato, Mexico. The new organization has mounted an innovative
two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, it has pressed for compensation
and retraining for the displaced workers in Watsonville. In addition, the
group has worked in conjunction with the newly reformed Teamsters'
Union to make demands on Green Giant in Mexico, including higher
wages for Mexican workers and the installation of a water treatment
system to end the contaminated watering of crops.164
Other workers have developed organizations to deal with the contingent
work force problem. In Morristown, Tennessee, General Electric (GE)
laid off its warehouse workers and moved the warehouse thirty miles away,
with a new corporation nominally in charge, and with new lower-paid
employees. Displaced GE workers discovered that the only new jobs they
could find in their area were temporary ones. They responded by creating
Citizens Against Temporary Services (CATS), which mounted a multithe upsurge in the contingent work that was
pronged protest against
165
evident in their area.
This handful of examples is indicative of the kinds of organizational
forms that people are struggling to build in the wake of plant closings.
Most of the organizations that began with a single closing, if they have
lasted past the initial crisis, have gone on to address a broader spectrum of
issues and people. 166 Many of these local groups have strong participation
beyond the workplace itself. Families, community members, church groups,
small businesses, and dislocated workers from other job sites are typical
members of such organizations. These groups open the possibility of new
and more flexible styles of action and organizing than typically characterize traditional labor unions.

164. Interview with Joe Fahey, President of Teamsters Local 912, in Chicago, III. (Aug. 1,

1992); see also DIRTY BUSINESS (Migrant Media Productions, 1990).
165. Interviews with Lodis Adams, Barbara Bishop, and Shirley Reinhardt, Members of
Citizens Against Temporary Services, in Morristown, Tenn. (Mar. 31, 1990); see George
Gonos & Shirley Reinhardt, Seeking Permanent Change in the Temporary Services Industry,

Winter 1992, at 14 (discussing the origin and work of CATS); Yount &
Williams, supra note 38 (same).
166. The Labor/Community Coalition to Keep GM-Van Nuys Open, for example, helped
to found the Labor/Community Strategy Center and the Labor/Community Watchdog,
which address issues of plant closings and also environmental equity and economic developBEYOND BORDERS,

ment questions generally. See LABOR/COMMUNITY WATCHDOG, L.A.'s LETHAL AIR:

NEW

(1991). Fuerza Unida plans to reach
out to other victims of plant closings in San Antonio and surrounding parts of Texas. See
supra note 161. The CATS group in Tennessee has become a chapter of the multi-issue
organization, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, and is pursuing its agenda of criticizing the
temporary services industry and pushing for greater corporate accountability within a larger
framework of economic justice and land-use issues. See Yount & Williams, supra note 38.
STRATEGIES FOR POLICY, ORGANIZING, AND ACTION
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In addition to the newly spawned groups, existing economic justice
organizations have increasingly found themselves taking up issues of deindustrialization as part of their ongoing work because it is relevant to the
lives of their members.' 6 7 A number of existing groups and networks are
attempting to help the locally based groups communicate, share ideas, and
develop common strategies either on a national or a regional basis. 6 '
These organizations face an uphill battle. Most of them are underfunded,
understaffed, overextended, and frustrated at the difficulty of addressing
the exceedingly large problems that confront their constituencies. Amazingly, however, many of them persist with energy and commitment. The next

167. For instance, La Mujer Obrera ("The Woman Worker") is a group based among
Latina, low-income, largely immigrant, garment workers in El Paso, Texas. In the course of
defining the major problems confronting its constituency, and inventing ways to fight for
improved conditions, this group has encountered numerous plant closings.
El Paso offers a fascinating study in deindustrialization. Long a center for garment
production, the city has gone through dramatic changes in recent years. Its garment industry
is now increasingly characterized by a sweatshop style of production, as larger, previously
unionized employers have moved offshore and smaller more marginal operations have
sprung up to take their place. Workers in present day El Paso tell stories of plant closings
that happen with no warning. Workers show up for work to find a padlocked door and an
employer that has simply vanished, too often leaving weeks of unpaid wages behind.
In response to these experiences, La Mujer Obrera has taken on industrial retention and
economic development as major projects. The group has pressed for local laws that could
more effectively regulate the new environment developing in El Paso and has lobbied local
development bodies to concern themselves with the fate of low-wage, lesser-skilled workers
in the community. Interviews with Carmen Dominguez, Maria Flores, and Sylvia Romo,
Director & staff members of La Mujer Obrera, in El Paso, Tex. (July 30, 1992); see also
Debbie Nathan, Garment Workers: The Long Last Strike, Ms., July/Aug. 1991, at 100
(describing successful lobbying of the legislature to pass law making nonpayment of wages a
crime); Cecilia Rodriquez, Hunger Strike Hits Exploitation of Chicana Garment Workers in El
Paso, LAB. NOTES, Oct. 1990, at 1 (describing hunger strike organized to dramatize the
exploitation of El Paso's garment workers); We Must Act Now, UNIDAD Y FUERZA, Aug.Sept., 1992, at 8 (newspaper of La Mujer Obrera, on file with author); La Mujer Obrera, Lo
Que Todo Trabajador Debe Saber Cuando Una Fdbrica Cierra [What Every Worker Should
Know When a Factory Closes] (on file with author).
For a report of a similar pattern of sweatshop production methods emerging for Asian
immigrant women employed by small subcontractors in the San Francisco garment industry,
see Leo L. Lam, Comment, Designer Duty: Extending Liability to Manufacturersfor Violations
of LaborStandardsin Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 623 (1992); Subcontractor Stiffs Garment Workers: "Let Them Eat Lace, " Says Designer, LAB. NOTES, Jan. 1993, at 1.
168. The Federation for Industrial Retention and Renewal (FIRR) in Chicago, is a
national network of local and regional plant closing groups. By the summer of 1992 it had
over 30 affiliates spread throughout the country and published a quarterly newsletter. See 4
FIRR NEWS, Fall 1992 (on file with author). The Regional Economic Justice Network,
coordinated by Southerners for Economic Justice of Durham, N.C., works to link economic
justice organizations around the southeastern United States. Though not restricted to plant
closing or deindustrialization issues, it has placed issues of capital flight and sustainable,
people-oriented economic development high on its agenda. Interview with Leah Wise,
Director of Economic Justice, in Atlanta, Ga. (Sept. 25, 1992).
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section surveys a number of legal strategies tried by unions and by this new
crop of other organizations.
C.

CRISIS APPROACHES

I went to work that morning as usual, and when I got to the side door
there where I always used to go in, I saw the supervisor standing at the
door. She said to us, "You all are just to go on in to your machines and
wait there. Do not clock in."
I felt it then. And I said, "What's the problem?"
She said, "There will be a public announcement in just a few minutes,
but until then, I'm only supposed to tell you to go on in to your machines

and wait there. Do not clock in."
It was kind of like there was one of those robots, you know, standing at
the door: "Go - on - in - to - your - machines - and - wait - there. Do not - clock - in."

I looked at her and I said, "They're shutting us down aren't they?"
She looked at me. "I'm afraid so," she said. And then she started to
cry.
Well, we got in there, and in a few minutes they made the
announcement. Levi's was closing down. The only thing left for us to do
was to finish out the work that was on the floor. I was at the very end of
the building, so I worked on for eleven more days after that, and some
people in shipping may have worked twelve. But some went home that
very day, and some the next.

After they made the announcement, they come around and handed
each and every one of us our paperwork. They passed it out. Each one
had a little folder. They had calculated out for each one of us our years
of service, what they was, and what we would get on our benefits and
everything. We got to talking later, and we figure it had to have taken
them months, I'd say at least six months, to do that amount of paperwork
on each one of us. There were 830 people.
As far as how I felt about it that day, and the days after, and weeks,
really for a couple of months after that? It was just like getting kicked in
the gut. That's what I told people then, and that's what it was like. It
was just like getting kicked in the gut. Maybe you'll want to say in your
paper it was like getting kicked in the stomach. Maybe you should put it
like that. But that's what it was like.
Shirley Martin

169

Upon learning of the planned closure of the ... plant.., the defendants embarked upon a conspiracy to prevent the closure ... Defendants
first sought to uncover or invent violations of laws allegedly committed
169. Interview with Shirley Martin, dislocated worker, in Maryville, Tenn. (Apr. 24, 1991).
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by [the plaintiff company] that had no nexus to the closing of the...
plant, but which might be used to force [the company] to keep the...
plant open ....

For example, defendants investigated conduct with re-

spect to, and sought to uncover violations of, the antitrust laws, the
environmental protection laws, the securities laws and the Hart-ScottRodino pre-merger notification law. Defendants intended to use any
violations uncovered to sue, harass and intimidate plaintiff so as to
prevent [the company] from closing the.., plant.
Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief
170
Anchor Hocking Corp. v. Moore

Look, I know I'm just a working man. But I'm not a dummy. I know
that if I try to sue some big company out here, I am really up against it.
And I'm just telling you that I want a lawyer to represent me who is as
mean and as smart and as quick as a junkyard dog.
Glen X. Adams

17 1

1. National Labor Relations Act
Duty to bargain. As discussed in Part II.A., when the recent wave of plant
closings hit U.S. industry, the law of shutdowns as it had developed under
the NLRA contained competing strands, but was strongly protective of an
employer's right to make its own unimpeded decisions about capital deployment. Darlington held that even a discriminatory antiunion closing was
within management's prerogative unless the employer had other facilities
172
with other employees whose collective bargaining rights might be chilled.
In Fibreboard the Court imposed a mandatory duty to bargain over a
decision to contract out, but stressed the narrowness of its holding and
featured reassurances about managerial freedom. 7 3
In a 1981 decision, the Court made clear that Justice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard was gaining preeminence. In First National Maintenance v. NLRB, 174 the Court resolved various conflicts that had emerged
among the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the circuits,
holding that an employer had no duty to bargain with its unionized
170. No. C2-88-0738 (S.D. Ohio filed July 13, 1988) (verified complaint for injunctive

relief).
171. Glen X. Adams was a client of mine who said these words to me in my office in
Knoxville, Tennessee sometime in the early 1980s in an effort to educate me about what he
needed and wanted from a legal advocate in his battle with asbestos manufacturers. He has
since died of mesothelioma, a rare cancer caused by exposure to asbestos.
172. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965); see supra
notes 129-137.
173. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213, 217-26 (1964); see supra
text accompanying notes 139-148.
174. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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employees over its decision to carry out a partial closing. 175 Justice Blackmun observed for the majority that "in establishing what issues must be
submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress had no expectation that
the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the
running of the business enterprise in which the union's members are
employed.' ' 1 76 The Court adopted a balancing test to determine whether a
duty to bargain existed in partial closing cases: 1 77 "bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability
of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-manageprocess, outweighs the burden
ment relations and the collective-bargaining
178
placed on the conduct of the business.'
The Court concluded that an economically motivated decision to shut
down part of a business "is not part of § 8(d)'s 'terms and conditions,'... over
which Congress has mandated bargaining.' ' 1 79 First National Maintenance
became the subject of much scholarly attention and was seen as an important setback by those seeking greater leverage and participation for workers faced with the threat of plant closings.1 8 °

175. Id. at 686.
176. Id. at 676.
177. The Court groped mightily for definitions of which cases were without and which
were within the scope of mandatory bargaining. It described business decisions clearly
outside the scope of required bargaining as those that "have only an indirect and attenuated
impact on the employment relationship," and contrasted them with those that "are almost
exclusively 'an aspect of the relationship' between employer and employee," which it saw as
clearly inside the scope of mandatory bargaining. Id. at 677. Continuing in its Herculean
task, the Court described yet a third set of cases it saw as more ambiguous (like First
National Maintenance itself), those that have "a direct impact on employment," but have as
their "focus only ... economic profitability." Id. at 677. A moment's consideration of the
issues involved in a plant-closing decision should reveal these definitions to be highly
troublesome.
178. Id. at 679.
179. Id. at 685 (citation omitted). The employer in First National Maintenance entirely
terminated one of its operations. When it lost a contract for janitorial services at a local
nursing home, the company simply laid off the workers who had been doing that job. Id. at
668-69. As the Court itself acknowledged, the opinion therefore did not reach "other types
of management decisions such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting,
automation, etc., which are to be considered on their particular facts." Id. at 686 n.22.
Cases since FirstNationalMaintenance continue to reveal unresolved questions.
180. See, e.g., James B. Atleson, Management Prerogatives,Plant Closings and the NLRA, 11
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 107 (1982-83) (criticizing Court's purported balancing
test as recognizing only the interests of management); Jeffrey D. Hedlund, An Economic
Case for Mandatory Bargainingover Partial Termination and Plant Relocation, 95 YALE L.J.
949, 961 (1986) (criticizing Court for ignoring evidence that maximum economic efficiency
can be reached only through mandatory bargaining scheme); David A. Larson, Subcontracting and the Duty to Bargain, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 270 (1989-90) ("court's
analysis.., considered only the interests of the employer"). But see Joseph R. Knight, Note,
Decisional Bargainingand the NLRA: A Plea for Resurrection of First National Maintenance,
68 TEX. L. REV. 625, 642 (1990) (defending Court's balancing test as weighing employees'
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In 1984, in United Technologies and UAW Local 989 (Otis II), 181 the
NLRB decided a partial closing case that involved not a cessation of
activity, but the transfer of bargaining unit work to another location.
Citing extensively from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard, the
NLRB attempted to articulate a rule for cases that were not squarely
covered by the balancing test of First National Maintenance, but which
nonetheless had to be examined in its light.
The NLRB concluded that the duty to bargain found in Fibreboardarose
not so much from the fact of subcontracting, but because labor costs, over
which the employees have significant control, and about which they might
therefore be expected to bargain, had played a key role in the company's
decision to subcontract the work. The NLRB distinguished the employer's
decision to subcontract in Fibreboard,which fell within § 8(d)'s "terms and
conditions" clause, from that in First NationalMaintenance, on the ground
that the decision in the latter case involved a change in the basic operation
of the business.1 82 Examining the facts in Otis II in this light, the NLRB
found that the employer had no duty to bargain about the relocation of its
work. Otis's decision had involved a basic reassessment of the corporation's direction, and a serious reorganization of its operations, thus distinguishing it from Fibreboard183
and aligning it, in the NLRB's new view, with
FirstNationalMaintenance.
The difficulty in coherently distinguishing those decisions that "turn on
labor costs" from those that are "fundamental changes in the nature and
direction of the business" is intractable. Many closings turn on both,
especially in a deindustrializing and increasingly global economy. The
concepts are elastic enough that any employer with competent legal advice
will articulate plenty of nonlabor-cost reasons for a decision about which it
does not wish to bargain.
From the workers' point of view, there is another problem with this
doctrine. Even if those cases "turning on labor costs" could plausibly and
reliably be distinguished from those involving some "fundamental change
in direction of the business," the assumption underlying the labor costs
rationale is a grim one. An employee "victory" on this doctrinal terrain
consists in securing the aid of the authorities to require that an employer
provide its workers with an opportunity to offer concessions! In many
cases even this limited relief is unlikely because the plant is already closed
and a return to the status quo ante will be viewed as unduly burdensome.

interests as a "component of the benefit to labor-management relations," when the test is
correctly applied).
181. 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).

182. Id. at 893.
183. Id. at 892-93.
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the right to transfer
Employees may well be left with back pay and perhaps
1 84
location.
another
at
exists
employer
that
with
if a job
Otis II proved to be a difficult precedent to interpret or apply with any
certainty, in part because it contained three different tests announced in
the primary opinion and in concurring and partially dissenting opinions.
In 1991, in Dubuque Packing Co., Inc. v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Local 150A, 185 the NLRB attempted to reconcile prior precedents
86
This case arose from a
and to announce a generally applicable rule.'
decision by the Dubuque Packing Co. to close its operations in Iowa, and
to reopen in New Rochelle, Illinois, attempting to shed its existing union
as it did so.' 87 In Dubuque the NLRB embraced the notion of a balancing
184. See, e.g., Reece Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 448, 453 (1989) (applying Otis II, Board held
employer violated the duty to bargain and awarded backpay to Massachusetts employees and
a chance to move to Maine, North Carolina, or Holland, if jobs existed).
185. 303 N.L.R.B. No. 66, at 1, 17-18 (1991) (Dubuque II). For more on this case, see
LeRoy, supra note 54; Roger S. Walters & Stewart D. Langdon, The Duty to Bargain Over
Business Decisions: The Dubuque Case, 43 LAB. L.J. 579, 584-87 (1992) (outlining single
balancing test in Dubuque II).
186. The NLRB undertook this effort in response to the D.C. Circuit's opinion in
Dubuque I. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880 F.2d
1422, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1989), remanding United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
150-A v. Dubuque Parking Co., Inc. (Dubuque 1), 287 N.L.R.B. 499 (1987) (instructing the
NLRB "to articulate a majority-supported statement of the rule that the Board will be
applying").
187. Thanks to a talk by Professor Lorraine Schmall at an ABA section meeting, we have
access to a richer and better-grounded sense of what the case was about than can be gleaned
from the Board's opinion alone. In the process of applauding the basic direction of Dubuque
Packing, Schmall, who lives in the Rochelle, Illinois area, shared the following narrative:
Dubuque Packing is about a company with a long collective bargaining relationship
between managers in a very competitive and expensive business and workers who
labored long and hard under what most people would find to be oppressive
conditions. They were meat packing; they were slaughtering and skinning and
slicing and packaging hogs. They had been doing it in Dubuque, Iowa and somebody was going to do it, for less money, in Rochelle, Illinois. There was no change
in the direction of the business.
Both the union and the company were very sophisticated and mature bargainers.
The giant meatpacker was clearly losing money. It had told its workers that and
had already had some concessions. The Food and Commercial Workers wanted to
look at the company's books before the union gave back any more money. Instead
of fisticuffs, the parties taunted each other with hired guns: accountants and
actuaries....
... Companies don't automatically discharge members for the protected concerted activities like they did in the old refusal to bargain cases. They let their
accountants do their work for them. They prove that they are broke. They like the
union; they have no anti-union animus. It's just that they're broke and they need to
make more money and the only way they can make more money is to manufacture
and produce more cheaply and that's why it would be better to be union-free than
unionized.
Shortly after the plant was closed in Dubuque,... employees ...

suddenly found
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test, and announced that it would require bargaining only when the benefits for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process
outweighed management's need for freedom of action.1 88 In applying this
highly elastic test to plant-closing decisions, however, it distinguished
between the cessation-of-work situation in First National Maintenance and
cases in which a unit was transferred to another work site.'8 9 The latter
type of relocation case was, in the NLRB's view, closer to the NLRAprotected situation in Fibreboard, and more likely to involve significant
benefits from bargaining. 9 ° In sum, Dubuque Packing limited the situations in which a closing employer will be free of a duty to bargain, and in
that sense has slightly altered the legal balance in favor of labor in certain
classes of plant closings.
Even if, in the wake of Dubuque Packing, more employers are found to
be under a duty to bargain about decisions to relocate, the impact of such
a trend will be limited. Only about fifteen percent of workers in the
United States are in collective bargaining relationships at all. Given the
present dynamics of the economy and the present state of the law, the few
employees that are in collective bargaining relationships have precious
little leverage with which to bargain, even when their employers are
ordered to the table.
Injunctions pending arbitration. Imposition of a duty to bargain over closings does not exhaust the applicability of the NLRA. The Act can serve
preventive ends, by empowering unions to bargain for express contractual

themselves working for the Fleur-de-lys Corporation, whose three principles had
formerly been the three principles in the Dubuque Packing Company, who lowered
the hourly wage from $16 to $6. In Rochelle, we all know that the Dubuque Plant
closed less than a year after it was opened. A few months later it was reopened by
the Fleur-de-lys Company. The employees, many of whom worked for Swift then
Dubuque then Fleur-de-lys, found themselves with successive pay cuts with each
new employer, even though from the best they could tell, they continued to take a
left off Main Street, a right on Route 38 and a left on Industrial Drive. Many of
them have been doing so for the past decades. What they do is remove hair from
hogs. It just seems that the names and the amounts of their checks keep changing.
Many of the meatpacking workers now have two jobs, like the man who drives a
school bus part-time. These workers are in the same position as Peter Eisbach,
whose packinghouse job in Dubuque was sent down to Rochelle. Peter was described in a news story as one of the "newly poor," who cut back on all family
"frills," including the $18 for Brownie day camp for the youngest Eisbach.
Lorraine Schmall, Collective Bargaining in the 90s: An Efficient and Ethical Direction in
Dubuque Packing Company, Address at Twentieth Anniversary Midwinter Meeting of the
ABA Section of Labor & Employment Law, Committee on the Development of Law Under
the National Labor Relations Act D15-D20 (Mar. 2, 1992) (transcript on file with author).
188. Dubuque II, 303 N.L.R.B. at 16.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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protections against plant closings or to cushion their effects. 9 ' The NLRA
may also be deployed in crisis situations, in the absence of such prospective planning. For instance, the Act may entitle the union to obtain a
temporary injunction against the closing of a plant'9 2 pending resolution of
an arbitrable dispute under the collective bargaining agreement.1 9 3 Admittedly, it is a stopgap measure,' 9 4 and any ultimate relief will depend on the
strength of the contract language, which is unlikely to be great. Nevertheless, in a shutdown situation, even a short amount of additional time can
be of great value to workers and communities.
Though plant closings occur in a myriad of different circumstances, most
of them share an atmosphere of crisis. The stakes are high, the impact
potentially devastating, and the workers often fearful and disoriented.1 9 5
191. Such "planning" use of the NLRA is discussed in Part II.D.1.
192. A suit for such an injunction is brought under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
193. See. e.g., Local Lodge No. 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 288 (7th Cir. 1981)
(union able to enjoin plant closing pending arbitration of contractual distinction between
contracting out and elimination of jobs); Lever Brothers Co. v. International Chem. Workers, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 121 (4th Cir. 1976) (same). These injunctions are known in the
trade as "reverse Boys Market injunctions," from the case of Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail
Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1970) (holding that an employer could
secure an injunction against a strike if the relevant collective bargaining agreement contained no-strike clause, despite the ban on labor injunctions contained in the NorrisLaguardia Act). Such injunctions are premised on the theory that one party to the labor
contract should not be allowed to proceed in a manner that would irreparably injure the
other in advance of arbitration. The doctrine reflects the strong pro-arbitration (and
antistrike) gloss the Court has put on the NLRA. Because this kind of injunction protects
the status quo pending arbitration, in a plant closing situation it can provide crucial
organizing and thinking time for the workers whose jobs are threatened. It may, therefore,
alter the parties' bargaining positions on the closing as a whole, irrespective of the outcome
of the specific arbitration. For a critique of the asymmetrical trade-off involved in the
antistrike application of the Boys Market doctrine, see Staughton Lynd, Investment Decisions
and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 369, 416-23 (1979).
194. See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875, 885 (W.D.
Pa. 1972) (injunction effective only until final binding arbitration complete or until final
decree entered, which may be a very brief time).
195. As our opportunities for observation of these crises have unfortunately multiplied,
we have begun to appreciate the level of stress and anxiety brought on by most plant
closings. The literature describes a grieving process similar to that experienced upon the
loss of an intimate friend or family member, along with the complications and stress brought
on by the acute financial crisis that most often accompanies the news. For example, Walter
Strange, professor of psychology at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, testified about the effects
of the closing of an Olin-Mathieson plant in Saltville, Virginia:
In the case of [Mr. S1, aged 46, with an eighth grade education and 20 years at the
plant, the worry and the tendency to wake up in a cold sweat, precipitated by the
realization that the plant was going to close, were exacerbated markedly by the lack
of structure during the period of unemployment which followed. [Mr. S] was used
to work and the structure it provided. During his four-month period of unemployment, he became increasingly restless-with an apparently ill-focused need to keep
busy. At the same time, the worry of what to do continued "to dang" on him-
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If the company is irrevocably committed to leaving, then the workers'
leverage is likely to diminish daily as the departure date approaches. In
such a situation, an injunction can slow down the process and allow the
union and its members to get their bearings. Even if the union's only
realistic goal is negotiating a favorable severance package, the imposition
of an injunction increases the union's ability to bargain.19 6
The union's success in obtaining injunctive relief depends on the existence of an arbitrable grievance. Therefore, the specific language of the
collective bargaining agreement, and the factual circumstances surrounding the company's announcement, will in large part determine the availability and nature of a remedy. More profoundly, the background rule that
major investment decisions are not subjects of mandatory bargaining, that
they are the "private" concern of the "owners" of the enterprise and those
who manage for them, operates as a severe limit on the efficacy of contract

preoccupied him, so that he found himself wanting to go off alone to think. During
this period he also found himself tiring easily. His appetite diminished and he
found his temper growing "risky"....
Despite his large frame, [Mr. S] was physically vulnerable. He had had a kidney
removed-a fact of which he seemed especially conscious. At the closing, he had
sought to cushion the fact that all of his company medical coverage stopped with
the closing, leaving him without protection at a time when the stress upon him was
at its peak, by using his severance pay to buy a year's private coverage. Now, his
increased sense of psychological vulnerability tended to carry over to a heightened
concern for his physical continuity as well, which added to his worry. Also, bills
were piling up.
Hearings on H.R. 76 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 107-08 (1978) (testimony of Walter A. Strange).
196. Interview with Jim Eggleston, Attorney at Law, in Oakland, Cal. (June 19, 1989).
For further discussion of injunctions pending arbitration in plant closing or reorganization
situations, see Boltuch, supra note 156, at 56-62. Some readers may balk at my equation of
enhanced bargaining power for workers as a social good, and at my implicit approval of the
use of procedural strategies to gain such (however feebly) enhanced power. One could even
argue that such usage is against public policy because Congress has concluded that 60 days'
notice to employees is sufficient. From this vantage point, a legal move taken to buy time
beyond that already provided by statute might well appear as an abuse of the system. At
least one court views "union delay" in a plant closing situation as a phenomenon so
self-evidently negative that its prevention can help to justify a rule of law without further
explanation. See Arrow Automotive Indus. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 226 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the possibility of using bargaining as a tool for delay weighs against mandatory
bargaining).
Certainly I would prefer a rule structure that specifically guaranteed a reasonable time
and space for worker and community response and did not leave such matters to the speed
and cunning of junkyard dogs. I hope that the larger picture this article presents, and the
various arguments advanced in it, will demonstrate why I believe the legal system should
provide enhanced protection for the interests of workers and communities in productive
resources that they have helped to create and that significantly affect their welfare. In the
meantime, I believe those workers and the communities in which they live should use every
tool and handhold at their disposal. They are few enough.
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language concerning closures. As one lawyer observed after years of
fighting steel closures in the industrial heartland:
[T]he ordinary tactics of labor law such as filing grievances and § 301
suits are ineffective. At most such tactics buy time: sooner or later they
fail, because sooner or later the decisionmaker comes up against the fact
agreement does not restrict management's
that the collective bargaining
1 97
authority to shut a plant.
2. Common-Law Claims
Workers. Given the limits described above, it is not surprising that groups
faced with plant closings have reached beyond the confines of labor law in
their search for legal protection. Workers, even unionized ones, have
sought recourse in common-law actions, with the hope that notions of
fairness, entitlement, and obligation from the worlds of tort, contract, or
property could offer a way around the restrictive view of management
accountability so evident in the world of labor law.' 98 This phenomenon is
perhaps not surprising given that common-law theories of product liability
and warranty have proven an important alternative to workers' compensation for employees injured on the job, 19 9 and common-law tort and con197. Staughton Lynd, Corporate Ruthlessness and Community Despair, LAB. UPDATE, Feb.
1981, at 3, 13.
198. After noting the ineffectiveness of traditional labor law at protecting workers in this
type of situation, Staughton Lynd observed, "New and untested as such claims may be they
offer more promise than conventional labor law litigation in plant closing/reopening
struggles." Id. at 13; see also Barbara Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effects on EmployeesThe Need for New Remedies, 35 LAB. L.J. 268, 275-79 (1984) (suggesting wrongful discharge,
covenant of good faith, and selected business torts as fertile ground for plant closing
plaintiffs, and suggesting that the problems of federal labor law preemption defenses to state
court movement in these directions are not insurmountable).
199. In recent decades American employees have sometimes fared better when they stood
before the law as persons seeking damages for personal injury from the tort system rather
than as workers seeking statutory awards from the workers' compensation system. As lawyers
have successfully found inventive ways to avoid or compensate for the exclusivity provisions
of workers' compensation schemes, tort recoveries for workplace injury, jury trials, and even
punitive damages in such cases, have become commonplace features of the legal landscape.
Of course these trends are hotly debated from a number of different perspectives. See, e.g.,
Summers, supra note 122, at 522.
Just as workers attempting to win common-law recoveries must thread their way through
or around the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation laws, common-law plantclosing plaintiffs have been confronted with federal labor law preemption defenses to their
complaints. The subject of preemption in the plant-closing context is one of considerable
complexity. For some rudimentary discussion and references, see infra notes 226 & 227.
At any rate, it is dubious that claims growing out of plant closings will experience as warm
a reception in the common-law world as have claims growing out of individual personal
injury on the job. By their nature, factory shutdowns are mass events and raise from the
outset all the political, practical, and ideological controversies that have troubled and
divided the courts and legal scholars alike on the question of mass torts.
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tract theories have provided a remedy for discharged individuals who
under traditional employment law would have been viewed as employees-at00
will.

2

One of the best publicized cases in which workers brought common law
claims against a departing employer grew out of the massive shutdowns
that took place in the Mahoning Valley, in and around Youngstown, Ohio,
from 1977 to 1980. During that brief time span, three major steel works
closed and over 10,000 jobs were lost.20 1 One of the lawsuits brought by
workers and community members, Local 1330, United Steelworkers of Amer1'
eas of
ica v. United
States Steel Corp., 202 was widely reported, 201 in part because
2
the massive scale of the steel shutdowns and the social dislocation involved; 1
200. See supra notes 90-91. For an early influential article suggesting the viability of such
theories, see Peter Shapiro & James Tune, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 335 (1974). For an article that explicitly draws the link between individual wrongful
discharge cases and the plant-closing situation, see Barbara Rhine, Business Closings and
Their Effects on Employees-Adaptation of the Tort of Wrongful Discharge, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J.
362 (1986).
201. Soon the closing disease was also evident in Pittsburgh and the Monongahela Valley.
One poet described the aftermath of the steel shutdowns there as follows:
Gray
Driving through the Monongahela Valley in winter
is like driving through the gray matter
of someone not too bright but conscientious,
a hard-working undergraduate who barely passes.
Everybody knows how hard he tries. I'm driving up
into gray mountains and there, it may be snowing
gray, little flecks like pigeon feathers, or what
used to sift down onto the now abandoned slag piles,
like what seems to sift across the faces
of the jobless in the gray afternoons.
At Johnstown I stop, look down the straight line
of the Incline, closed for repairs, to the gray heart
of the steel mills with For Sale signs on them. Behind me,
is the last street of disease-free Dutch elms in America,
below me, a city rebuilt three times after flood.
Gray is a lesson in the poise of affliction. Disaster
by disaster, we learn insouciance, begin to wear
colors bright as the red and yellow sashes on
elephants, whose gray hides cover, like this sky,
an enormity none of us can fathom, though we try.
Maggie Anderson, Gray, in WORKING CLASSICS 6 (Peter Oresick & Nicholas Coles eds.,
1990). For a description of a steel shutdown in Chicago, see DAVID BENSMAN & ROBERTA
LYNCH, RUSTED DREAMS: HARD TIMES IN A STEEL COMMUNITY (1987).
202. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
203. See, e.g., Agis Salpukas, HearingNear on Fate of Youngstown Mill: Workers Seek Bar to
Disposal by U.S. Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1980, at D4.
204. The case attracted attention from national church groups, media, and legal commentators alike. Jim Benn, presently the director of the Federation on Industrial Retention and

1814

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:1757

in part because of the depth and breadth of popular resistance to the
corporation's decision;20 5 in part because of the aggressive, popularly
rooted and inventive lawyering that accompanied that resistance; 2 06 and in
part because of the noteworthy judicial views that were expressed during
the course of the litigation.2 °7
The suit began only after local steelworkers and their community allies,
under the banner of the Ecumenical Coalition of the Mahoning Valley,
worked unsuccessfully for two years to save steel jobs. They had sought to
reopen a closed mill under employee-community ownership and later
unsuccessfully attempted to block a merger of two steel giants, which they
rightly feared would lead to more closings. Finally, when Youngstown

Renewal, says of the Youngstown experience, "It was the case that gave birth to the plant
closing movement as we know it today." Telephone Interview with Jim Benn, Director of
the Federation on Industrial Retention and Renewal of Chicago, I11.(Feb. 3, 1993).
205. Rank and file steelworkers, for instance, obtained over 100,000 signatures on a
petition to the federal government, which was then personally delivered to Washington by
busloads of union members. The Ecumenical Coalition was formed with local church
leaders and community activists. A Steel Crisis Conference was convened. Rank and file
workers briefly occupied the Pittsburgh headquarters of U.S. Steel and its Youngstown
administration building. See Staughton Lynd, The Genesis of the Idea of a Community Right
to Industrial Property in Youngstown and Pittsburgh, 1977-1987, 74 J. AM. HIST. 926, 932-33,
936 (1987).

206. Among the plaintiffs' attorneys were Alice and Staughton Lynd. Staughton Lynd is a
legal services lawyer, a radical historian, a social activist, and a long-time campaigner for
peace. On his own and with Alice Lynd, his wife, he has spoken and written extensively on
the issue of plant closings and industrial democracy. The Lynds' involvement with this case
contributed to its high profile, partly because of their links to other economic justice
activists, but more importantly because of the quality and intensity of the work that they put
into the fight, together with other lawyers on the team, fellow strategists and activists, and
workers and community. members who were their clients. See STAUGHTON LYND, THE FIGHT
AGAINST SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL CLOSINGS 11 (1982) [hereinafter LYND,
THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS] (telling the story of the shutdown of three steel mills in
the Mahoning valley during the period 1977-1980); Lynd, supra note 197, at 938-39, 954-55
(discussing theory of community right to industrial property from Youngstown lawsuit);
Staughton Lynd, The Fight to Save the Steel Mills, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 19, 1979, at 37
(discussing the permanent layoff of 5000 employees at Campbell Works in Youngstown and
Jones & Laughlin's plans to shut down a second Youngstown mill). Lynd reminds his
readers that the legal strategies developed over the course of the Youngstown struggle owed
much of their deepest insight to the workers themselves: "I have deliberately placed
rank-and-file steelworkers in the center of the narrative. I think that they belong there."
LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS, supra, at 11. Other lawyers on the plaintiffs' team
included Youngstown attorneys Jim Denney, Bob Clyde, and Jim Callen. Id. at 142. It is
also the case that Lynd's writings about this fight have memorialized and made it accessible
to a larger public in ways that have not been true for many other struggles. Lawyers and
activists alike seldom have time, training, or past experience that would encourage them to
write for publication. This is a shame, and it is to be hoped that more publications about

particular efforts rooted in different industries, parts of the country, and diverse strategies
will be forthcoming.
207. See infra text accompanying note 212.
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workers learned in late 1979 that U.S. Steel would shut down the last large
20 8
works in the Mahoning Valley, they brought suit.
Rather than pursuing a traditional labor law strategy, the plaintiffs
claimed that U.S. Steel was breaching an implied contract it had entered
with its workers during the course of earlier concession bargaining. 2°9 The
company, the plaintiffs claimed, had promised that if the mills could be
made profitable through concessions, the mills would remain open. 2 10 The
workers were convinced that the plant was still making a profit and were
furious that the company was now reneging on its promises.2 1 1
At a pretrial hearing, Judge Thomas D. Lambros announced sua sponte
a second common-law theory based on property rights. His heartfelt
statement generated great interest among property scholars and plantclosing activists alike. The court endorsed, or at least seriously entertained, a view of property rights consonant with the same vision many
workers and community members had been urging:
Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has been happening for many years because of steel. Schools have been built, roads
have been built. Expansion that has taken place is because of steel. And
to accommodate that industry, lives and destinies of the inhabitants of
that community were based and planned on the basis of that institution:
Steel.
208. Plaintiffs included a citizens' group that had formed in response to the crisis, a local
Republican congressman, a nearby United Auto Worker local, United Steelworker locals
from the area, and some 65 individual employees from the U.S. Steel plant that was
threatening to close. Lynd, supra note 197, at 4.
209. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1,
3 (N.D. Ohio 1980). The plaintiffs advanced a claim based on promissory estoppel in § 90 of
the Second Restatement of Contracts-the theory that detrimental reliance on a promise in
the proper circumstances may render that promise legally enforceable. Id.
210. Lynd's condensed narrative of the factual background of their detrimental reliance
claim is as follows:
In the fall of 1977, at the same time that Youngstown Sheet & Tube closed its
Campbell Works, United States Steel represented to its Youngstown workers that
their mills could be kept open if the workers made them profitable. This message
was repeated for twenty-six months in a variety of forums, including recorded
messages over the in-plant telephone or "hot line," and by a variety of agents,
including Chairman of the Board Roderick. As late as November 1, 1979, less than
a month before the shutdown announcement, workers were assured at a public
forum in Cleveland that the Youngstown Works were profitable and U.S. Steel had
no plans to shut them down.
The workers and their local unions detrimentally relied on this promise by
acquiescing in job combinations, dove-tailing of seniority lists, shift scheduling to
save energy, and other concessions.
Lynd, supra note 197, at 4-5. The company denied making any binding promises.
211. The plant's profitability was, even according to advocates for the plaintiffs, a "close
question," and depended on how it was gauged. Id. at 5.
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But what has happened over the years between U.S. Steel, Youngstown and the inhabitants? Hasn't something come out of that relationship, something that out of which-not reaching for a case on property
law or a series of cases but looking at the law as a whole, ... and then
sitting back and reflecting on what it seeks to do, and that is to adjust
human relationships in keeping with the whole spirit and foundation of
the American system of law, to preserve property rights....
It would seem to me that when we take a look at the whole body of
American law and the principles we attempt to come out with-and
although a legislature has not pronounced any laws with respect to such
a property right, that is not to suggest that there will not be a need for
such a law in the future dealing with similar situations-it seems to me
that a property right has arisen from this lengthy, long-established relationship between United States Steel, the steel industry as an institution,
the community in Youngstown, the people in Mahoning County and the
Valley in having given and devoted their lives to this indusMahoning
2
try.

21

Based on this property right, the court granted plaintiffs the injunction
they sought, temporarily barring U.S. Steel from dismantling the steel
mill. 213 From the workers' point of view this was a tremendous victory.
Practically, they had at least temporarily saved the plant. Philosophically,
the property theory articulated by the trial judge was a potential breakthrough. It gave weight and legal meaning to years of prior investment by
current workers, their predecessors, and the surrounding community, and
would offer some ballast against their presently precarious standing in the
global economy. 2 14 It was also stronger than their original contract claim
in that it was less vulnerable to the company's presently superior bargaining strength.21 5

212. Singer, supra note 90, at 618, 619 (quoting Judge Lambros's statements from pretrial
hearings and as they appear in Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States
Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1279-80 (6th Cir. 1980) and LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST
SHUTDOWNS, supra note 206, at 163-66 (footnotes and emphasis omitted)). Lynd recalls, "No
one sitting in the court room had ever heard anything like this before .... The lawyers were
in a state of shock." Id. at 166.
213. See United Steelworkers of Am., Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.
Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
214. For an elegant and doctrinally contextualized exploration of the property claim
involved in the case, see Singer, supra note 90.
215. Needless to say, corporate actors with reasonably competent legal advice and reasonably competent leadership are unlikely to make explicit promises once they are aware such
promises might become actionable. In fact, they are likely to take care to disavow even
implicit promises. In Youngstown, for example, after the lawsuit against U.S. Steel, "At the
few remaining steel facilities in the Mahoning Valley, LTV made sure that future concession
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Despite the expansive tone of the trial court's ruling on the pretrial
motion, the plaintiffs' claims were rebuffed in the end. As to the contract
claims, the court found that the promissory behavior at stake was either
not of a kind that workers should have reasonably construed as promissory
(apparently media statements by public relations personnel of the company fell into this category) or was performed by persons who could not
bind the corporation. 216 The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to
prove the Youngstown facilities were in fact profitable, even if the U.S.
Steel promises had been binding.21 7
As to the property claim, the trial court, while sympathetic, ultimately
declined to recognize a property right derived from the long-term relationship between industry and community:
[T]he lives of 3500 workers and their families and the supporting Youngstown community cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. United States
Steel should not be permitted to leave the Youngstown area devastated
after drawing from the lifeblood of the community for so many years.
Unfortunately, the mechanism to reach this ideal settlement, to recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in the code of laws of
our nation.... [T]his Court is not a legislative body and cannot make
laws where none exist ....

[T]his Court can determine no legal basis for

the finding of a property right.2 18

Plaintiffs in Local 1330 were able to show repeated assurances from
management that if the mill made a profit, it would stay open. They were
also in a strikingly good position to demonstrate deep, long-term human
investment in the defendant corporation, to show lifetimes of detrimental
reliance upon that corporation's reasonably expected performance by employees and by the surrounding community. 21 9 Despite the factual setting,
agreements were in writing and were insulated against contract claims like those made in the
U.S. Steel suit." Lynd, supra note 205, at 940.
216. United Steel Workers of Am., Local No. 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.
Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
217. Id. at 6-9.
218. Id. at 10. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the common law
claims. Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264, 1279-82 (6th Cir. 1980). In the meantime the plaintiffs had added an antitrust claim,
which the Sixth Circuit preserved and remanded. See infra note 367 and accompanying text
(discussing antitrust claims).
219. The reluctance of courts to apply existing common law norms to the plant closing
context contrasts with their more generous attitude in the context of individual discharge.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing developing law of wrongful discharge).
Even more striking is the contrast between the court's approach to plant closing cases and
those outside the employment context altogether: "It is more difficult for employees to
convince courts to enforce promises of job security than it is for parties in other contexts to
convince courts to enforce other promises made with similar seriousness and with similar
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however, and despite broad-based mobilization and capable lawyering, the
plaintiffs in Youngstown suffered resounding legal defeat. The courts to
which they turned proved unwilling to interpret property, tort, or contract
rules 2to afford relief to workers or local unions in the plant-closing set2
ting. 0
Another set of common-law claims by workers grew out of a partial
closing by Atari, Inc., a large electronic games manufacturer in California.
22 1
The company announced a partial plant closing in the midst of a union
organizing campaign, but the union's attempt to press unfair labor practice
charges under the NLRA failed because Atari was able to rebut any
implication of antiunion animus by showing that its decision had predated
the organizing drive. 22 Workers then sued the company on their own for
common law fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract, based on
the company's explicit promises of job security and denials of "rumors" of
2 23
layoffs in the months preceding the announcement.
224 and
Although plaintiffs withstood motions for summary judgment
22 5 they first had to overcome a
eventually obtained favorable settlements,
preemption challenge under the NLRA, a defense that other workers
2 2 6 Ironically, the plainseeking common-law remedies have encountered.
reliance." Jack Beerman & Joseph Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The
Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 923 (1989).
220. For critical commentary on the outcome in Local 1330, see Daniel Farber & John
Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 903, 938-45 (1985); Jay Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 829, 858-60 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 630-31 (1982); Singer, supra note 90.
221. As later described by lawyers for the workers:
A massive layoff of 1700 workers was announced in the largest plant shutdown
[then] to hit Silicon Valley's electronics industry. Over 500 employees were pulled
off their work sites, herded into meetings, stripped of their keys and badges and
summarily fired. Most were not even allowed back into their work areas to collect
personal belongings.
Employment Law Center, A Summary of Carson, Villanueva, et al. vs. Atari, Inc., Warner
Communications, Inc., Raymond Kassar, et al., 2 (June 3, 1986) (unpublished paper, on file
with author).
222. Id. at 3.
223. The plaintiffs also argued that reasonable notice was an implied requirement of
California's Labor Code, which provided that employment of no fixed duration "may be
terminated at the will of either party upon notice to the other." Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
224. Atari v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. Rptr. 773, 774 (Ct. App. 1985).
225. The settlement amounted to approximately four weeks severance pay for each
worker. Id.; see also Atari to Pay $1 Million to Settle Suit Stemming from Closing of California
Plant, 1986 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 109, at A-1 (June 6, 1986) (settlement could provide
each worker with over $1000).
226. See, e.g., Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1516-18 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding fraud claims by individual union members growing out of a plant shutdown after

1993] LAW, POVERTY, AND AMERICA'S ERODING INDUSTRIAL BASE 1819
tiffs prevailed by turning the union's election defeat and Atari's successful
defense against the unfair labor charges into a convincing argument that
the NLRA had nothing to do with their situation. In essence, the evolving
doctrinal structure forced the workers to tell an antiunion narrative, or at
least to perform a convincing erasure of the union's presence and relevance to their claim.
This strategy turned out to be a winning one for the Atari employees.
But the spectacle of workers needing to distance themselves from unions
and labor law in order to be able to claim employment rights rooted in
other sources, is quite revealing about the present state of U.S. workplace
law, with its decided pull toward the elaboration of individual rights and
the atrophy of collective ones. In any event, unionized workers who assert
common-law claims in plant closing situations may have more difficulty
defeating the preemption claim than unorganized workers.2 2 7
Government Bodies. Workers are not the only plaintiffs who have attempted to use common law claims to prevent shutdowns. State and local
governments frequently have contractual and quasicontractual dealings
with manufacturers. In attempting to attract or retain industry, officials
may offer low-interest loans, tax breaks, infrastructure contributions, and
technical assistance to corporations. They may float bonds whose proceeds are tax free, a fact that makes lenders willing to accept a lower
interest rate from the borrowing entity. When an employer decides to
leave a location despite having received such benefits, aggrieved governments have sometimes brought lawsuits based on common-law claims.
In West Virginia, for instance, Governor Arch Moore, Jr. fought a
shutdown relying on contract and fraud claims, with short-lived success.2 28
concession bargaining preempted by NLRA because they alleged employer conduct that was
arguably a violation of that Act and because the claims had previously been the subject of
arbitration and unfair labor practice charges); Serrano v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 790
F.2d 1279, 1287-88 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding such fraud claims preempted by NLRA because
they alleged conduct that was arguably prohibited by the Act and because federal interests at
stake outweighed state interest).
227. Id. The theory of preemption may be used to win dismissals of lawsuits by workers
and unions. In addition, it may be used to invalidate state and local legislation. See infra
note 432 and accompanying text. The WARN Act, on the other hand, contains an explicit
antipreemption provision. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104 (1992 Supp.).
228. See Moore v. Newell Corp., No. 87-0117-C(K) (N.D. W. Va. filed Sept. 24, 1987)
(plaintiff's complaint); West Virginia v. Anchor Hocking Corp., No. 87-C-759-1 (Cir. Ct.
Harrison County, W. Va. filed Oct. 7, 1987) (plaintiffs' complaint); Anchor Hocking Corp. v.
Moore, No. C2-88-0738 (S.D. Ohio filed July 13, 1988) (verified complaint for injunctive
relief). See generally Joseph White, Factory Towns Start to Fight Back Angrily When Firms Pull
Out, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1988, at 1. The cocounsel for the State of West Virginia in the
Anchor Hocking dispute describes this case and others in J. Bradley Russell, Implied
Contracts and Creatinga Corporate Tort: One Way State and Local Government are Starting to
FightPlant Closings, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 1249 (1988).
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Anchor Hocking had operated a glassmaking plant in Clarksburg, West
Virginia for eighty-seven years had received over $3.5 million in lowinterest loans from the state's Economic Development Authority, job
training funds, and tax abatements. 22 9 After the Newell Corporation
acquired the company in a hostile takeover, it announced it would close
the plant. When emergency meetings between the Governor and Newell
officials failed to result in an agreement, the Governor brought suit in
federal court for breach of an oral contract between himself and company
officials, who had allegedly promised during their negotiations to help
facilitate transfer of the plant to a new owner and maintenance of a viable
facility at Clarksburg. 23° The Governor succeeded in winning a temporary
restraining order preventing the company from removing equipment from
the plant.23 1
When Governor Moore and the state later refiled in state court,23 2 they
also alleged breach of express and implied contracts based on the lowinterest loans, job training funds, and tax abatements; breach of a general
duty of good faith and fair dealing; and fraud. Additionally, they argued
that the company had a duty to "seek fulfillment of consideration" by
facilitating and cooperating in attempts to get the plant into the hands of a
new owner that would keep it operating. 23 3 Although the state court
initially granted an injunction, this success, too, was only temporary. After
an evidentiary hearing, the court found that the commercial loan docu-4
ments explicitly gave Anchor the right to retire its debt ahead of schedule;2
the tax incentives given to Anchor were generally available to all similar
manufacturers in West Virginia; and the job training funds were from
federal, not state, sources and were not conditioned on job security agreements in any case.23 5
West Virginia's common-law claims in the Anchor Hocking case were
frustrated in large measure by the language of the loan documents, which

229. West Virginia v. Anchor Hocking Corp., No. 87-C-759-1, at 2 (Cir. Ct. Harrison
County, W.Va. filed Oct. 7, 1987) (plaintiffs' complaint).
230. Moore v. Newell Corp., No. 87-0117-C(K) (N.D. W. Va. filed Sept. 24, 1987)
(temporary restraining order).
231. Id.
232. Newell successfully argued that the case should be tried in state court. West Virginia
v. Anchor Hocking Corp., No. 87-C-759-1 (Cir. Ct. Harrison County, W. Va. filed Oct. 7,
1987) (plaintiff's complaint).
233. Id.
234. Although the 1979 loan agreement provided that "[s]o long as loans.., remain
unpaid ... Anchor Hocking shall conduct its business in Harrison County, West Virginia," it
also provided that the company "shall have the right, at any time, to anticipate payment of
all or any part of this Note." Anchor Hocking Corp., No. 87-C-759-1, at 4-5 (opinion and
order). The 1986 loan deal was similar. Id. at 7-8.
235. Id. at 9-10.
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made specific reference to Anchor's right to pay up and get out. Although
one of the trial court's orders indicates that after the Anchor Hocking
closing West Virginia attempted to negotiate tougher language with industries seeking government benefits, 236 the financing packages that currently
are offered by the state to industry
continue explicitly to allow for prepay23 7
ment of loans without penalty.

In the course of its suit, the state suffered an additional setback when
the Newell Corporation filed a civil rights action in federal court in Ohio,
Anchor Hocking's principal place of business. 23 8 The company claimed
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(c) that the Governor and the state had
conspired to deprive it of its constitutional right to close its plant and
sought damages and an injunction that would prohibit the Governor from
enforcing the injunction he had obtained in state court. 239 This conspiracy
case was ultimately settled, with the parties agreeing to drop all other
pending actions. 24" The state of West Virginia ended up with precious
little to show for its efforts. 24 1 It obtained only a weak commitment from
236. Anchor Hocking Corp., No. 87-C-759-1, at 9 (opinion and order). Specifically, the
opinion recited that the state had sought a promise from the prospective purchaser of an
automobile plant in Charleston to stay in West Virginia for the full anticipated duration of
the government loans at issue, and that the requested provision became known as "the
Anchor Hocking clause" in negotiations. Id.
237. Telephone interview with David Warner, staff member with West Virginia's Community and Economic Development Office, Morgantown, W. Va. (Feb. 3, 1993). This economic
development staffer indicated that West Virginia financing packages for industry are not
entirely toothless. He explained that the packages contain provisions that allow the state to
call an industrial development loan if certain employment levels are not achieved, or in the
event of a change in corporate ownership. Id.
238. Anchor Hocking Corp. v. Moore, No. C2-88-0738 (S.D. Ohio filed Sept. 23, 1988)
(verified complaint for injunctive relief).
239. Newell claimed infringement of its rights under the Commerce Clause, Due Process
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Takings Cause, and Eighth Amendment. Id.
240. Anchor-Hocking Corp., No. C2-88-0738 (S.D. Ohio filed Sept. 23, 1988) (final order
approving settlement and terminating action).
241. From Newell's point of view, the Governor had been able to exact a substantial
price. The company's move was delayed by many months, and the company was forced to
incur legal expenses. A governor could hardly be a more prominent "state actor," and it is
true that he could marshall substantial resources to carry on both negotiations and legal
proceedings. So it is right that Newell should have a forum in which to complain about
government action, and the company may have perceived no injustice in its invocation of the
Constitution as a bar to this particular public official's attempt to hold it accountable for the
public monies it had received (and perhaps to advance his own political fortunes).
Nevertheless, Newell's casting of itself as the victim in this story, and its invocation of
federal judicial power, surely underscores oft-stated criticisms of the public-private distinction as it currently functions in constitutional law. "Private" conduct is immunized from
most constitutional challenge based on the assumption that abuse and overreaching by
public actors are the only dangers against which the Constitution commonly offers a shield.
That assumption looks particularly inadequate in the plant-closing context in which "private"
corporate action can have momentous public effects. The public-private distinction in U.S.
constitutional law is another piece of the general background law unfavorable to those who
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Newell, memorialized in the order of settlement, to cooperate in the
state's efforts to find a new buyer that would keep the Anchor Hocking
however,
facility in operation.2 4 2 A successful deal was never put together,
243
empty.
stands
currently
facility
Hocking
Anchor
and the former
In another example of common-law claims advanced by a governmental
entity, the Town of Norwood, Ohio, brought suit against General Motors
(GM) when it announced plans to leave Norwood. GM, then the city's
largest employer, had maintained its Norwood plant for over sixty years,
receiving substantial government benefits during that period.2 44 Excerpts
from the complaint bring home with unusual clarity the stark situation that
may confront a small one-company town when the plant announces it will
close:
The closing of the Norwood GM plant has had and will have a
catastrophic economic effect upon the City of Norwood; the Defendant,
General Motors Corporation, is the City's largest employer and taxpayer,
and the City derives nearly one-third of its tax revenues from the Defendant .... In light of the closing of the Norwood GM plant, the City of

wish to achieve greater legal leverage for workers and communities in plant-closing battles.
Newell's overall posture in this case is simply one reminder of that fact. Although corporations should be able to find shelter in the Constitution from arbitrary exercises of state
power, the best reading of the Constitution should not leave workers and communities
defenseless in the face of arbitrary exercises of corporate power. Cf. Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441, 453-61 (1992) (noting the substantial threats posed to
women's liberty by "private" power, and the inefficacy of the Constitution as presently
interpreted in guarding that liberty).
242. Included in the settlement were noncompetition provisions, which severely limited
the economic options of those who wanted to save the plant. See Anchor-Hocking Corp., No.
C2-88-0738, at 2-3 (final order approving settlement and terminating action).
243. Telephone Interview with David Warner, supra note 237.
244. The plaintiff's complaint details the development of the GM plant as a part of the
City of Norwood and its contributions to the plant:
The Defendant, General Motors Corporation, first established an assembly plant
in the City of Norwood in 1923. The size of the plant grew continuously, until the
plant became the City of Norwood's largest employer .. . and ...

became a vital

and integral part of Norwood's community. The City of Norwood encouraged the
growth of the Norwood GM plant by granting numerous concessions... including ...

the building of an underpass at Forest Avenue .. . to accommodate trains

bringing rail cars into the Norwood GM plant ... vacat[ing] several streets in and
around the GM plant ...

assisting General Motors in the purchase ...

of property

... assisting with traffic problems and, in general, doing anything that General
Motors requested.
City of Norwood v. General Motors Corp., No. A8705920 (Ct. Common Pleas Hamilton
County, Ohio filed Aug. 7, 1987) (complaint and jury demand, on file with The Georgetown
Law Journal). This complaint also recited that the work performed at Norwood would be
moved to Van Nuys, California. For a view of the GM decision from the Van Nuys end of
this whipsaw, see MANN, supra note 4.
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Norwood now anticipates a gross reduction of revenue, for the years
1986 to 1991, in the amount of... $15,688,786.000 ....
To begin adjusting for the sudden, and unexpected, termination of
operations at the Norwood GM plant, the City of Norwood has instituted
a number of immediate, emergency cost saving measures, including:
a) A ten percent ... reduction in salary for all administrative personnel;
b) Termination of approximately ten percent... of the City's work force,
with the termination of an additional seven percent ... through the

process of attrition;
c) Elimination of the City's Waste Collection Department;
d) A ten percent reduction in the budget of the Police Department;
e) A ten percent... reduction in the budget of the Fire Department;
f) Elimination of most liability insurance coverage;
g) Reduction in senior citizens' social services;
h) A thirty percent... increase in water rates and;
i) A decrease, due to attrition, of the City's police and fire departments. 245
The city also recited that GM planned to vacate its facility and withdraw
all its fire and security personnel despite uncertainty about remaining
hazardous materials on the site. To stop the shutdown and the withdrawal of safety personnel, the city claimed that GM was liable in nuisance
and for breach of contract, for "breach of equitable fiduciary duty," and
for fraud and misrepresentation. 4 6 It sought and briefly won a temporary
restraining order that required GM to maintain security and fire protection, and barred it from removing or destroying any records relating to
hazardous materials on the site.24 7
The reprieve was short-lived, however. The court soon dismissed the
bulk of the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, reserving for
the future only the nuisance count.2 4a Once GM agreed to tear down the

245. Id. at 4-5.
246. Id. at 7-12, 14-18.
247. City of Norwood, No. A8705920 (temporary restraining order entered Aug. 10, 1987).
248. City of Norwood, No. A8705920 (decision entered Sept. 2, 1988). The court dismissed
that part of the nuisance claim that dealt with improper handling of hazardous materials,
saying that in the absence of demonstrable illegality, such matters were better left with
regulatory agencies. Id. at 3. The court preserved that part of the nuisance claim that dealt
with the withdrawal of fire and security personnel, id. at 4, but dismissed the other counts.
Id. at 5-10 (insufficient pleading of facts to support promisory estoppel); id. at 10-11 (same
for fiduciary duty); id. at 11-14 (same for fraud).

1824

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:1757

plant, the city dropped even that claim, and the case was over. 2 4 9 The
a significantly
lawsuit was unsuccessful in saving jobs or in obtaining
25 °
city.
the
or
workers
the
for
package
severance
improved
A more encouraging outcome for a city's contractual claims involved the
Diamond Tool & Horseshoe Company in Duluth, Minnesota. In 1987 the
workers at Diamond were faced with concession demands from a company
that had already been steadily transferring jobs and equipment to a plant
in South Carolina. When union members voted down Diamond's proposed concessions, they realized they should brace for a fight.25 1
Ensuing union research revealed that the company's parent corporation
has acquired it in a leveraged buy-out several years earlier and had
financed the purchase in large part through $10,000,000 of municipal

249. Telephone Interview with Robert Kelly, City Attorney for Norwood (Feb. 3, 1993).
250. Telephone Interview with Diane McBride, Attorney at Waite, Schneider, Bayless &
Chesley, cocounsel for the City of Norwood in City of Norwood v. General Motors in
Cincinnati, Ohio (Feb. 5, 1993). Despite the shock of GM's closing, and despite the limited
efficacy of the lawsuit, Norwood has not given up the ghost. In fact, according to some
accounts, the city has bounced back in a remarkable way. For those interested in the
fortunes of poor people, however, reports of the bounce-back suggest more trouble than
hope. A cheerful dispatch to The New York Times in January 1992, reported unselfconsciously:
Norwood has discovered that there is life after G.M .... Young professionals who
once shunned blue-collar Norwood are moving here and lifting prices of the city's
spacious homes.
City officials and residents almost unanimously agree that Norwood's prospects
are better without the automaker ....

Although Norwood is not out of the woods and has to contend with an ominous
$2.7 million budget deficit, it no longer mourns the loss of G.M., and its citizens are
upbeat about the future. Their optimism is inspired largely by the city's new office
building and fountain, which replaced the GM plant and brightens what would
otherwise be a fading downtown. Some believe the city now has all the ingredients
to eventually match the exclusivity of neighboring Hyde Park ....
. Indeed, many citizens said morale had improved in Norwood, which was once
the butt of jokes in Cincinnati about hillbillies who came from Kentucky to work at
the plant.
Adam Bryant, G.M.'s Gone, but This City's Alive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1992, at D1, D5. It is
hard to imagine a clearer instance of a development strategy based on utter disregard
for-actually, outright hostility toward-poor people. I trust that the anti-Appalachian bias
is so blatant as to need no comment, but I want to make a comment about that unabashed
prejudice. It stinks.
See also infra note 357. For a highly detailed and variegated look at another city where the
rhetoric of revival and the reality of poverty linked to deindustrialization go hand in hand,
see Symposium, Buffalo Change & Community, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 313 (1991).

251. Greg LeRoy, Tax, Bonds, and Videotape: Rewriting the Script On Shutdowns, LAB.
RES. REV., Fall 1992, at 31, 39.
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industrial revenue bonds. 2 2 The bond documents prohibited Triangle, the
parent company, from removing most city-financed assets during the life of
the bonds.2 53 Further, authorizing legislation stressed prevention of unemployment as one of the major policies behind the granting of revenue bond
254
authority.
Armed with this knowledge, the union and the Diamond workers approached the City of Duluth and convinced it to sue on the bonds. 5 At
the trial court level, the plaintiffs won an unprecedented ruling 2 5 6 -the
trial court found that the transfers of equipment from Duluth to South
Carolina were not made in good faith, that they had materially impaired
"the operating unity" of the Duluth facility,2 5 7 and that "Triangle ha[d]
attempted to violate the spirit, intent and purpose of the Minnesota
Municipal Industrial Development Act., 258 It ordered the company to
bring back to Duluth some of the equipment it had already shipped to
South Carolina. 9
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding that
Triangle had an obligation to remain in Duluth during the life of the
bonds. It reversed, however, that part of the trial court's order requiring
Triangle to return the equipment. 260 Although this ruling was less favor252. Id.
253. In Re Indenture of Trust No. 158 (findings, conclusion, and order).
254. The policies and purposes section of the Minnesota Municipal Industrial Development Act of 1987 states in part: "The welfare of the state requires the ... development of
economically sound industry ...through governmental action for the purpose of preventing.., chronic unemployment." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.152 (West 1992). The Act goes on
to authorize a municipality to issue bonds "in anticipation of the collection of revenues of a
project to be situated within the state." Id. § 469.155 (emphasis added).
255. In re Indenture of Trust dated as of March 1, 1982, No. 158 (Dist. Ct. St. Louis
County, Minn. filed June 17, 1988). Significantly, the union won entry into the lawsuit as a
third-party beneficiary of the bond agreements. According to local union leadership, their
ability to participate as full members of the lawsuit was important to the energy and success
with which the city's claim was pursued. Telephone interview with Tom Stillman, dislocated
worker and past president of local union, Duluth, Minn. (Feb. 5, 1993).
256. The ruling was unusual enough that it drew widespread attention in the press. E.g.,
Duluth Gets Tough with Fleeing Company, CITY & STATE, July 4, 1988, at 24; Cities Win Round
in Plant Case, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1988, at Cl; Wayne Nelson, Firm Told to Return
Equipment: Triangle Corp. Ruling Praisedby City, Union, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., June 28, 1988,
at 1A; Dennis Walters, Decision BarringMove of Equipment Financed by IDBs May Stir Other
Cities, BOND BUYER, June 29, 1988, at 1; Julian Weiss, Duluth v. Triangle: A Catalyst?, Bus.
FACILITIES,

Sept. 1988, at 35.

257. "Operating unity" was a term of art important under the provisions of one of the
financing documents in the bond deal. In Re Indenture of Trust No 158 (findings, conclusion,
and order).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 18.
260. In re Indenture of Trust dated as of March 1, 1982, re City of Duluth $10,000,000
Indus. Dev. Revenue Bonds, Series 1982-1 (The Triangle Corporation Project), 437 N.W.2d
430, 436-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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able to the city, it nevertheless halted Triangle's steady progress toward
closing, at least for a time. 61
As the above stories suggest, revenue bonds and other development
incentives may provide assertive state and local governments with some
leverage for job security. 262 Nevertheless, local governments are acutely
aware of their precarious position in the restructuring economy and are
frequently dissuaded from taking legal action against fleeing employers.2 6 3
Deindustrialization, the global assembly line, the global market, and fierce
geographic competition for the dwindling number of manufacturing jobs
are all trends that exert strong pressure on state and local officials to avoid
any appearance of a climate "hostile" to business. 2 64 Even in the relatively
successful Duluth case, workers report that convincing the city to take the
261. As with so many plant closing victories, this ruling represented only a temporary
defense for the workers. As of this writing, the Triangle bonds have been paid off in the
normal course of business, and the workers at Diamond have been confronted with another
set of demands for concessions. Telephone Interview with Tom Stillman, supra note 255.
262. The City of Chicago took similar action against a toy manufacturer that received
industrial revenue bonds. See Steven Greenhouse, Chicago Sues Toy Company Over Industrial Revenue Bonds: Tighter Rein on Incentives for Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1985. The
case eventually settled. Telephone Interview with Greg LeRoy, Staffmember, Midwest
Center for Labor Research, Chicago, I11.(July 17, 1990).
263. Carolyn Adams reports, for instance, that organizers of a Philadelphia conference on
plant closings "had great difficulty securing from both local government and the local
businesses the participation of representatives who were not sure the subject should be
discussed at all." Carolyn Teich Adams, The Flight of Jobs and Capital: Prospects for
GrassrootsAction, in COMMUNITY AND CAPITAL IN CONFLICT 3, 9 (John C. Raines et al. eds.,

1982).
Similarly, workers in Kenosha, Wisconsin who attempted to block or delay the closing of a
Chrysler plant there, were unable to persuade the governor of the state to seek enforcement
of the state's contract rights against Chrysler, although the evidence of contractual undertaking was extremely strong. Interview with Jim Eggleston, Counsel for plaintiffs in Wilson v.
Chrysler Corp., No. 88-C-215 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 25, 1988), in Oakland, Cal. (June 19,
1989). The workers were forced to go it alone on a different theory. Their complaint was
based on the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program, 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (1988)
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35,
4341-47 (1988). See infra note 347 & 388.
264. There are deep inconsistencies in "free market" talk as it is presently wielded.
These seem particularly glaring in the context of local government efforts to attract capital
and to develop a "friendly" business climate. One lower-level state economic development
staffer who wished to remain anonymous explained it to me in something close to the
following words:
Well, one thing I've learned ... is that these companies have begun to get
sophisticated. You are not going to attract them with some flimsy song and dance.
They want to make their decisions ... based on your government's past behavior.
They're not interested in this pie-in-the-sky stuff, and they don't ask things like
what you can promise them about the future. They want to know what your track
record already is. They ask things like, whether your governor called out the troops
the last time there was a major strike.
So much for laissez-faire.
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step of initiating litigation was no easy task.a65 It was only after a series of
rallies and town meetings, and on the heels of a petition drive, that the city
government agreed to take legal action.26 6
Despite being faced with similar "business climate" pressures and despite the ambivalence of the state government toward their case, the town
of Ypsilanti, Michigan, recently won a significant victory against a departing employer based on a theory of promissory estoppel. After GM decided
to close its large Willow Run plant, the Township of Ypsilanti (which had,
over the course of eighteen years, granted the company numerous separate
tax abatements worth more than one billion dollars), sued GM for breach
of contract, promissory estoppel, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment.2 67 Ypsilanti claimed that during GM's efforts to secure the most
recent set of tax breaks, the company promised the township that jobs
would be retained and that the plant would remain an "operational
facility" during the life of the abatements. 6 8 Michigan's Plant Rehabilitation and Industrial Development Districts Act 269 allows the creation of

industrial development districts by municipalities, which may, upon application, grant tax abatements for purposes of industrial rehabilitation and
development. The plaintiff township made several related claims. First, it
argued that a contract arose from certain application forms that GM had
filled out to obtain the abatements at issue and from other interactions of
the parties.2 7 ° It also claimed that GM should be liable independently of
the operation of the statute, on a theory of promissory estoppel. a7 1
On February 9, 1993, in a ruling that attracted national attention, the
trial court granted Ypsilanti Township an injunction, 7 2 blocking GM from
moving its plant until near the end of the decade. Judge Donald Shelton
265. Telephone Interview with Tom Stillman, supra note 255. Stillman recalls that the
mayor of Duluth never commented publicly on the lawsuit, despite its national significance.
266. LeRoy, supra note 251.
267. Charter Township of Yspilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK, at 2
(Cir. Ct. Washtenaw County, Mich. Feb. 9, 1993).
268. Id.; Complaint and Jury Demand, filed Apr. 29, 1992, at 3-4.
269. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.551-207.571 (1991).
270. CharterTownship of Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, Complaint and Jury Demand at 5-6.
271. Id. at 7.
272. Before winning the injunction, Ypsilanti withstood numerous substantive and procedural challenges. Steps included motions to dismiss, an attempt to remove the case to
federal court, and an eve-of-trial unilateral attempt at "revocation" by GM of the tax
abatements at issue. Telephone Interview with Doug Winters, Attorney for Township of
Ypsilanti (Feb. 8, 1992). A federal district judge rejected the attempt at removal and
remanded the parties back to state court in July 1992. See Charter Township of Ypsilanti v.
General Motors Corp., No. 92-CV-72568-DT (E.D. Mich. filed July 7, 1992) (order of
remand).
Following Judge Shelton's ruling, GM, unsurprisingly, announced at once its intention to
appeal. Doron P. Levin, Judge Blocks Plan by G.M. to Close a Plant in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1993, at D1, D7.
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ruled that the application forms and the statute did not create a contract
between GM and the township. He found that the Michigan legislature
had not intended to create such obligations through its tax abatement
program. 273 He proceeded to hold, however, that GM should be enjoined
from moving its Willow Run plant to any other facility, based on a theory
of promissory estoppel.2 7 4 He found that GM had made promises upon
which it should reasonably have expected Ypsilanti to rely, that the township had in fact relied upon those promises to its detriment, and finally
that enforcement was necessary in order to avoid injustice. Although he
was "mindful of the fact that two federal courts have refused to apply the
promissory estoppel doctrine to prevent plant closings,, 275 he distinguished those cases on the ground that there GM pleaded economic
necessity, a defense it explicitly stipulated to be inapplicable in the Ypsilanti case.27 6
What the future of Judge Shelton's opinion will be is uncertain. His
logic is straightforward and doctrinally mainstream. The facts are egregious in the extreme. What makes the case unusual and less predictable is
that one of the parties is one of the largest corporations in the world.
Although the doctrine may be unremarkable, the identity of the parties
and the magnitude of the resources at stake are not. In any case Ypsilanti
is a brave opinion, and one that has added an important new chapter to
what will be a long story.
Limits of the Common Law. As CharterTownship of Ypsilanti makes clear,
common-law claims offer theoretical advantages over some of the limitations of statutory claims brought under labor and employment legislation
as currently enacted and interpreted. In practical terms, however, they are
still in their infancy.27 7 No matter how such claims are received by courts
in the future, the applications of contract doctrine are severely constrained
273. The judge also noted sharply that the failure to require any reciprocity was "not
something of which the State should be proud." Charter Township of Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-

CK, at 20.
274. Id. at 27-28. Parts of the text of Judge Shelton's opinion appear infra Part III.
275. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, at 27. The court cited Local 1330,
651 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'g 492 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (see discussion of Local
1330, supra note 202 and accompanying text) and Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F.

Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The court also acknowledged an adverse ruling in Norwood v.
General Motors, which he distinguished on the grounds that it had been decided on the
pleadings. For discussion of the Norwood case, see supra note 244 and accompanying text.

276. Id. at 27.
277. One observer sees judicial rules as more helpful than legislative ones for displaced
workers, but offers few concrete reasons why. See Denis Collins, Plant Closings: Establishing
Legal Obligations, 40 LAB. L.J. 67, 72-73 (1989) (discussing the lawsuits that grew out of the

Anchor Hocking closing in Clarksburg, the Chrysler closing in Kenosha, West Virginia, and
the GM closing in Norwood, Ohio).
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by the increasing disparities in power between those in control of productive resources and those dependent upon them. 27 8 As the bargaining
power of those in control continues to swell, there is little reason for them
to make promises of any serious value to workers and communities and every
reason for them to exercise care in avoiding unnecessary entanglements.
A form of property rights protection seems to offer a superior solution
to contract rights in this context, because it does not depend on agreement
of the parties. Certainly a property right in job security can be amply
supported by logic and cogent analogy. Numerous writers have argued as

much, advocating for the rights of individual workers and of factory work
forces and communities as a whole.2 7 9 What is lacking is the political will
and the social consensus to recognize and protect such a right.
278. One example of the begging posture adopted by many local communities in the face
of these power disparities is an editorial in the Flint, Michigan newspaper soon after news of
Judge Shelton's opinion in the Ypsilanti case. The editors observed: "Flint should not
follow Ypsilanti Township's lead ....

Rather than creating a more hostile environment for

GM and at the same time discouraging other firms from locating here, this community would
be much wiser to aggressively pursue strategies that make this area more competitive and
more attractive to business development." Our Views: Willow Run case no reason for Flint
officials to sue GM, FLINT J., Feb. 12, 1993, at A8.
279. See Jack M. Beerman & Joseph W. Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning:
The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 946-56 (1989) (arguing that baseline
assumptions often predetermine legal outcomes in employment law; viewing jobs as a
property right is one means of altering outcomes); Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev,
Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20
B.C. L. REV. 457 (1979) (reviewing evolving legal trend toward employment as property
right); William B. Gould, IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The
Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (calling for state and
federal statutory enactments); Donald Herman & Yvonne Sor, Property Rights in One's Job:
The Case for Limiting Employment-at-Will, 24 ARIz. L. REV. 763 (1982) (proposing statutory
protection of employment property right); Singer, supra note 90 (arguing that the legal
system should recognize and protect the reliance interest in some plant closing cases); Note,
Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1081 (1973) (arguing for judicial
recognition of property right in employment); Comment, Unemployment as a Taking Without
Just Compensation, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 488 (1970) (arguing for property right in employment
to ensure just compensation to persons unemployed as consequence of governmental fiscal
and monetary policy); Peter F. Drucker, The Job as PropertyRight, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1980,
at 21 (discussing evolution of the job as a property right); see also Charland v. Norge Div.,
Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.) (recognizing both nonexistence and
future possibility of such a right), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969). But see Benjamin Aaron,
Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532
(1962) (arguing against giving property status at least to seniority rights, both because capital
mobility is a "necessary condition of an expanding economy" and because unions need to be
free to renegotiate these rights).
Beyond the scope of this article is the law applicable to public employees, who, by virtue of
having the state as their employer, can claim due process rights if, based on some independent source such as state law, they hold a property interest in their job. See, e.g., Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (requiring procedural due process when
civil servant has property right in job); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)
(holding that property interest is created by an independent source such as state law).
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But the advantages of some property theories may be ephemeral too,
given the realities of the newly restructuring and globalizing economy.
Even those theories have often been built on notions of detrimental
reliance and reasonable expectations. Theorists have often characterized
the property right to a job or to continuing production as one that ripens
over time. aS° If the velocity of capital mobility and the frequency of capital
injection and withdrawal continue, and if the percentage of contingent
workers in the work force keeps increasing, any serious expectation of job
security will begin to look less and less like a reasonable or realistic one. 8 '
How many workers in years to come will honestly be able to make the
kinds of claims so eloquently voiced by the steelworkers in Youngstown
and Pittsburgh who worked in jobs their fathers had held before them and
who had expected their sons and daughters to be able to do the same?
3. New Ownership
In the majority of cases in which an employer cannot be persuaded,
enabled, or forced to stay in business in a particular location, workers and
communities find themselves dealing with the question of alternative ownership. Sometimes they plunge into a search for another business that
might be willing to acquire an ailing company, or interested in purchasing
facilities from a healthy company that wishes for reasons of its own to stop
production in those facilities and move elsewhere. In other instances
workers may decide they want to buy out the business themselves. 8 2
The scenario may be as simple and as benign as that of an aging sole
proprietor who has no successor ready to take over at his or her retirement.
In such a case, if workers, a union, or the local community are alert to the
situation and in touch with relevant resources, it may be possible to help
match the aging owner with a competent and acceptable successor, with or
without some degree of worker ownership, thus saving jobs and carrying on
280. See Singer, supra note 90.
281. Of course, as is so often the case in arguments over judge-made law, there is a certain
circularity at work here. If courts aggressively began to find a property right in employment
security, then people might reasonably expect more, thus justifying a stronger pattern of
property rights, and so on.
282. The issues entailed in employee ownership are many, and the literature is large. A
few resources on the topic are as follows: Sherman L. Kreiner, Worker Ownership as the
Basis for an Integrated, Proactive Development Model, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 227
(1986-87); Deborah Groban Olson, Employee Ownership: An Economic Development Tool for
Anchoring Capital in Local Communities, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 239 (1986-87);
Deborah Groban Olson, Union Experiences with Worker Ownership: Legal and PracticalIssues
Raised by ESOPS, TRASOPS, Stock Purchases and Co-Operatives, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 729;
Virginia Duquet, Note, Advantages and Limitations of CurrentEmployee Ownership Assistance
Acts to Workers Facing a Plant Closure, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 93 (1984); Dan Swinney, Worker
Ownership: A Tactic for Labor, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1985, at 99 (arguing that employee

ownership can be a viable option to avoid job loss and capital flight).
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the business. The Midwest Center for Labor Research has identified this
plotline as a surprisingly common one, at least in its home base of Chicago.
It has been able to intervene successfully in a number of such situations
that otherwise would have resulted in permanent job loss. 28 3
The situation is often more difficult, however. First, if a company wants
to shut down a facility, there often are problems with the viability of the
enterprise. Although the operation's economic marginality may have its
roots in past mismanagement,2 8 4 there is no guarantee that past errors will
be easily reversed by a successor, especially if there has been (as there
often is) a strong pattern of disinvestment and "milking" before the
announcement that the company is going to close the plant. If a plant's
economic status is shaky, private investors will be hard to find.28 5 Prospective employee investors must ask themselves hard questions about the
underlying or potential health of the business before jumping in.28 6
If a plant represents a good investment risk, and the plan to run it under
new management is accompanied by an excellent business strategy,2 87
283. See Barbara Marsh, Study Highlights Small Biz Succession Woes, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus.,
Oct. 13, 1986, at 4 (noting that 17% of 98 small to medium-sized West Side manufacturing
companies surveyed faced potential problems with ownership succession); see also LeRoy,
supra note 251, at 36 (discussing Midwest Center for Labor Research's for-profit subsidiary,
Chicago Focus, which "broker[s] aging-owner companies to capable new entrepeneurs.").
284. See generally LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1987 (discussing widespread problems with
mismanagement and what unions can do to correct it).
285. Sometimes the problem is strongly compounded by the magnitude of the needed
investment. In the struggles that grew out of the destruction of the steel industry in the
Mahoning and Monongahela Valleys, for instance, there was (and still is) strong interest in
worker and community ownership. But the sheer scale of the capital needed to start up and
run steel mills made the job virtually impossible. A strong infusion of participation by the
federal government was probably the only hope under the circumstances. The Carter
Administration came close to committing funds a number of times, but finally refused, and
the presidential victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 killed the possibility entirely, at least for
the next 12 years. See LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS, supra note 206, at 63-81

(describing efforts of the Ecumenical Coalition to obtain assistance for a worker and
community buy-out from federal agencies during the Carter Administration).
286. Worker buy-out plans may require employees to contribute capital of their own,
perhaps putting all their severance benefits, even retirement plans on the table. The level of
personal risk-taking asked of a group already placed in a radically precarious position can be
substantial.
287. A strong business plan may be key to the success of the enterprise. Good feasibility
studies can be important in assessing the plant, the potential market for its products, and the
plan. See Margaret Hallock & Bob Baugh, High Stakes: Oregon Labor Sets Union Agenda for
High Skill, High Wage Strategy, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1992, at 69 (examining Oregon union's
attempt to develop high-skill, high-wage industrial strategy); James Parrott, Fashioning an

Industrial Strategy for Garment Workers, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1992, at 55 (examining garment
union's efforts to develop multipronged industry strategy in women's apparel market).
On the other hand, the very notion that it should now be the union's job to create a
"strong business plan" raises troubling questions for unionists who rightly perceive important underlying conflicts between themselves and management, and who have grown up
within the U.S. system of labor relations in which workers have been greatly distanced from
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supporters may be able to attract the interest of private capital, but they
may run into difficulty maintaining control of that interest, especially if
they want to restructure decisionmaking authority inside the corporation.

Although most workers want a right to participate in decisions in return
for the sizable risk that worker ownership often entails, many forms of
employee ownership, especially the Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP) model,2 88 provide for the purchase by employees of certain stock,
but do not entail any necessary changes in the basic managerial structure
or style.
Therefore, issues of corporate governance often become relevant during
worker buy out discussions. The resolution of these issues will be affected
by the same inequalities in bargaining strength that presently characterize
the economy in general. Although in some situations employee ownership
can preserve jobs that are worth having,289 employee ownership is likely to

strategic corporate decisionmaking. The worker ownership debates are first cousins to
similar debates raging about new forms of management that stress various kinds of labormanagement cooperation. For a sample of the academic interest in how new ownership
arrangements work out and how they often intersect with new management schemes, see
generally ARTHUR HOCHNER ET AL., JOB-SAVING STRATEGIES:

WORKER BUYOUTS AND

OWL (1988). For an introduction to some of the labor-management cooperation debate, see
generally Laurence J. Cohen, New Bargaining Approaches to New Economic Conditions:
Pursuing a Mutuality of Interests, 5 LAB. LAW. 263 (1989); Karl E. Klare, The LaborManagement Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 39 (1988); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of IndustrialPluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992); Symposium, Labor-ManagementRelations: A New Economic Development Tool, 60 J. ST. Gov. 1 (1987).
288. Many commentators credit favorable tax treatment for the rise in popularity of
ESOPs in recent years. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law
Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1752 (1990). See
generally David Ellerman, ESOPS and Co-ops: Worker Capitalism& Worker Democracy, LAB.
RES. REV., Spring 1985, at 55; Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, Who Will Benefit from ESOPs, LAB.
RES. REV., Spring 1985, at 71. For an argument that employee takeovers of thriving
businesses (or credible threats of same) represent a fruitful tactic for labor in the current
economy and one that is much more interesting than ESOPS, see generally, Alan Hyde &
Craig Harnett Livingston, Employee Takeovers, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1131, 1136-38 (1989).
289. A recent example that has attracted favorable attention from plant closing activists is
the City Pride Bakery, formed by workers who lost their jobs when Pittsburgh's last local
bakery went out of business. They mobilized a strong campaign with broad participation and
high visibility, and prevented the loss of their jobs. See Tom Croft, Achieving City Pride:
Labor, Community and Private Sector Bake a New Idea in Ownership, LAB. RES. REV., Fall
1992, at 1 (describing City Pride takeovers). While worker ownership tided these employees
over, once they had saved the facility, private investors became interested and the plant is
now running under conventional ownership. Until its recent closure, the case of Seymour
Specialty Wire was often mentioned as another success story. See Jeremy Brecher, "If All the
People Are Bonded Together": The Naugatuck Valley Project, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1986, at 1,
5-8. Gary Hansen & Frank Adams, Saving Jobs and Putting Democracy to Work: LaborManagement Cooperation at Seymour Specialty Wire, LAB. MGMT. COOPERATION BRIEF, Sept.
1987, at 1 (describing successful Seymour Specialty Wire buy out). Other observers, how-
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prove a disaster in others. The financial contributions of workers (perhaps
their desperately needed pensions or their meager severance benefits) may
be irrevocably lost. The energy and commitment of rank-and-file leaders
may be brutally sapped by the process of trying to revitalize the operation
against all odds.2 9 °
Additionally, it is difficult to discern which situations lend themselves to
the considerable effort required, and which should be avoided.2 9 1 Workers
and community activists faced with the possibility of a buy out should
become familiar with the different forms of ownership and management
that are available to them. It is also important for those involved in these
choices to trade narratives-success stories and cautionary tales alike.2 92
In some instances the present owners of a plant are not interested in
selling to the workers or their friends, or to any competitor.29 3 This
ever, are skeptical that worker ownership can at present be campaigned for and carried out
in a way that strengthens the labor movement. See, e.g., Mike Slott, The Case Against Worker
Ownership, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1985, at 83 (arguing that while worker ownership may
save jobs in a particular locality, harm may be done to the labor movement as a whole).
290. Two leaders from a worker-owned factory in Tyler, Texas, described the grueling
nature of this process. These bright, courageous, and hilariously funny women told me what
they encountered in helping to start up and run a garment factory in East Texas on the heels
of a shutdown by the Levi Strauss company. Interview with Essie Carter & Janet Miller,
worker-owners, in Tyler, Tex. (July 10, 1991). Even with a core of excellent workers, the
spiritual boost they got from each other, some help wrung from the departing company, and
exemplary support and encouragement from the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, their experience was in many ways hellish. For a nevertheless upbeat look at this
effort, see Jackie Van Anda, Colt Enterprises,Inc.: Union-Based Self-Determination in Texas,
in WHEN WORKERS DECIDE: WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY TAKES ROOT IN NORTH AMERICA
31-36 (Len Krimerman & Frank Lindenfeld eds., 1992) (examining how the mostly black and
Hispanic unionized garment workers became owners of the largest worker-owned factory in
the United States, and the first one in Texas); see also Gene Redmon et al., A Lost Dream:
Worker Control at Rath Packing, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1985, at 5 (interview with key
members of union involved in foundered employee ownership at Rath Packing).
291. For a debate on one particular buy out, see Staughton Lynd, Why We Opposed the
Buy-Out at Weirton Steel, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1985, at 41; Corey Rosen & Staughton
Lynd, How Bad a Deal Is Weirton Steel, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1985, at 108, 108-14 (disagreeing with each other on the pros and cons of the Weirton buy out); see also Jane Anderson,
Note, An Employee Stock Ownership Plan: The History of the Weirton Steel Buy-Out, 26 Duo.
L. REV. 657, 669-74 (1988) (discussing issues raised under ESOPs and the Weirton solution).
For two fairly sanguine evaluations of worker ownership, see Corey Rosen & Alan Cohen,
Employees to the Rescue: The Record of Worker Buyouts, 6 J.L. & CoM. 213, 215 (1986); Corey
Rosen & James Wilson, Employee Ownership: A New Strategy for Economic Development, 15
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 211, 224-25 (1986-87).
292. For one collection aimed at such an exchange, see WHEN WORKERS DECIDE:
WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY TAKES ROOT IN NORTH AMERICA (Len Krimerman & Frank
Lindenfeld eds., 1992).
293. When the Anchor Hocking company closed its plant in West Virginia, for instance, it
planned simply to consolidate production at another nearby facility. It did not intend to
leave the market, and it was not interested in doing anything that might help a competitor,
however new or socially "worthy." After a cluster of lawsuits Anchor Hocking agreed to
cooperate with the state of West Virginia in trying to find a company to take over the facility,
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attitude on the part of U.S. Steel in Youngstown gave impetus to the
efforts of people there, and later in Pittsburgh, to explore the use of
eminent domain as a tool to take over productive capacity in cases in
which an owner was unwilling to sell at a fair price or unwilling to sell
period.2 94
Exploration of the eminent domain power in the Pittsburgh area took
place after sustained grassroots organizing efforts that grew out of the
dismantling of the steel industry. Plant closing opponents, cooperating
under the banner of the Tri-State Conference on Steel, succeeded in
establishing the Steel Valley Authority (SVA). The Authority is a quasipublic agency formed by the joint action of ten cities and burroughs in and
around Pittsburgh, under Pennsylvania's Municipal Authorities Act of
1945.295 Its purpose is the coordination of industrial development and
retention, and it explicitly possesses powers of eminent domain. The
present policy of the SVA is not to acquire industrial property with the
intention of managing the property itself, but rather to facilitate transfer to
third parties.2 9 6
The SVA has not yet actually exercised its eminent domain power, but it
has seriously investigated that option on a number of occasions.2 97 Sometimes the credible threat of such an exercise can alter outcomes. 298 For
but it insisted on a noncompeting successor, which meant that the old jobs performed could
not really be kept in West Virginia. See supra text accompanying notes 228-233 (discussion
of Anchor-Hocking case).
294. For a discussion of the eminent domain power in such a context, see generally Phyllis
Rippey, The Community on the Constitution: Eminent Domain and Corporate Disinvestment, 8
LEGAL STUD. F. 27 (1989); Keith J.Smith, Eminent Domain as a Tool to Set up EmployeeOwned Businesses in the Face of Shutdown, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 271 (1986) (arguing that exercise
of eminent domain power to appropriate a closing business to sell it to employees is a
justifiable exercise of government power); Gregory F. Buckley, Note, Eminent Domain: The
Ability of a Community to Retain an Industry In the Face of an Attempted Shut Down or
Relocation. 12 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 231 (1985) (exploring use of eminent domain to save local
industry facing a shutdown or relocation).
295. 53 PA. C.S.A. §§ 301-22 (1992). The Act is liberal in its delegation of authority to
local actors.
296. See Joseph Hornack & Staughton Lynd, The Steel Valley Authority, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 113, 121-23 (1986-87) (examining Steel Valley Authority's exploration of the
use of eminent domain to prevent disinvestment in heavy industry). For further discussion
of the SVA, see Lynd, supra note 205, at 949-52; Staughton Lynd, Towards a Not-for-Profit
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition and Use of Industrial Property, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 13, 32-40 (1987) (discussing eminent domain powers of SVA);
David Schultz & David Jann, The Use of Eminent Domain and ContractuallyImplied Property
Rights to Affect Business and Plant Closings, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 383, 400-04 (1990)
(discussing historical origins and powers of SVA); Mike Stout, Reindustrialization from
Below: The Steel Valley Authority, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1986, at 19 (describing how organizers of the SVA won a public support campaign for reindustrialization).
297. Telephone Interview with Jim Benn, Director of the Federation for Industrial
Renewal and Retention (Feb. 4, 1993).
298. Id.; see also Hornack & Lynd, supra note 296, at 123-24 (arguing that "[t]he mere
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instance, the Nabisco company altered plans to close its bakery in Pittsburgh when a plausible threat of eminent domain arose, especially in light
a local official that Pittsburgh would learn "how
of the public promise by
' 299
oreos.
own
its
to make
The threat of eminent domain was used effectively in New Bedford,
Massachusetts, in 1984. The mayor threatened to use eminent domain
against a company that had announced it was leaving town. 300 Local
observers credit the threat for the eventual sale of the company to an
employer more willing to stay in town. They maintain that it was a
successful "indirect" use of eminent domain power to preserve jobs.30 1
The use of eminent domain is not greeted with equal confidence or
enthusiasm, however, by all public officials. While some see it as an
admirable way to protect the community against the forced destruction of
accumulated human and social capital, others see it as an unprecedented
and dangerous intrusion on free enterprise, or at any rate, a risky venture.
And whichever way a local official sees such an exercise of governmental
authority, she is likely to be worried about the "business climate." Despite
the favorable turn of events in New Bedford, for example, a union campaign in Boston a couple of years later failed to persuade the city council
to use eminent domain to prevent the closure of a meatpacking plant
there. Chief legal counsel for the city concluded that the proposal to take
the property and turn it over to another party would not be "for a valid
public purpose,, 3 0 2 though it is common hornbook wisdom that prior case
threat of eminent domain taking can persuade an existing owner to change its investment
plans").
299. Telephone Interview with Jim Benn, supra note 297.
300. See generally Nationalization-American Style, TIME, June 18, 1984, at 66. The union

at the plant commissioned a study of the possible use of eminent domain, which concluded
that the exercise of such authority would be lawful.
301. See Follow-Up on the News: Saving Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1985, § 1, at 37 ("As a

result of all the publicity, there were a number of companies and individuals who expressed
interest in buying the plant."). For a description of the New Bedford story, see Hornack &
Lynd, supra note 296, at 124; Schultz & Jann, supra note 296, at 404-09; Andy Buchsbaum,
The New Bedford Case, INTERRELIGIOUS ECONOMIC CRISIS ORGANIZING NETWORK NEWSLETTER, Spring/Summer 1985, at 1. For additional background material, see generally Fred

Bayles, City May Try Legal Tool to Save Jobs, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., July 1, 1984, at 3D; Ernest
Corrigan, City Council backs bid to save Morse, THE STANDARD-TIMES (New Bedford, Mass.),

June 15, 1984, at 5 (mayor seeks cooperation from Gulf & Western, but voices willingness to
proceed with eminent domain); Ernest Corrigan, Will City Seize Morse? Lawler ready to adopt
Studds takeover plan, THE STANDARD-TIMES (New Bedford, Mass.), June 4, 1984, at 1;
Steven Greenhouse, New Bedford May Step In So Jobs Won't Move Out, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
1984, at D2; Tamar Lewin, Factory Takeover Weighed by a City: New Bedford Considers Novel
Use of Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1984, at Al; Rod Poineau, City's Morse takeover
plan justified use of eminent domain, THE STANDARD-TIMES (New Bedford, Mass.), June 17,
1984 (on file with The Georgetown Law Journal); Rust Belt Revival? THE NATION, June 16,

1984, at 723.
302. Letter from Joseph Mulligan, Corporation Counsel, City of Boston, to Councillors of
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law on the public purpose requirement is elastic in the extreme.3 °3 On the
heels of that conclusion, the city council backed down on an earlier
resolution to begin the eminent domain process. Unionists attributed the
outcome to a countercampaign by "the major corporations of the area"
and to their own late start.30 4
The use of eminent domain to preserve industrial capacity may face
another constitutional obstacle. In the 1980s the City of Oakland, California took steps to take the Oakland Raiders football team by eminent
domain in order to prevent it from moving out of town. The California
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such action in the face of a
challenge that the taking lacked a public purpose.3 °5 On remand, however, the court of appeals ruled that the city's action was contrary to the
Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution, in that it violated the
dormant prohibition of state regulation of interstate commerce.30 6

City of Boston (Feb. 12, 1986) (on file with author).
303. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), for instance, the Court
held that taking land from large landowners for resale to private residential lessees fulfilled
a public purpose in the context of Hawaii's pathologically concentrated landholding patterns.
In a different vein, but with the same elastic result, the high court of Michigan held that
Detroit could take the small residential holdings of Poletown residents and turn them over
to the General Motors Corporation in the interest of economic development. Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). For more on
Poletown, see supra note 76. As to the Boston controversy, Clayton Gillette & Joseph Singer
observed in an op-ed piece:
The prospect of lost jobs provokes intense emotions; so does the prospect of
government taking of property. The legal issues are similarly difficult. These
difficulties, however, should not hide the true nature of the underlying issue:
whether Boston would be better served by retention or dissolution of Colonial as an
on-going enterprise. That is a decision that must be made, in the first instance, by
the political officials of the city.
• .. [I]t is by no means clear that legal doctrine or precedent stands in the city's
way should it decide that a taking would confer substantial benefit.
Clayton P. Gillette & Joseph W. Singer, Colonial's plant and eminent domain, BOSTON
Feb. 23, 1986, at A25. The authors were commenting on the Colonial Company's
plan to sell its entire business to a company that was going to move Colonial's production
elsewhere, name included. See Boston, Mass. Considers Using Eminent Domain in Face of
PlannedPlant Closing, ECON. & INDUS. DEv. NEWS, Feb. 24, 1986, at 1. Why there would be
no legally sufficient public purpose if the city intervened at fair market value in these
circumstances is difficult to see.
304. See Eminent Domain Used to Preserve Boston Jobs at Colonial, THE UNIFIER, July 1,
1986 (recounting the experience of the union in unsuccessfully pushing for use of eminent
domain) (on file with The Georgetown Law Journal).
305. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
306. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156-58 (Ct. App. 1986); see
also Edward P. Lazarus, The Commerce Clause Limitation on the Power to Condemn a
Relocating Business, 96 YALE L.J. 1343 (1987) (arguing that use of the eminent domain power
by local governments to prevent business from relocating violates the Commerce Clause).
GLOBE,
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When asked to review the use of eminent domain as one tool for a state
worried about plant closures, the New York Lieutenant Governor's Task
Force on Plant Ownership Transfer concluded that "there would seem to
be no insurmountable legal impediments to the use of the power 3in7
connection with efforts to prevent the closing or relocating of businesses,
and observed that existing agencies were probably adequate to handle any
required action if the government chose to exercise eminent domain.3 °s
Nevertheless, the Task Force also was of the view that the30 9exercise of
eminent domain should be reserved for "dire circumstances.,
Despite obstacles and hesitancies, some state or local government in the
future is likely to attempt to use the eminent domain power to preserve
local industrial capacity. Governments will be drawn into such activities by
the logic of the economic transformation going on around them and by the
mobilized pain and anger of their constituents.
4. Discrimination Claims
Plant closings do not affect all members of a community equally. At
workplaces in which jobs were once reserved for whites or men, the facially
neutral last-hired first-fired principle means that women and racial minorities are often hit the hardest if a facility lays off part of its work force. If a
plant is closed altogether, then transfer rights-if they exist at all-are also
most likely allocated on the basis of seniority. 31 ° The use of seniority as a
sorting device in either case acts to carry forward past discrimination in a
way that can be devastating both for the individual workers involved and
for the larger social project of diversifying and desegregating the American
workplace.3 1 1
307. Lieutenant Governor's Task Force on Plant Ownership Transfer, Task Force Report
97 (Chip Carey & Michael Klein coordinators, Mar. 1985).
308. Id. at 99.
309. Id. at 98.
310. See, e.g., A Test for Women Who Build Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1992, at D1
(observing that with the plant in Ypsilanti, Michigan scheduled to shut forever next year,
"the women ... are once again the most vulnerable. They have less seniority [than most of
the men] because they did not get in the door ... until 1968, 12 years after G.M. acquired
the plant").
311. This is a subject with a vast literature of its own, emblematic in many ways of our
deepest divisions and questions over the nature of discrimination: Who bears "responsibility?"
Which inquiry about a given situation should be primary: the intentions of individual
perpetrators, or the impacts on subordinated groups? What obligations should institutions
have to undo racial or gender hierarchies caused in part by events and actors and impersonal
forces beyond their immediate control? Convictions on either side run deep. For several
angles on some of the issues involved, see generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050-52 (1978); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-28
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Antidiscrimination attacks by minorities and women on seniority-based
layoffs have been singularly unsuccessful. Some of the Supreme Court's
most ringingly hostile rulings on affirmative action, such as Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education3 12 and Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
3 13
Stotts,
have arisen in the context of such controversies. The cases
suggest that disproportionately laid-off minorities or women must prove
that their lesser seniority was caused by specific acts of discrimination
directed against or at least suffered by them individually. Otherwise, a
layoff in order of seniority is viewed as "neutral," not as actionable race or
gender discrimination. 31 4 The difficulty is compounded by the Court's
indication that a layoff plan (perhaps imposed by court order, perhaps
arrived at through collective bargaining) that protects against disproportionate layoff of minority personnel is in itself impermissibly discriminatory if it
alters existing seniority rules.31 5 Women and racial minorities have thus
been doubly rebuffed in efforts to claim legal protection from disproportionate layoffs: antidiscrimination law gives them no sword, because "bona
fide" seniority systems are "neutral" as a matter of law, renders creation of
a shield illegal, because such a preference is seen as so invasive of majority
expectations and interests that it violates the Constitution. After gaining
some familiarity with the law pertaining to plant closings, and learning in
painful detail how little legal protection there is for blue-collar workers'
job security, I find it startling to see the reverence with which the Court
has treated the job security of white workers when it is threatened not by
the unrestrained mobility of capital, but by the competing job security
claims of more recently hired coworkers of color:
A worker may invest many productive years in one job and one city with
the expectation of earning the stability and security of seniority. "At that
point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is
probably the most valuable capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth
even more than the current equity in his home." Layoffs disrupt
these
3 16
settled expectations in a way that general hiring goals do not.

(1987); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 298-99

(1990).
312. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
313. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
314. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977). See
generally Mark Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination: The Seniority
Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943, 944-45 (1984).
315. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (plurality of opinion) (layoff plan too intrusive a burden
on more senior nonminority employees); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784, 467 U.S. at 579

(only members of a plaintiff class that show that they have been actual victims of discrimination may be awarded competitive seniority, and thus be protected from layoff).
316. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Firefighter

1993] LAW, POVERTY, AND AMERICA'S ERODING INDUSTRIAL BASE 1839
This was the response when the seniority rights of a small number of white
teachers were temporarily threatened by efforts to desegregate the teacher
corps in public schools. When will American workers of all races and
genders find their investment in their jobs treated with this level of
seriousness in situations in which those investments are threatened with
long-term destruction by the powerful?
Disproportionate layoffs are not the only employer actions in a plant
closing situation that should be subjected to antidiscrimination analysis.
Job transfers from one location to another also give rise to concerns about
discrimination, especially on the basis of race and age.3 17 Observers note
that many domestic factory relocations involve moves from urban to suburban and from "brownfield" to "greenfield" sites.3 8 Given the demographics of late twentieth century America, such moves usually result in a net
transfer of jobs from people of color to whites.3 19 Because they involve a
new startup, such moves also result in a net transfer of jobs from older to
younger workers.32 ° There may well be multiple reasons why an employer
would wish to go suburban: more favorable taxation, cheaper rent, or
v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 58). The Court then
held in light of the weight and importance of the seniority interests at stake that it would be
unconstitutional for Jackson schools in cooperation with the teacher's union to adopt
voluntarily a rule designed to avoid racially disproportionate layoffs. Id. I have commented
that this phenomenon-this peculiarly racial play on relativity of title-warrants further
investigation in Frances L. Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class, and the Future of Civil
Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1068 (1989).
317. For thoroughly-explored treatments of this subject, see Marley S. Weiss, Risky
Business: Age and Race Discriminationin CapitalRedeployment Decisions, 48 MD. L. REV. 901
(1989) [hereinafter Weiss, Risky Business] (arguing that capital redeployment decisions
based on age or race violate federal antidiscrimination statutes); Marley S. Weiss, Capital
Redeployment as Aggregate Employee Selection System: Proving and Remedying Race and
Age Discrimination in Plant Closure, Location and Subcontracting Decisions 20-100 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing the problems of proving discriminatory
purpose and effect in capital redeployment cases).
318. A "greenfield" location is one where an employer moves into territory that is new
perhaps new only to that employer, perhaps new to manufacturing in general. It is likely to
be characterized by younger, wealthier workers, a cleaner environment, a newer (perhaps
customized) infrastructure, etc. "Brownfield" locations are the already industrialized areas
now frequently being left behind. See, e.g., Candace Hawes, Transplants No Cure: It's Time
to Regulate Foreign Investment, DOLLARS & SENSE, July/Aug. 1991, at 16.
319. One study, for instance, found that minorities constituted 14% of the state's overall
workforce, but held 20% of the jobs in plants that shut down between 1975 and 1978. Weiss,
Risky Business, supra note 317, at 911-12 & nn.40, 42 (citing ILLINOIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SHUTDOWN:

ECONOMIC DISLOCATION AND EQUAL

OPPORTUNITY (1981)).
320. For example, a greenfield employer can offer exactly the same wage and benefits
package to a greenfield work force that is exactly the same size as the prior brownfield crew,
and still reduce payroll-related expenses by a substantial margin, due primarily to the age
factor. An older work force, especially one bearing the accumulated burdens of industrial
injury and disease, will be more costly in health insurance and workers' compensation claims
and premiums. Hawes, supra note 318, at 16.
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lower rates of unionization. 3 2' But the racial effects of a move from the

innercity to a suburb, or from a major metropolitan area with an aging
industrial base to a greenfield location are unmistakable. Adversely affected workers have mounted successful antidiscrimination challenges to
such race-marked moves.32 2 Other challenges have involved claims of age
discrimination in relocation decisions.3 23
Employees often fail to win such discrimination cases. 324 Few relocation

321. Other issues are often at work as well. Employers leaving brownfield locations may
be seeking to avoid what they view as an onerous level of governmental regulation. Or they
may hope to leave hazardous waste and other environmental problems behind. One of the
demands raised by steelworkers in the Mahoning Valley was that government should favor
brownfield development as a matter of both social and environmental policy. See LYND, THE
FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS, supra note 206, at 197-211 (discussing advantages of brownfield
development).
322. Plaintiffs in Bell v. Automobile Club, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 3 (E.D. Mich.
1983), for instance, claimed that their employer's relocation from the inner city to the
suburbs was racially discriminatory. The parties eventually reached a settlement involving
several million dollars and assurance of transfer opportunities and assistance for innercity
employees. Id. at 4-5; see also Gregory D. Squires, "Runaway Plants," CapitalMobility and
Black Economic Rights, in COMMUNITY AND CAPITAL IN CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 62, 80
(discussing Bell and similar legal challenges).
Simply bestowing transfer rights on minorities may not avoid the impact of the flight from
minority communities. One witness explained this in testimony before a congressional
committee about a GM warehouse in Oakland, California that was closing and moving to a
smaller, whiter town in Nevada. Although GM was giving transfer rights to the current work
force, which was more than 50% minority, the witness still saw difficulties: "Many of the
Blacks and Chicanos of the plant face that move with enormous apprehension. Whereas
they presently live in a fully bi-cultural city, they are now faced with the necessity of moving
to an environment with virtually no minority population." The National Employment Priorities Act: Joint Hearings on H.R. 5040 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities and
the Subcomm. on Labor Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1980) (prepared statement of Ralph Wipple, Regional Director,
United Auto Workers).
323. See, e.g., Adama v. Doehler-Jarvis, 353 N.W.2d 438, 439 n.1 (Mich. 1984) (alleging
that employer's consideration of cost of pension benefits in deciding to close plant constituted age discrimination); Cannistra v. FAA, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1621, 1622
(D.D.C. 1979) (alleging that transfer of functions from headquarters to facility in another
state constituted age discrimination); see also National Senior Citizens Law Center, Untender Mercies: Layoffs and the Older Worker, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1104 (1989) (providing guidance for attorneys in analyzing labor force cutbacks and evidence of violations of
federal age discrimination statute); Cathy T. Prost, Older Workers Are Hit by Corporate
Restructuring, Say Advocates, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1992, at Al (noting American Association
of Retired Persons report that rising age discrimination is due to recession-related layoffs);
Ellen Sacks, Corporate Downsizing orAge Discrimination?,TRIAL, July 1992, at 26 (discussing
successful approaches to establishing age discrimination causes of action under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
324. See, e.g., Bailey v. Delta Air Lines, 722 F.2d 942, 945 (1st Cir. 1983) (denying black
employees injunctive relief from changes in employment status, because plaintiffs failed to
show required irreparable harm); Fuerza Unida v. Levi Strauss, slip op. (5th Cir. Mar. 29,
1993) (rejecting claim by Latina women workers that they experienced race and sex discrimination in promotion practices prior to their plant's closure and in the selection of their plant
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decisions are simple; few can accurately be boiled down to a single discriminatory factor, whether of motive or effect. Consequently, plaintiffs face
substantial proof problems. More fundamental, perhaps, is the question
of whether courts will prove ready to interpret the reach of antidiscrimination law to cover major capital deployment decisions. The best reading of
the employment discrimination canon suggests that antidiscrimination law
should be applied to such decisions because they are likely to have such a
profound effect on the economic well-being of racial minorities and on the
ongoing effort to desegregate the American workplace, two of the central
goals of U.S. antidiscrimifiation law.32 5 Further, refusal to do so in a
globalizing and deindustrializing economy may well render antidiscrimination law toothless in precisely the cases that could make a real difference.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that such claims will be met by a reluctant
judiciary.
Even if courts were willing to apply antidiscrimination law to major
investment decisions, the power of that body of law to fight plant closings
would be limited. First, for reasons that will be discussed in greater detail
below, the race and gender dynamics of deindustrialization are quite
complex, and not all plant closings will display simple patterns that can be
easily assimilated to existing law. Secondly, even in clearer cases, antidiscrimination law as currently developed has a strong tendency to redistribute a given crop of losses among different groups of workers, rather than
to establish ways to obtain more meaningful job security for all workers
vis-a-vis employers. In a deindustrializing economy, this is ultimately a
losing game for minority and majority workers alike.3 26
I am not suggesting that the fight to maintain and improve places for
women and minority workers in the industrial work force is unimportant.
As one commentator cogently observed: "One danger is that many proposals to address the problem of dislocated workers may create a two tier
system in which dislocated workers receive income maintenance, relocation assistance, and specialized job training and counseling, whereas disadvantaged workers are again left on the outside., 327 Nor am I suggesting
for closure); Reinhardt v. General Electric, No. 3-90-749 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 1992) (rejecting age discrimination claim by displaced workers in case of partial closing and reduction in
force); Payne v. Bobbie Brooks, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 707, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (denying race
discrimination claim by class of black workers), aff'd mem. 701 F.2d 180 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
325. See Weiss, Risky Business, supra note 317.
326. If an antidiscrimination strategy standing alone is not adequate to solve the problems
of deindustrialization, that hardly distinguishes it from the other partial and incomplete
legal strategies catalogued here.
327. Lucy Gorham, Response, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281, 282 (1984-85)
(responding to John M. Jeffries & Richard McGahey, Equity, Growth and Socioeconomic
Change: Anti-DiscriminationPolicy in an Era of Economic Transformation, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L.
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that, if successful, the fight to use these laws to open up the workplace
would only benefit "protected classes." To the contrary, to the extent that
antidiscrimination laws can be used to achieve and defend secure diversity
in American workplaces, they will strengthen the ability of all workersblack and white, male and female, native-born and immigrant-to gain
political and economic protection from the vicissitudes of economic restructuring. Segregation has demonstrably weakened American labor throughout its history, by underscoring and exacerbating racial divisions that have
prevented unity of action.3 2 The difficulty, however, is that an immediate
job security remedy in an antidiscrimination case too often involves only
the redistribution of rights and resources from worker to worker, with
precious little redistribution of rights or resources from management to
labor.3 29
The disproportionate layoff cases illustrate this problem. Such cases as
Wygant and FirefightersLocal Union No. 1784 fail to grasp the nature of the
evil that gave impetus to our antidiscrimination laws and instead take a
protectionist stance toward entrenched racial privilege that threatens to
haunt the workplace for years to come.33 ° But even if these cases had
allowed diversity-preserving layoff schemes to stand, problems with job
security would have remained in a deindustrializing economy. Every worker,
of whatever gender or skin color, will remain more vulnerable to layoffs
than should be the case in a humane and democratic society. So in the
long run, (and even in many ways in the short and intermediate runs as
well) it is in the interest of white workers to resist resegregation by
deindustrialization.
& Soc. CHANGE 233 (1984-85)).

328. See Martha Mahoney, Speaking for White Working Men:

Justice Scalia, David

Duke, and the Cultural Construction of Race 7-12 delivered at Law & Society meeting (May

1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
329. I struggled with this issue in Frances L. Ansley, Comment, Cost Allocation in Title VII
Remedies: Who Pays for Past Employment Discrimination, 44 TENN. L. REV. 347 (1977).

One suggestion I made was that unions might seek ways of avoiding layoffs for any worker by
requiring that employers spread available hours among the entire work force. Id. at 362.

This solution results in a net gain for the workers as a group, because all of them have
enhanced job security, and there are fewer fault lines along which they can be divided or
frightened.
I have since heard an interesting story from an antidiscrimination lawyer who was

attempting to preserve jobs for minority police officers in the face of layoffs in a department
still operating under a desegregation consent decree. Through discovery it was learned that

prior to desegregation of the police force, layoffs had routinely been averted through
reduced time arrangements.

It was only after desegregation that immediate layoff of the

most junior officers (who were disproportionately black) was put forward as the order of the
day. Telephone Interview with Jeanne Mirer, Attorney in Detroit, Mich. (Oct. 19, 1991).
330. For more on this question, see generally Ansley, supra note 329 (analyzing modern
judicial tendency to protect "innocent" incumbent employees at the expense of victims of
discrimination).
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The relevance of antidiscrimination law to plant closing decisions is also
rendered problematic by the complexity of the age, race, and gender
effects of economic restructuring. Although many plant closing decisions
preserve traditional privileges and reinforce entrenched patterns of marginalization and subordination, in the ways described above, there are also
more complex patterns at work in some instances.33 ' In some sectors and
along some axes, deindustrialization is hitting relatively privileged sections
of the blue-collar work force with particular ferocity. 33 2 This pattern may
help to explain why one Bureau of Labor Statistics study found that a
higher percentage of white employees with three years or more of service
had lost their jobs because of plant closings or layoffs than did black or
Hispanic workers,3 33 or why another study reported that male workers
suffered dislocation at a rate forty percent greater than female workers.3 34
331. Such complexity is not restricted to the world of deindustrialization. All antidiscrimination law is in some ways experiencing "destabilization" as critics and lay people begin to
grapple with questions of multiple and overlapping identity, and how the multiplicity and
overlap comport with the categorical approaches embedded in our antidiscrimination statutes and our equal protection jurisprudence. Legal scholars have begun questioning some of
the underlying structures and assumptions of antidiscrimination law generally, just as scholars from other disciplines are grappling with similar themes. See, e.g., TERESA AMOTT &
JULIE MATTHAEI,

RACE, GENDER &

WORK:

A MULTICULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF

WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1991) (analyzing the role of women's "work lives" within
many ethnic groups, in U.S. economic history); Kimberk6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (criticizing the single
categorical analysis of both antiracist and antisexist legal doctrines, which tends to marginalize the complex experiences of black women); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the
Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 34
(1989) (arguing that black women should qualify for "more than strict scrutiny" under the
Equal Protection Clause because of the double and interactive burden of race and sex). For
some rudimentary thoughts of my own, see generally Frances L. Ansley, A Civil Rights
Agenda for the Year 2000: Confessions of an Identity Politician,59 TENN. L. REV. 593 (1992).
332. For instance, the automobile and steel industries are deeply affected by deindustrialization. These are heavily unionized industries, with relatively high wage and benefit levels,
in which white males held the overwhelming majority of the jobs for years, and where they
are often still dominant. I do not wish to overstate this piece of the picture, because some
industries particularly hard-hit by the internationalization of the economy (such as garments
and textiles) are characterized by low wages and high participation by women and people of
color. My point is that the race and gender effects of deindustrialization are not simple and
are therefore not well described by simple paradigms.
333. Paul 0. Flaim & Ellen Sehgal, Displaced Workers of 1979-83: How Well Have They
Fared?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1985, at 3, 9, cited in Weiss, Risky Business, supra note
317, at 912 n.40. Readers should note that such effects are not replicated in all studies, and
there is plenty of evidence to show various disproportionate impacts on women and people
of color. Id.
334. Laurence Mischel & Calvin George, Dislocation and Adjustment: The Impact on
Women and Minority Workers (Mar. 1987) (paper prepared for Hearingson S.538 Before the
Subcomm. on Employment and Productivity of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (presented by Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton)) (on
file with author).
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In addition to the fact that relatively privileged workers are at least in
some instances hard hit by job loss, relatively disadvantaged workers are
sometimes the recipients of "job gain." The jobs that have left Tennessee
for Mexico,33 5 for example, involve a net transfer of slots from white
workers to workers of color, and from the more privileged global North to
the largely impoverished global South.3 3 6 When a windshield-wiper manufacturer moves from Buffalo, New York, to a maquiladora factory in
Matamoros, Mexico, there is also likely to be a net transfer of jobs from
men to women.33 7
335. See John Gaventa, From the Mountains to the Maquiladoras, in COMMUNITIES IN
ECONOMIC CRISIS, supra note 27, at 85, 88-90 (describing the Allied-Signal Corporation plant
closing in Knoxville, Tennessee and subsequent transfer of jobs to maquiladora border towns
in Mexico).
336. These transfers usually do involve a transfer of jobs from older to younger workers,
so in that sense they could be said to fit an age-discrimination model. When I traveled with
a group of Tennessee women workers to visit with women workers in Mexico, for instance,
we discovered that most of the group's Mexican "counterparts" were young enough to be
their daughters or even granddaughters. The Mexican women were startled to learn that in
the United States, women in their fifties were still "allowed" to work in factories! But these
age patterns too are complex. For example, young African-American men and women in the
United States are among the starkest victims of the cumulative moves and trends that make
up the overall picture of deindustrialization. See Jeffries & McGahey, supra note 327, at 253.
337. One of the characteristics of the maquiladora industry that has attracted the greatest
attention is the overwhelmingly female work force that has been employed in the U.S.
transplant factories along the U.S.-Mexican border. On a visit to industrial parks in
Reynosa, Mexico in 1990, I saw numerous permanent signs outside maquiladora facilities
advertising for women workers ("operadoras" or "personel feminino"). Similar patterns
have emerged in other export processing zones in newly industrializing countries. See
RACHEL KAMEL, THE GLOBAL FACTORY 36, 41 (1990); MARIA PATRICIA FERNANDEZ-KELLY,
FOR WE ARE SOLD, I AND MY PEOPLE: WOMEN AND INDUSTRY IN MEXICO'S FRONTIER

47-69 (1983). I heard the story of the closing of the Trico windshield wiper plant in Buffalo
and its move to Matamoros from Norm Harper, an officer in his United Auto Workers local
who took it upon himself to travel to Matamoros to see for himself the conditions there, and
who has been talking to people about the maquiladoras ever since. Interview with Norm
Harper, in Chattanooga, Tenn. (June 3, 1989). For more on the Trico move, see generally
Lawrence G. Flood, Union-Community Relations in Buffalo: A Preliminary Assessment, 39
BUFF. L. REV. 445, 456-60 (1991).
Various explanations for the female-dominated maquila work force have been advanced.
Employers tend to dwell on such notions as the greater manual dexterity of women. Labor
activists, on the other hand, take a different view. They see the preference for women in the
maquiladoras as part of a successful employer strategy to create a new industrial sector with
wages substantially lower than prevailing rates in the male-dominated heavy industries of the
Mexican interior. Because wages for "women's work" in Mexico are, as in the United
States, significantly lower than wages for men's work, a hire-female policy could achieve this
result without encountering the resistance that seemed likely if individual employees were
asked to work for a wage lower than what they had come to perceive as the norm. One
anonymous informant who was studying the maquila industry also reported to me that
women are perceived as less likely than males to be trouble-makers or labor organizers. This
source said that some employers in the maquilas run special security checks on male
applicants to screen out union activists, but frequently neglect such checks for female
applicants. On the use of black lists by export-processing employers in a number of Central
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Of course, these changes are not being implemented as part of some
global affirmative action plan dreamed up by multinational corporations
for the purpose of righting the wrongs of colonialism. Nor are they
bringing an end to race or gender hierarchies. On the contrary, a number
of critics are beginning to articulate an analysis of global economic restructuring that underscores the ways that these developments reinforce traditional hierarchies.3 3 8 The transfer of jobs can mean a relocation of
exploitation more than a transfer of meaningful resources; it can mean a
consolidation of existing power relations more than a transfer of power to
the less advantaged. And even among those toward the bottom of the
social ladder, traditional orderings are seldom upset altogether. Though
real wages in some hard hit U.S. industries are falling, the position of
earners in the first world relative to those in the third world has not been
reversed.33 9
While it is true that in some industries or regions white and male
workers may experience higher rates of disruption of their traditional
expectations of security than women or minorities, they often retain a
significant margin of advantage even after painful adjustments. And in
other industries or regions, it appears that job losses hit women or minorities the hardest. In any event, evidence strongly indicates that members of
traditionally disadvantaged groups have more difficulty finding reemployment following a job loss, and are more likely to suffer a permanent
decline in income.3 4 °
These examples are meant to suggest that the gender and racial impacts
of plant closings are complex in ways that make unidimensional antidiscrimAmerican companies, see NATIONAL LABOR COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF WORKER AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PAYING TO LOSE OUR JOBS, 54-59 (1992).

In any event, the situation is not static. The director of a center for women workers in
Ciudad Juarez (across the river from El Paso, Texas) reported that for the past several years
maquila factories in Juarez have been hiring significant numbers of male workers. She
estimated that women constituted only about 60% of the maquila workforce in Juarez by the
Summer of 1992. Interview with Luz Maria Villalva, Director of Centro de Orientation de
La Mujer Obrera (COMO), in Cuidad Juarez, Mex. (July 28, 1992).
338. See, e.g., RACHEL KAMEL, THE GLOBAL FACTORY 9-15 (1990); KURT PETERSEN, THE
MAQUILADORA REVOLUTION IN GUATAMALA 169-170 &passim (1992).
339. As seen through the lens of a maquiladora advertisement in The Wall Street Journal,

for instance, the gap looks like this:
The current wage rate, including fringes, in a MEXICO
MAQUILADORA plant on the TEXAS-MEXICO border is as
low as $0.72 U.S. per hour. A MAQUILADORA plant

can give your company the competitive edge.
Advertisement by Valcon International, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1986, at 24.

340. Mischel & George, supra note 334, at 2 ("[Wjomen who are dislocated suffer much
longer spells of joblessness than male workers; the result is that women experience more
overall joblessness due to dislocation than men even though men lose jobs more frequently.").
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ination laws an incomplete aid to understanding or amelioration. Further,
widespread and frequent capital redeployments of the kind now so commonplace can and often do result in a net loss of power for all workers in
relation to employers generally, rather than a simple gain for those who
are on the receiving end of some specific job transfer.34 Thus, although
deindustrialization does not have a simple ameliorative effect on groupbased disparities, neither does it have a simple exacerbating effect on such
disparities.34 2
In other words, the changes taking place in the allocation of jobs and
resources among and between races, genders, and nations often contain
conflicting impulses. For instance, the exploitation and damage experienced by women in the maquiladoras is surely burdensome. At the same
time, the increased availability of wage work for young Mexican women
must be having a destabilizing-and at least in some ways equalizingeffect on patriarchal family relations in Mexico.
The work of documenting and analyzing the race, age, and gender
effects of global coproduction and Northern deindustrialization presents
an exciting challenge to scholars and activists alike.3 43 In the meantime,
an antidiscrimination response to economic restructuring that fails to
address the domestic and international complexities of the present changes
is inadequate. Further, it is important to recognize that the most significant shifts brought about by the global economy are not those taking place
between different groups of workers but the radical increase in insecurity
for all workers that has resulted from the dramatic rise in capital mobility.
Nevertheless, many capital redeployments do have demonstrably discriminatory effects on classes currently protected by our antidiscrimination
laws. What Professor Marley Weiss calls "discriminatory capital redeployment decisionmaking" does happen and should be actionable when it
does.34 4 But even in these cases, the negative right to be free from

341. See Mahoney, supra note 328, at 28-35.

342. The increased availability of wage work for young Mexican women, for instance,
probably has a destabilizing-and at least in some ways equalizing-effect on patriarchal

family relations in Mexico, though the world of the maquiladoras is hardly likely to comport
with the reform agenda poor Mexican women of any age would define for themselves and
their families if given a chance.
343. For one work that begins to address this task, see UNEQUAL BURDEN: ECONOMIC
CRISIS, PERSISTENT POVERTY & WOMEN'S WORK (Lourdes Beneria & Shelley Feldman eds.,
1992) (focusing primarily on women in developing countries); see also Richard McGahey,
Industrial Policy: Minority Economic Interests and American Political Response, REV. BLACK
POL. ECON., Summer-Fall 1984, at 81 (arguing for minority input in the national debate in

industrial policy).
344. Weiss, Risky Business, supra note 317, at 1016-17. She notes tellingly:

Anything less, in this era of capital mobility, creates a ready vehicle for corporate
evasion of .... [A]ny employer determined to escape its equal employment oppor-
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invidious discrimination is a relatively weak right when there is no affirmative entitlement to employment, the available pool of jobs is shrinking, and
the legal system radically favors corporate freedom over worker and community security. Antidiscrimination law alone cannot solve even the racial
problems evident in current plant closing patterns, in part because it has
no theory or method for dealing with the issues of class that are so
fundamental to those patterns.
345
5. Other Crisis Tools

Environmental Claims. Occasionally workers or communities have raised
environmental objections to plant relocations. In some instances, workers
at a plant's existing home have claimed that a proposed new site is
environmentally inappropriate, and have invoked environmental laws to
attempt to block relocation.34 6 Others have claimed that the shutdown has
tunity obligations would be free to do so ....
[E]mployers who cannot justifiably
reject individual workers based on labor force characteristics heavily correlated
with race or age, would be permitted to screen out entire workforces on the basis of
the identical characteristics.
Id.
345. I will attempt neither to create a definitive list of such tools here, nor to treat each
approach in depth. But several bear mentioning.
346. Simpson Dura-Vent workers in a United Electrical Workers local in Redwood City,
California, for instance, brought a suit to force the City of Vacaville to withdraw its support
for a redevelopment project slated to include the relocating company, and based their claims
on the California Open Spaces Land Act. It is important to note, however, that their
approach was much broader than the simple environmental claims. The workers, the union,
and their supporters mounted a multifaceted campaign to stop the relocation. They discovered that Vacaville was facilitating the relocation with various economic incentives and they
went to work to publicize and criticize that use of public development resources. They
leafleted, held press conferences, blanketed the target community with "warning" notices
that it was to be declared "blighted," did a racial impact assessment of the move, successfully lobbied for local legislation, injected themselves into the local economic development
process, offered testimony at hearings on the redevelopment project, and generally raised a
hue and cry. For discussion of the local legislation involved, see infra note 435.
A full description of the activity mounted by the union, in which it was joined by the
Oakland-based Plant Closures Project, is beyond the scope of this paper. The story is
noteworthy for its creative and multipronged use of law suits and other legal handles (such
as filing a protest with the State Industrial Development Financing Advisory Council), all
thoroughly interwoven with popular mobilization and grass-roots action. Conversation with
one person actively involved in carrying out the campaign suggests that specific legal
doctrines were of considerably less significance than creative mobilization techniques, energy, and common sense about tactics. Interview with Jim Eggleston, Attorney at Law, in
Oakland, Cal. (June 19, 1989). For examples of the mobilization efforts, see Michael
Eisenscher, Testimony Before the Vacaville Redevelopment Agency in Opposition to Tax
Exempt Redevelopment Financing Offered to Simpson Dura-Vent Through Certificates of
Participation for Vacaville Investers, Apr. 12, 1983 (on file with author); Warning! Declaration of Blight, (leaflet distributed to residents of Vacaville by opponents of redevelopment
plan) (on file with author); Plant Closures Project, Simpson-Dura-Vent Workers Struggle
1983 (packet of background information prepared for speakers) (on file with author).
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caused or will cause injury to a plant community's human environment

34 7
Some workers and
that should be actionable under environmental laws.
communities threatened by closure have been able to use the existence of
34 8
environmental hazards left at the old location as a bargaining chip.
Plaintiffs in Lake ErieAlliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corridorv.
9
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers34 applied a more searching environmental
analysis to problems of deindustrialization. On the heels of devastating
plant closings in traditional steelmaking communities in Youngstown and
Pittsburgh,3 5 ° U.S. Steel proposed to build a new steel mill in a greenfield
spot in Conneaut, Ohio. 351 The company had to apply to the Army Corps

347. For instance, Chrysler workers in Kenosha, Wisconsin, discovered that federal money
from the Urban Development Action Grant program (UDAG) was being used to help
develop a site in Detroit for jobs that the company planned to transfer there from Kenosha.
United Auto Workers Local 72 and individual employees brought a class action against
Chrysler based in part on the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-70 (1988). Although an environmental impact statement had been completed, the
plaintiffs argued it was inadequate because it examined only the impacts in Detroit and
failed to consider impacts on the human environment in Kenosha that would be occasioned
by the loss of jobs in that auto-dependent town. Wilson v. Chrysler Corp., No. 88-C-215
(E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 25, 1988). The case settled prior to trial, so it is impossible to say what
would have happened had plaintiffs' NEPA claim actually been tried.
The Simpson Dura-Vent workers mentioned in the preceding note joined their Open
Spaces Land Act claim with a "human environment" argument under the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-193 (West 1970), but received short
shrift. The trial court observed:
The last major concern of Petitioners is that the City of Vacaville filed [sic] to
consider the socio-economic effects of the project on the City of Redwood City.
The Court disagrees.
[E]conomic or social changes can be considered only when they relate to a
physical change (again within the area of the project). This Court can find no
physical change that should have been addressed.
Barbic v. City of Vacaville, No. 85209 (Solano County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Nov. 29, 1983)
(memorandum decision).
348. See discussion of Norwood, Ohio case supra note 244; discussion of Committee
Against Schlage Lock Plant, supra note 162.
349. Lake Erie Alliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corridor v. United States Army
Corp. of Engineers, 486 F. Supp. 707, 709 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
350. For other pieces of the Youngstown and Pittsburgh stories, see supra note 201 and
accompanying text; infra note 368 and accompanying text.
351. 486 F. Supp. 707, 708 (W.D. Pa. 1980). Opponents of the plan described the new site
as follows:
The shoreline between Conneaut and Erie, Pennsylvania is perhaps the most
pristine section of the southern shore of Lake Erie. Four major summer camps are
located on the lakeshore within eight miles of the proposed site ....
The area ... underlies a major flyway for numerous species of migratory birds
.... At least forty varieties of fish have been observed in Turkey Creek.
Tri-State Conference on the Impact of Steel, Environmental Impact of New Industrial Plants:
The Case of Conneaut, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 331, 332 [hereinafter Tri-State, Environmental
Impact].
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of Engineers for a permit for activities and structures that might adversely
affect the lake,35 2 and the Corps was required to develop an environmental
impact statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). 35 3 The Tri-State Conference on Steel (Tri-State), a group convened to investigate and respond to the plant-closing crisis in Pittsburgh,
brought suit under NEPA, challenging the sufficiency of the Corp's environmental assessment.3 5 4
Using NEPA, Tri-State attempted to articulate an alternative vision of
economic development, one that would illuminate the nexus between
capital mobility and environmental stewardship. They argued for a presumption that industry should modernize in brownfield, rather than greenfield sites because:
[G]reenfield development by definition involves both despoiling a nonindustrial, "green" setting and abandoning in whole or in part one or more
existing industrial locations. In a developing economy, no facility can
continue to be profitable without recurrent new investment. When national policy chooses to locate new investment in greenfields, it simultaneously dooms older facilities and their surrounding communities to
eventual death.3 55
Tri-State acknowledged that not all decisions to relocate investment are
wrong ones, but argued social costs should be considered in calculating the
cost of greenfield development:
The true costs ... must include the cost of new houses, roads, sewers,
schools and other elements of social infrastructure in the area surrounding the site to be developed, as well as the unemployment insurance,
trade readjustment allowance benefits, welfare needs and other costs
that will accompany the decay of the brownfield community to be abandoned.3 56
...

The Conference believes that something more should be added to

these dollars-and-cents calculations. Youngstown, Pittsburgh, Aliquippa, South Chicago, Gary, and other traditional steelmaking communities are characteristically made up of ethnic neighborhoods in which

352. The permits were issued under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1988), and § 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C § 1344 (1988).
353. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1988). An EIS under NEPA is supposed to include an
examination of appropriate alternatives.
354. Lake Erie Alliance, 486 F. Supp. at 708.
355. Tri-State, EnvironmentalImpact, supra note 351, at 351-52.
356. Left unexamined in this analysis is the question of how to address or weigh the need
for capital in greenfield sites in the United States and the world. The issues can be thorny.
See RAGHAVAN, supra note 107.
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35 7
generations of families have lived near one another as they made steel.

The death of any one of these communities entails the loss of precious
human resources, as the younger sons leave for Houston to look for
work, and the grandparents are placed in a home for the elderly because
8
As a society, we
family arrangements for care are no longer possible.
have become too accustomed to leaving behind last year's neighborhood,
last year's car, last year's spouse. The perspective of brownfield modernization challenges us to become a society that can recycle and conserve
can modernize its
all of its resources, natural and human, and that 359
wake.
its
in
desolation
social
leaving
industry without

The cost-internalization argument raised here by Tri-State in the context of arguing for brownfield development is an important one, and has
357. Not all generations of steelworkers were able to live near one another, even while
steel was thriving. As a Southerner, I would point out that in addition to these "core
communities" of steelworkers in ethnic neighborhoods near the mills, there has also been a
pool of peripheral workers from the Southern mountains, who kept up a long-term but often
intermittent relationship to the industries of the country's industrial heartland. Unlike
African-American workers who migrated from the South, they were seldom motivated by a
desire to escape Jim Crow. Unlike immigrant workers, they did not face hurdles such as
language and citizenship and unbridgeable distances. Unlike many white Americans who
came from other parts of the country, they tended to maintain fierce loyalty to place and to
family. For all these reasons and more, many Appalachians helped to build the steel and
auto industries of the heartland, while remaining in some way marginal and provisional in
the communities surrounding the mills. They kept up strong ties, lived biregionally, were
carried home for burial, and often found that their home communities were drained of
able-bodied adults. Of course, some of them left home for good. (For a glimpse at some of
the attitudes they might encounter when they got North, see supra note 250.
Pieces of a song captures something of this pattern:
Early Monday morning
I keep thinking that I'm late to work
Why didn't someone wake me
Guess the mills are down again
Three years I've been trying to raise
My kids on cardroom wages
Guess it's time to hit the road and try
My luck up north again.
On the highway heading South
On the highway heading North
Just back and forth, sometimes I feel like a rolling stone.
From the rolling mills of Gary
To the rolling hills
And spinning mills of home. ...
Si KAHN, Spinning Mills of Home, in Si KAHN SONGBOOK 64 (1989).
358. As a feminist, I would point out that many of the important costs characterized in
this passage as "beyond dollars and cents" are only thought of in that way because of the
unwaged nature of so much important work traditionally done by women. See MARILYN
WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED:

359. Id.

A NEW

FEMINIST ECONOMICs

7-8 (1988).
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been raised in other contexts as well by advocates of greater restrictions on
plant closings, to show that the presently constituted "free market" may
not lead decisionmakers to the most efficient solution. Many of the social
costs most important to Tri-State and its constituents are costs that companies do not internalize under present law.
Additionally, positive government subsidies often contribute to making
greenfield development more profitable than staying put. Federal tax
write-offs attendant on a shutdown can generate millions of dollars of
capital for new projects,3 6 ° and any subsidies from government entities in
the new location also reduce the cost of the move.36 1
Plaintiffs in Lake Erie Alliance withstood initial motions to dismiss for
lack of standing and failure to state a claim. However, the case became
moot when U.S. Steel abandoned
plans for the Conneaut Mill, so no court
362
ever ruled on the merits.
The use of environmental claims, then, has varied. They have served
sometimes as little more than another stone to throw into the path of an
approaching plant closing. At other times they have been raised in such a
way as to challenge, at least in theory, the overall path of economic
development. Neither use has yet had broad impact, but the questions
raised by Tri-State's advocacy of brownfield development are profound
ones that will, and should, play a role in the current debates about U.S.
industrial policy.
Bankruptcy Leverage. It is not unusual for total or partial plant closings to
take place in the context of bankruptcy.3 6 3 Unions have learned the hard

360. Tri-State, Environmental Impact, supra note 351, at 350-51; see also M. Thomas
Arnold, Existing and ProposedRegulation of Business Dislocations, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 209,

213 & nn.24-27 (1980) (citing investment tax credits and deduction of moving expenses and
certain other losses as tax incentives for plant closure). Federal tax policy could be altered
to better promote the internalization of the costs of a plant shut down.
361. In the event that local officials in the "home" location are willing to pay the company
to stay, then this may even the scales as to local economic incentives. At any rate, the factors
pulling a company toward greenfield locations are many. Companies often believe they will
reap an advantage from a younger and less experienced work force, untainted by old injuries,
habits and attitudes. But many unionists see such justifications as part of a thinly veiled
campaign to destroy the institutional memory and know-how of a company's work force. On
the relationship of greenfield development to questions of race and age discrimination, see
supra Part II.c.4.
362. Lake Erie Alliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 486 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.
1983); Telephone Interview with Mike Healy, Cocounsel for plaintiffs, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Apr.
18, 1993).
363. The problems of worker rights in business insolvencies is, of course, not restricted to
the United States. On recent trips to Mexico and Central Europe, for instance, I spoke with
workers and unionists highly interested in this matter, due especially to turbulent economic
conditions in their respective countries. Mexican workers enjoy special priorities in bank-
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way that they need to be knowledgeable and adept in bankruptcy proceed-

ings." 6 (Unorganized workers are again at a disadvantage in this context.
If their employer goes into bankruptcy, they are much less likely to be in a
position to use or even understand the proceedings.)
In business reorganization proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, worker representation on the creditor committee can
make a big difference to the ability of employees to protect their interests.36 5
Such representatives can work to preserve the employees' share of the pie,
but they may also be in a position to shape business strategies for the
future that can help the company survive and adapt.3 66
Antitrust. The Sherman Act 367 and Clayton Act 368 prohibit monopolies
and attempts to monopolize. Workers may fight shutdowns by arguing that

ruptcy proceedings in that country, but may, in order to take advantage of those rights,
require specialized counsel that is often hard for workers to find. Interview with attorney
Gustavo de la Rosa Hickerson, Ciudad Juarez, in Chihuahua, Mex. (July 1992).
It is also not unusual for Mexican workers to use self-help in bankruptcy situations. They
may, for instance, post a full-time guard crew at the locked gates of a closed facility to
protect with their bodies (and with the widely respected strike flag) their lien on the plant
equipment. Interview with encamped workers, Matamoros, in Tamaulipas, Mex. (July 1992).
The League of Free Trade Unions (LIGA) in Hungary recently urged the International
Labor Organization to strengthen its recommendations about "stipulations for the employees' interests" in bankruptcy proceedings. LIGA Resolution Concerning the 78th session of
ILO, Issued on June 10, 1991, LIGA NEWS, 1991, at 4 (monthly of Democratic League of
Free Trade Unions, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal). A symposium on the subject
compared the law in the United States and a number of countries in Eastern & Western
Europe. Symposium on the Protection of Workers' Rights in the Event of Insolvency & Business
Reorganization, 5 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989) (reprinting reports from 1988 Colloquium of
Int'l Assn. of Legal Science in Helsinki). One contributor to that symposium observed,
"Increasingly, there has been acceptance not only of the need to ensure that workers get
what is owing to them because of past service, but that insolvency proceedings themselves
should offer the opportunity of avoiding unnecessary job losses." Brian Napier, Insolvency
Law Reforms: A Response to the Economics of the 1980s, 5 CONN. J. INT'L L. 217, 234 (1989).
364. Telephone interview with former union-side labor attorney Peggy Hillman, currently

staff attorney for the ACLU in Indianapolis, Ind. (July 8, 1992). One reason unions are
increasingly familiar with bankruptcies is that a number of corporations have attempted to
use bankruptcy as a method of shedding an unwanted union. See Charles Craver, The Impact
of FinancialCrisis Upon Collective BargainingRelations, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 465 (1988).
Since amendments to the Bankruptcy Act in 1984, any abrogation of a collective bargaining
agreement is to be governed by § 1113, which emphasizes collective bargaining and not the
bankruptcy court as the most appropriate forum for resolving labor issues. Id. at 495-508.
365. Employee pension and welfare funds also qualify as creditors, and representatives of
these funds can seek membership on such a committee. Thus far, however, health benefits
do not enjoy statutory protection analogous to pensions covered by ERISA, though health
benefits are often an important issue in these proceedings. Telephone interview with Peggy
Hillman, supra note 364.
366. For one example of a union's achieving such a result, see infra note 457.
367. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
368. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988).
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a company's refusal to negotiate alternative ownership arrangements 36 9 is
motivated by anticompetitive animus. Antitrust was one of the theories
used in the fight against the Youngstown steel shutdowns,37 ° based on the
company's refusal to consider a joint worker and community buy out of
certain U.S. Steel facilities.37 1
In November 1979, U.S. Steel announced its plans to close the last
major steel works in the area. By the next month, after futile efforts to
convince the company to change its mind, several local unions and a
number of individuals had filed suit. In January 1980, workers staged an
occupation of the Youngstown headquarters of the company, asking for
negotiations about a worker lease or buyout of the facilities. They left the
building after assurances that the company would meet with the union to
discuss such a proposal, and a meeting was in fact held the next day, which
led union leaders and the local papers to believe that the workers would be
given an opportunity to put together such a deal.3 72
Therefore, it was a shock two days later when David Roderick, Chairman of the Board of U.S. Steel, declared to a newspaper reporter:
I don't believe those are really viable options. We obviously would not
be interested in selling the plants to a group of people that can only be
successful if they were massively subsidized by the Federal government.
We are not, in other words, 373
interested in creating subsidized competition
for ourselves at other locations.

Although a setback to workers' hopes of saving the mill, this unusually
frank admission formed the basis for an antitrust claim.37 4 In the coali375
tion's view, Roderick's statement had given them a clear smoking gun.
369. See supra Part II.c.3. (discussing new ownership as a strategy to prevent plant
closings).
370. The Youngstown steel shutdown is discussed supra Part II.c.2.
371. The description of events surrounding the antitrust claim offered here is primarily
based on LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS, supra note 206.
372. Id. at 151-59.
373. Id. at 159 (quoting David Roderick, Chairman of the Board of U.S. Steel, from
transcript of trial in which the reporter's tape recording of the statement was played) (emphasis added).
This statement was made by the same Roderick who so fetchingly noted in 1981,
I think in the past we sometimes suffered too long trying to figure out how to break
even at, say, Youngstown, rather than trying to figure out how to double the profit
of our Oilwell division ....
We're saying now, "Let's manage assets we can make
money on rather than sit there nursing a sick cow."
Richard Kirkland, Big Steel Recasts Itself, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1981, at 28, 29. I will eschew for
now the temptation to analyze the gendered subtext of Mr. Roderick's remarks, but such an
analysis would surely be fun to do.
374. LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS, supra note 206, at 158-61.
375. Roderick's announced position raises fascinating questions. Should a corporation be
allowed to refuse to sell to another on the basis that it is "subsidized" by the government in
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The trial court held that the claim was not ripe because the plaintiffs
could not show they had adequate financing to buy the steel works even if
U.S. Steel were willing to sell. 376 The Sixth Circuit vacated the trial court's
judgment on this claim and remanded, "perhaps out of an excess of
caution,, 3 77 observing that U.S. Steel's announced refusal to deal with a
government-subsidized enterprise was unique. It also noted plaintiffs'
argument that dismissal on ripeness grounds would be unfair because U.S.
Steel's announcement itself made the assembly of a "ripe" financing
package impossible.3 78
Following this ruling, the plaintiffs frantically tried to put together such
a package.379 They lacked the protection of an injunction preserving the
status quo, however, and soon learned U.S. Steel was entering into a
friendly lease agreement with a company formed to operate the most
profitable pieces of the old steel works, thus making the remaining works
less and less attractive to public or private investors.3 8 °
Several forces eventually led to the settlement of the antitrust claim and
dismissal of the suit. In addition to the court's refusal to allow plaintiffs to
amend the antitrust claim, dismissal hinged in part on the fact that many
local constituents believed that the community needed to cooperate with
the new lessee in hopes of salvaging at least a few jobs. Further, successful
financing appeared unlikely because prospects for the necessary federal
loan guarantees were dim.38 1 Terms of the settlement included: a promise
by U.S. Steel to keep several mills intact for five years in case the new
lessee decided to expand, an agreement from the new lessee not to
obstruct local efforts to obtain additional feasibility studies for a worker
buyout, and the creation of a joint committee between Community Steel
Corporation (an entity formed by workers and community members to

some way that is unfair? Is there such a thing as an unsubsidized corporation in America?
As the Sixth Circuit later asked in remanding the antitrust claim for further proceedings,
"Could United States Steel, in the event the Chrysler Corporation sought to manufacture
some portion of its own steel needs, refuse to sell steel to that corporation because of the

to supply to Chrysler?" Local 1330,
massive aid which the federal government has seen fit
United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1283 (6th Cir.
1980).
376. United Steel Workers of Am., Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp.
1, 12-13 (1980). Financing for a worker buyout of a facility as capital intensive as basic steel
is, needless to say, a staggering problem. See supra Part II.c.3.
377. Local 1330, 631 F.2d at 1282.
378. Id.
379. See LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS, supra note 206, at 182 ("[I]t is impossible adequately to describe the daily crises, the emergency conference calls, the great mass of
government indecision.").
380. Id. at 183.
381. Id. at 184-85.
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reopen the plant) and the new lessee, to oversee the progress of the
settlement.3 8 2
What could have been described as a modest victory that kept hope alive
by at least preserving some options for a future worker buyout, was soon
robbed of any real potential when the new Reagan Administration ended
all chance of federal loan guarantees.3 83 When the dust had settled, one
of the participants observed, "The most the Mahoning Valley can hope for
from its battle with United States Steel is a reopened [number] 14 mill
which would initially create only about 75 jobs and eventually perhaps
160. ' ,384 Whether antitrust theories in a proper case may assist in arranging future buy outs or other transfers is still an open question.
Antipiracy Provisions of Legislative Schemes. A number of state and federal programs aimed directly or indirectly at job creation prohibit or
restrict the use of program funds for projects that move jobs from one
location to another rather than creating new jobs, especially if the place
being left behind is adversely affected in any serious way. In some cases
such provisions have enabled plant-closing opponents to raise legal objections to threatened job transfers. For instance, the Urban Development
Action Grant Program (UDAG), 38 5 which authorizes Housing and Urban
Development Grants for economically distressed cities,"' specifically pro-

382. Id. at 185-86; U.S. Steel Plant Action Called Legal; Suit Ended, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1980, at D4.
383. LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS, supra note 206, at 186.
384. Id. at 187.
385. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-20 (1988).
386. The targeting of UDAG grants to places that are "economically distressed" creates
an intersection worth noting. UDAG not only protects jobs for those who already have
them, but also can be used to get jobs for those without them. UDAG applicants must
project how many full-time jobs their proposal will create and how many of them will be
available to low-income, long-term unemployed and minority people. In the presence of a
strong community group, this part of the application has been used to argue against the
funding of a jobs-poor project, or to judge the continued efficacy of funded projects as they
mature. See Ed Gramlich, Organizing for Jobs: Looking at UDAGs and IRBs, (undated
manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing, from point of view of low-income community
action groups, how they might use subsidized development projects to secure jobs for people
in their communities).
Plant closing advocates should look for ways to demand expansion of employment opportunities to those who need them, not simply to defend positions that luckier groups of workers
already have. As two commentators pointed out some years ago, "Little has been done to
link anti-discrimination policy to plant closing legislation or to state and local development
incentives, although these ideas were explored during the 1970s." McGahey & Jeffries,
supra note 327, at 272. Provisions like these in UDAG are one place to start. For a critical
analysis of the program's inadequacies, however, see Ed Gramlich, Bright Promises, Questionable Results: An Examination of How Well Three Government Subsidy Programs Created
Jobs: A Report from the Neighborhood Revitalization Project of the Center for Community
Change (1988) (on file with author).
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vides:
No assistance may be provided under this section for projects intended
to facilitate the relocation of industrial or commercial plants or facilities
from one area to another, unless the Secretary finds that the relocation
does not significantly and adversely affect the unemployment or economic base of the area from which the industrial or commercial plant or
facility is to be relocated.38 7

In Wilson v. Chrysler Corp.,38 8 workers brought suit after the Chrysler
Corporation announced that it would move production of one of its
product lines to Detroit from its previous location in Kenosha, Wisconsin.
They based their claim on the fact that UDAG money was used to prepare
a site in Detroit to receive these Kenosha jobs. They sought neither
recapture of UDAG funds, nor a halting of construction of the Detroit
facility, 38 9 but rather an injunction to prohibit defendants from using the
federal grant "to facilitate the Kenosha Plant relocation., 39 ° Other factors
at work in the lawsuit led to a substantial settlement before the merits of
the UDAG claim were decided,3 9 ' so it is difficult to know how the

387. 42 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (1988). One might see in this section of the UDAG statute an
implied critique of unrestrained capital mobility. In 1985 comments to a regulation promulgated pursuant to this provision, however, the then Assistant Secretary for Community
Planning and Development interpreted it to do nothing more than keep governmental
distortions "out" of an otherwise free and benign market for business investment: "Mobility
is an important element of a dynamic economic system. The Department believes, however,
that Section 119(h) represents a strong Congressional sentiment that discretionary Federal
grants should not be a decisive factor in the competition between geographic areas to
relocate business investment from one area to another." 24 CFR Part 570 Statement of
Policy-Anti-Pirating Prohibitions, UDAG Program, 50 Fed. Reg. 1505 (1985). For more
commentary on the antipiracy provisions and the policy behind them, see City of Jersey City
v. Pierce, 669 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J. 1987).
388. No. 88-C-215 (E.D. Wis. filed Feb. 26, 1988) (class action complaint for declaratory
and injunctive relief). The plaintiffs also sued the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, which administers UDAG grants under the Housing and Community Development Act, and the City of Detroit, the grant recipient in this instance. In addition to the
UDAG claim, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants should have conducted an environmental assessment of the impact of the Detroit project on the human environment in
Kenosha. For other mention of the Kenosha case, see supra text accompanying note 367
(discussing use of environmental claims to prevent plant closings).
389. Union Sues Over Use of HUD Assistance for New Chrysler Plant, COMMUNITY DEV.
DIG., Mar. 8, 1988, at 9 (reporting on Kenosha lawsuit). Fashioning an approach that did
not pit Kenosha UAW members against their brothers and sisters in Detroit was a challenge
to the strategists of this lawsuit, just as domestic and international competition among
workers for jobs generally poses a challenge to the plant closing movement as a whole.
390. Id. at 4.
391. Chrysler (and Lee Iacocca in particular) had made many assurances to Kenosha
workers and to the state and the community when the company acquired American Motors
and took over its former facility in Kenosha. In order to support and facilitate Chrysler's
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theories advanced in the complaint would have been received by the court
had the litigation proceeded to judgment.39 2
Another example of an antipiracy provision that workers have attempted to use in a plant-closing context involves a provision of Puerto
Rican law that is related to a specific provision of the U.S. tax code.
Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code, known as the Possessions Tax
Credit,3 9 3 gives corporations a federal income tax credit for qualified
income earned on investments in U.S. possessions. 39 4 A dovetailed system
of tax relief in Puerto Rico allows a U.S. corporation to obtain breaks on
Puerto Rican income tax as well. But Puerto Rican law specifically provides that:
The Governor may refuse any application when he determines from the
facts submitted for his consideration and after the applicant has been
afforded the opportunity to make a thorough presentation of the issues
in dispute, that the application is in conflict with the public interest of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on any of the following grounds:
(1) That the establishment of the unit for which exemption is sought
would substantially and adversely affect the employees of an enterprise
under related control operating in any state of the United States of
America.3 95
An announced plant shutdown in Clarksville, Tennessee, has led the
United Rubber Workers Union to intervene in proceedings in Puerto
decision to produce M-body cars there, Wisconsin had made a $3,000,000 training grant to
the company. Under these circumstances, local feelings were running high at the notion that
the jobs would now be leaving, and the litigation attracted much publicity. After the
plaintiffs obtained an order to depose Mr. Iacocca, the case settled for a large sum.
Interview with Jim Eggleston, Attorney for plaintiffs in Wilson v. Chrysler, in Oakland, Cal.
(June 19, 1989).
392. My own assessment is that the UDAG claim was stronger than the environmental
one, though the notion of requiring "human impact statements" certainly is worth consideration. That local workers took it upon themselves to research and monitor corporate and
government compliance with the antipiracy provisions of UDAG strikes me as salutary.
393. Possessions Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 936 (1954).
394. For a variety of reasons, Puerto Rico has garnered the lion's share of the investments
designed to take advantage of this credit. See Randall Samborn, Plant Shutdowns: Hundreds
of Closings Provoke Legal Struggle, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1991, at 1, 14 (discussing tax
exemptions for corporations investing in U.S. territories).
395. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 256g(b)(1) (Supp. 1989). The roots of this provision lie in a
controversy that arose in the late 1940s or early 1950s when certain factories were leasing the
northeast for Puerto Rico, and Congressional attention focused on the predecessor to § 936.
Puerto Rico reportedly convinced Congress that antipiracy provisions inside the revenue
code itself were unnecessary, on the basis that Puerto Rico itself would screen out runaway
shops in order to avoid a backlash against the program. Telephone Interview with Luis
Costas, Attorney at Law, San Juan, P.R. (Mar. 23, 1993); see Letter from Greg Leroy,
Midwest Center for Labor Research, to Wanda Rubianas, Director of Puerto Rico Federal
Affairs Office (Feb. 2, 1993) (on file with author).
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Rico, where Acme Boot Co., the departing employer, is seeking tax abatements. At this writing, a hearing has been set on the exemption petition,
and plans are for the president of the local union in Clarksville to travel to
Puerto Rico to testify. He will seek to show that the establishment of
Acme's unit in Puerto Rico will "substantially and adversely affect the
employees" of Acme Boot in Tennessee.3 9 6
Another case involving section 936 tax benefits is Oil, Chemical, &
Atomic Workers Union v. American Home Products Corp. 3 9 7 Whitehall
Laboratories (whose parent corporation was American Home Products)
had run a factory in Elkhart, Indiana for twenty years, when it announced
in the late 1980s that it would be moving some production to Guayama,
Puerto Rico. Layoffs began, and by late 1990 American Home Products
made public its plan to close the Elkhart plant entirely, eventually to layoff
almost eight hundred workers.39 8 When the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic
Workers Union (OCAW) realized that much of the work previously done
at Elkhart would be shifted to Puerto Rico and that the company was
recognizing substantial section 936 advantages from this relocation, 3 9 9 it
decided to take the company to court. The union claimed that the company was relocating jobs from the mainland,40 0 despite its certification
396. Interview with Bob Becker, organizer for Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network, in
Knoxville, Tenn. (Apr. 14, 1993); Telephone Interview with Carolyn Wonders, United
Rubberworkers, Akron, Ohio (Apr. 23, 1993).
397. No. 91-1093 (D.P.R. filed Jan. 22, 1991) (complaint and request for jury trial).
398. Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Home Prod., Inc., No.
591-00050S, at 2 (N.D. Ind. filed Feb. 7, 1991) (complaint and jury demand).
399. The Midwest Center for Labor Research estimates that in 1987 the average tax
savings for "936 companies" was $26,725 per Puerto Rican worker per year, and that the
total cost to the U.S. Treasury in lost tax revenues is three billion dollars per year. It reports
that there are about 300 companies claiming this credit, employing about 100,000 workers.
Midwest Center for Labor Research, Section 936 Fact Sheet 1 (Feb. 1993) (on file with
author).
400. Problems in tracing the geographical paths of jobs, especially if the employer is a
transnational company with multiple locations and an ever-evolving business strategy, can
prove a difficult obstacle to invoking antipiracy principles. In Oil, Chemical, & Atomic
Workers Union, for instance, corporate representatives vigorously disputed the union's claims
that Elkhart jobs were flowing in serious numbers to Puerto Rico. See Samborn, supra note
394, at 14.
In a domestic example of "tracing difficulties," a group of displaced workers in East
Tennessee learned that a section of their plant would close, but that the work previously
done there was going to be moved to a new warehouse approximately 30 miles away where a
much lower pay scale was planned. The original employer stoutly maintained that the new
warehouse was being run by a wholly independent company. The displaced workers learned
that the new warehouse employees would be paid in part with funds from the Job Training
Partnership Act, another statute that has antipiracy restrictions on receipt of federal funds.
The workers eventually were successful in obtaining a copy of the JTPA contract, which
showed direct involvement by the original employer. They were then able to get the state
Department of Labor to declare the outfit ineligible for JTPA funds. Linda Yount & Susan
Williams, Temporary in Tennessee, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1990, at 73-78. Such results do
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otherwise to Puerto Rican officials, in part through arrangements with
another American Home Products subsidiary, whose role, according to the
union, was to hide the real employment impacts at stake.4"" The case
settled in August 1992 for $24 million dollars. In addition to charging
violations of U.S. and Puerto Rican tax laws, plaintiffs also claimed that
defendants' behavior constituted racketeering.40 2 The OCAW, along with
other affected unions, has begun lobbying Congress to tighten up the
provisions of section 936. It argues that the present program subsidizes
the shipment of jobs offshore and operates more as a windfall to high
profit industries than as a benefit to Puerto Rican workers. Its substantial
cost to the Treasury is especially hard to justify in times of attempted
budget reduction.4 °3

not prohibit a plant closing, but they lessen the financial incentive for an employer to make a
move.
401. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union, No. 91-1093, at 4-5, 9, 10-11, 21-22, 29-30.
Other legal actions resulted from the plant closing as well: OCAW brought unfair labor
practice charges against the company alleging a refusal to negotiate about the terms of the
shutdown, and the union also brought suit under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN) discussed in Part II.D.2.1. Samborn, supra note 394, at 14;
Telephone Interview with Gregory Mooney, Attorney for Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
Union, Denver, Col. (Feb. 4, 1993); American Home Products, OCAW Settle Charges
Stemming from Firms's Use of Puerto Rican Plants, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-8 (Nov. 19,
1992).
402. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, No. 91-1093, Complaint at 34. The Racketeer
Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
The RICO claim brought national attention to the case. See Samborn, supra note 394, at 14
(describing plaintiff's argument under RICO, and defendant's response). Employers have
increasingly used RICO against workers, as an alternative to procedures and remedies
available under the NLRA in striking and picketing cases, but this was a new deployment of
the statute in the employment law context. Although the union's claim was belittled to the
press by counsel for American Home Products early in the litigation and greeted with
requests for Rule 11 sanctions, it survived motions to dismiss and was headed for trial. Id. at
14. Out of the $24 million settlement, part went to the international union, part to
attorneys' fees, and the remainder was distributed to dislocated workers under the supervision of "independent trustee," Professor Ray Marshall. Telephone Interview with Gregory
Mooney, Attorney for OCAW (Feb. 4, 1993). All other pending matters between the parties
arising out of the Elkhart closing were included in the settlement as well.
403. For a report on recent activities, see OCAW Backs Cap on Tax Breaks for U.S. Plants
in Puerto Rico, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-8 (July 22, 1992) (reporting on H.R. 5270,
imposing 85% limit on tax credits available under § 936).
There are various proposals for reform. One idea is simply to lower the amount of credit
allowed, thus lessening the incentive for companies to move offshore. Another proposal is to
write nonrelocation provisions into a federal statute, giving oversight responsibility to some
"neutral" body such as the IRS, rather than leaving responsibility entirely with Puerto Rico.
Others are interested in restricting the credits available to drug manufacturers (who are the
leading users of § 936) to the extent that their prices exceed normal inflationary trends.
Telephone Interview with Greg LeRoy, Midwest Labor Research Center, Chicago, Il. (Feb.
8, 1993).
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Mopping Up. Finally there is a catchall category of legal handles on plant
closings that I will dub "mopping up." In the many cases in which plant
closings cannot be stopped, workers may be faced with the impending
disappearance of an institution with which their lives and the lives of their
families have been entwined for years. In such situations there are questions that need to be answered, resources that need to be located and
secured, and information that needs to be preserved. Various legal provisions may help workers and communities to do these things, but much
depends simply on the wit, energy, and inventiveness of those affected and
their lawyers.
"Mopping up" operations of this kind include: identifying all assets and
making sure that all worker and community interests in that property have
been properly asserted;4 °4 preserving workers' right to health insurance for
the maximum time feasible; mapping and providing for removal of all
hazardous wastes left on site; securing employee health and safety records;
arranging for retraining and transfer rights; instituting grief workshops,
suicide prevention clinics, and counseling services; ensuring that all taxes
due have been paid; screening the laid-off population for chronic workrelated injuries so that people can make workers' compensation claims
while necessary items of proof are still available; 40 5 and negotiating and
monitoring a severance package. 4 6 Mopping up cases seem to proliferate
in the reporters as the wave of plant closings continues.40 7
D.

PROSPECTIVE APPROACHES

As this article should have made abundantly clear, fighting the fire of a
plant closing crisis is a daunting task for workers and communities. It is
logical, therefore, for some of the veterans of such battles to look for ways
to deal prospectively with the problems of deindustrialization. How can
plant closings be prevented, or how might the political and legal relations
in a plant closing be restructured in such a way that employees and local
citizens would be less vulnerable and disarmed when employers decide
they want to withdraw investment capital?

404. See, e.g., Nanci Snow, Employees' Rights to Employer-ContributedPension Benefits After
a Plant Shutdown, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 807 (examining worker interests in pension funds

when worker laid off prior to vesting of pension rights).
405. For a discussion of postclosing workers' compensation claims, see supra note 128.
406. See Mark Daniels, Creating,Administrating,and Terminating Severance Plans in an Era

of Dislocation, 6 LAB. LAW. 905 (1990).
407. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1988) (holding that employer must continue providing retirement benefits after collective bargaining agreement expired).
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1. Worker Planning
One obvious way to plan for job security, at least for that small portion
of the work force that is unionized, is to bargain for protection from plant
closings in the labor contract itself. Some unionists have succeeded in
doing so, and such provisions have been upheld by courts4 °" and arbitrators.4 ° 9 Examples of protections that unions have won include agreements
prohibiting a move beyond a reasonable commuting distance, prohibiting
layoffs except in the absence of work, limiting subcontracting, guaranteeing transfer rights, requiring survival of the collective bargaining agreement at the new location, 41 0 requiring notice, and providing for severance
packages.411
Job security has become a common priority in bargaining as the signs of
deindustrialization have grown more fearsome and unmistakable. 412 There
are sharp disagreements over strategy and priorities, and divisive questions
about whether to focus on protecting those currently employed or to
include those coming behind. The ability of unions to bargain effectively
for more job security than their members already have is hampered by the
decline in union power in industry after industry, and the emergance of
management's main strategic goals of capital mobility and flexibility (both
in conflict with job security).4 13

408. See Local 127 United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.
1962) (upholding labor contract provision prohibiting moving of plant during the term of the
agreement).
409. See Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 58 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 653 (1972).
410. Not everyone approves of employer agreements to recognize the union in a new
location. See, e.g., Jeffrey Hall, UA W-GM Saturn Contract: "Sweetheart Deal" or Novel Labor
Management Agreement?, 17 MEM. ST. L. REV. 69, 91 (1986) (arguing that the deal between
the UAW and GM whereby the Saturn plant would be unionized from its opening if the
UAW would agree to various new work rules, results in "an evisceration of employees' right
to freedom of choice and majority rule," and thereby violates both the NLRA and the
Tennessee Right-to-Work law).
411. See generally Eugene Eisner, Plant Closings, Relocations and Transfers of Unit Work: A
Union View, in LABOR LAW & BUSINESS CHANGE, supra note 137, at 227; Burton Boltuch,
Workplace Closures and Company Reorganizations: Enforcing NLRB, Contract and Noncontract claims and Obligations, 7 LAB. LAW. 58 (1991).
412. See, e.g., Steve Beckman, Job Security: The Focus of Union Initiative, 31 LAB. L.J. 465
(1980) (UAW staffer discussing consequences of uncertainty facing unions); John Hoerr,
Why Job Security Is More Important than Income Security, Bus. WK., Nov. 21, 1983, at 86.
Disagreements over how to achieve job security sometimes run deep. See MIKE PARKER &
JANE SLAUGHTER, THE SEARCH FOR JOB SECURITY: UAW BARGAINING IN 1990, at 15-16
(highly critical of UAW's strategy to date) (booklet distributed by Labor Notes, Detroit,
Michigan, on file with author) ("Every little bit of job security that unions have won or will
win comes about because they are able to force the companies to give something that
management believes will reduce their profits or control. . . . The best job security is a strong
union. ").
413. For a nuts and bolts discussion from management's point of view about handling the
kinds of contractual issues that typically arise in a plant closing, see Richard Van M.
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One of the most creative and effective tools that workers and communities have begun to utilize prospectively is the development of "early
warning" systems. The Midwest Center for Labor Research has pioneered
these efforts by publishing a manual41 4 that loosely sets out the components of an early warning system: "[Aln early warning system consists of a
labor and community-based network of information-sharing and research.
It combines workers' shop floor knowledge with information available
from every possible public source. It tries to anticipate a company's
disinvestment or shutdown plans while there is still time to intervene."4'15
By pooling the experiences of those who have been through plant
closings, the Center has identified a number of danger signs that indicate
the likelihood of a closing. Typical signs include a change in corporate
ownership, disinvestment in equipment, declining maintenance, declining
sales, mismanagement,4 1 6 duplicate capacity, "business climate" complaints, changes in surrounding land use patterns, 4 17 inadequate research
and development, removal of equipment, the taking of unusual bargaining
positions, and the like. An Early Warning workshop leader may meet with
workers from a given locality, walk them through the checklist, and then
have them rate their own workplaces.
For workers to realize that their workplace is "at risk" is not enough to
prevent a plant closing. The impact of a closing can be lessened, however,
through an early warning network that can provide experienced contacts,
and help people generate ideas about alternatives. Additionally, when a
high risk of closing is detected ahead of time, the groups may be able to
obtain competent feasibility studies that can take a hard look at the
chances of preserving a viable enterprise, either under new management
or other changed circumstances.4 1 8

Krotseng, Judicial and Arbitral Resolution of Contractual Plant Closing Issues, 35 LAB. L.J.

393, 394-402 (1984). Not all owners and managers are committed to fighting job security.
Some are of the view that increased job security is good for worker morale and productivity,
and therefore good for business. See, e.g., James F. Bolt, Job Security: Its Time Has Come,
HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 115, 115-16.
414. GREG LEROY, EARLY WARNING MANUAL AGAINST PLANT CLOSINGS (2d ed. 1988).

For a description of some of the early days of MCLR's early warning work in Chicago, when
the Center received funding and other support from the city government under Mayor
Harold Washington, see Elaine Chapentier, Early Warnings in Chicago, LAB. RES. REV., Fall

1986, at 91, 91-95.
415.
416.
Spring
ment).
417.

LEROY, supra note 414, at 9.
See generally Mismanagement and What Unions Can Do About It, LAB. RES. REV.,
1987 (issue devoted to options available to unions to correct corporate mismanageA typical land use change that would bode ill might be the initiation of retail and

tourist development of a waterfront area that had previously been home to factories.
418. Funding for such studies can be hard to come by.

One of the best, though little-

known, features of the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act
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If in a given locality a group is already working on issues of plant
closings and deindustrialization, it can provide important assistance to an
early warning effort. The stronger the links between the unions in the area
and local community groups, the more likely that there can be a meaningful response to the threat of a closing. Organization makes effective
worker-planning responses possible. In places where there is no local
union and no community organization focused on plant closings, it is
exceedingly hard for workers to mount an effective response.
2. Legislative and Administrative Planning
Although governments can and sometimes do take a preventive approach to plant closings, powerful pressures operate to push them in the
other direction. As mentioned above in Part I.D., state and local governments are often worried about the image they project to business and are
anxious to present a friendly face. These pressures affect their willingness
to act, because many of the steps they might take to plan ahead to prevent
plant closings are likely to be unpopular with the business community.
Nevertheless, some states and communities have taken action.4 19
Reciprocity Provisionsfor Development Money. One obvious approach is
for local governments to require more reciprocity in return for the subsidies and incentives they provide to business. Over the years the particulars of such subsidies have changed,4 2 ° but some set of incentives and
attractions has been widely available, whether in the form of tax abatements, infrastructure improvements, industrial revenue bonds, low interest
loans, or other such programs.4 2 '
(EDWAA) is its allocation of funds that states may devote to feasibility studies. See infra
Part II.D.2.c.1.
419. For some general discussions of plant closing legislation, see BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, PLANT CLOSINGS:

THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE (1988) (summarizing thenKERSON & GREG LEROY, FEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL RENEWAL & RETENTION, STATE & LOCAL INITIATIVES ON DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES & PLANT

existing legislation); ROGER

CLOSINGS (1989) (analyzing existing laws for the purpose of promoting more and stronger
plant closing legislation and suggesting model language); Richard McKenzie, Summary
Remarks, in PLANT CLOSINGS: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CHOICES 309, 310 (Richard B. McKenzie

ed. 1984) (opposing plant closing legislation as counterproductively restrictive of entrepreneurial action).
420. Laura Simmons, Industrial Revenue Bonds to Lose Tax-Exempt Status, KNOXVILLE
NEWS-SENTINEL,

Sept. 30, 1990, at D1, D3.

421. Whether these programs have ever produced all they were supposed to, even when
the corporate recipients of public largesse stayed happily and steadily on site, is a real
question. See Industrial Development Agencies Criticized by Fiscal Policy Institute, SENSES

ALERT! (Statewide Emergency Network for Social and Economic Security, Albany, N.Y.),
Oct. 1, 1992, at 1 (on file with author); Study Questions Whether Subsidiesfor Business Produce
Benefits for the Poor: Poor Monitoring, Reporting Make Accomplishments Hard to Measure,
COMMUNITY CHANGE,

Summer 1989, at 1.
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Experiences encountered by states and localities that have attempted to
hold onto a fleeing employer 42 2 have suggested to many observers that
governmental units should bargain for tougher accountability in their
future deals. 42 3 They might also plan for prevention of plant closings by
enacting new rules that would alter the setting in which deals are made
and enforced. Such rules might include "claw-back" provisions that allow
recapture of past subsidies under certain circumstances, or the creation of
reporting and monitoring requirements that enable the grantor of the subsidy to
ensure that it gets what it bargained for. Some governments have in fact
adopted such prospective responses despite business climate pressures.4 24
With state and local governments under the severe budgetary constraints of recent years, and with the growth of the global and hemispheric
economy (with or without a North American Free Trade Agreement), the
stage seems set for conflict between financially strapped governments and
increasingly mobile corporations. There is likely to be more legislative and
litigative activity over the rules governing industrial development. Measures tried or suggested to date include requiring broader representation
on the boards of public economic development agencies, greater public
access to information about development activities, greater coordination
and communication among localities and regions within a state, limitation
of subsidies to projects that credibly project substantial job creation or that
credibly target job creation to the hard-core unemployed, requirement of
"jobs impact statements" from applicants for development subsidies, a
change in accounting procedures that would require localities to report
foregone revenues as costs,4 25 public monitoring of performance by recipients of public monies, and recoupment of past support in the event a
recipient moves part or all of its operation during the life of the subsidy.4 26

422. For some accounts of such experiences, see supra Part II.c.2.B.

423. For example, after its experience with Anchor Hocking, West Virginia apparently
starting seeking more assurances from businesses that they would remain in West Virginia
during the life of the incentive. Anchor Hocking Corp. v. Moore, No. C2-88-0738, at 11
(S.D. Ohio filed July 13, 1988) (verified complaint for injunctive relief). Such efforts were,
however, apparently abandoned. See supra notes 236 & 237 and accompanying text.

424. Economic development staffers in West Virginia reported, for instance, that their
current financing packages to industry include the state's right to demand full payment on
the note if the recipient leaves the state during the life of the loan, or substantially fails to
meet the job estimates projected at the start of the loan. See supra note 237. Michigan has a

claw-back statute, which provides for repayment, with interest, of any benefits given to a
company to induce its presence. MICH. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 445.601-06 (West 1991).

New Haven, Connecticut passed an ordinance that recaptures subsidies in the event of a
plant relocation during the term of the benefit. NEW HAVEN, CONN., ART. VIi (1985) (on file

with author). The Vacaville, California ordinance, infra note 464, also contains a recapture
provision.
425. See Regan, supra note 66.

426. A group of bakery workers in New York City were recently successful in winning the
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The mere adoption of such measures, however, is seldom enough to
make much of a difference in efforts to retain industry unless these
measures are accompanied by ongoing citizen involvement. Most governmental development activities are carried out by economic development
professionals on the state or local payroll, in conjunction with business
people. Labor groups are often excluded from the process altogether or
asked to serve in ways that are primarily cosmetic. Community organizations representing ordinary citizens are seldom represented in economic
development activity at all unless they vociferously demand to be.4 27 The
presence of an active local group becoming involved in the application
process, from investigating applicants, to demanding performance as promised, to questioning substandard wages or the likelihood of job creation, is
probably necessary to put bite into accountability provisions.4 28 Governmental bodies, then, can make better deals for their constituents, either by
negotiating stronger language in specific transaction documents, or by
tightening the authorizing legislation for subsidy programs.

cooperation of Mayor Dinkins to recoup past tax breaks from a departing company. The
monies have not yet been returned, but once they are collected, the city's plan is to turn the
considerable sum over to the dislocated workers, who are seeking to establish a workerowned enterprise. If eventually successful, this sounds like a neat move. Telephone Interview with Lynn Bell, Dislocated Worker and Chair of Community-Labor Campaign to Save
Taystee Jobs, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 26, 1993). For a survey of restriction on economic
development subsidies, see FIRR, STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES ON DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES AND PLANT CLOSINGS 49-79 (1989); LEROY & KERSAN, supra note 419, at 31. One
specific statute worth noting is Wisconsin legislation that requires "job projection estimates,"
before a company and a municipality can enter into a revenue agreement for public financing
of development projects. The estimate is to address "whether the project ... is expected to
eliminate, create or maintain jobs on the project site and elsewhere in this state." WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 66.521(4m)(a)(2) (1990). The state department of development is required to
come up with this estimate, and the project recipient must file a report within a year of
completion or two years of the revenue bond, stating the net number of jobs actually
eliminated, created, or maintained. Id. § 560.034.
427. See Mark Crouch, Job Wars at Fort Wayne, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1986, at 47, 63
("Local labor leaders have the potential to move from a defensive posture of simply
monitoring economic development activities for anti-labor bias to a position as watchdogs
for the interests of the entire community, and as spokespersons for labor's natural political
allies: minorities, the unemployed and the poor.").
428. A good example of such a group is the Congress for a Working America's "Labor
Lightning Rod System," in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which was a "cooperative effort at
reviewing applications for business incentives given by government." See CONGRESS OF A
WORKING AMERICA, CFWA's LABOR LIGHTNING ROD SYSTEM, EVALUATION OF THE FIRST
YEAR, SEPT. 1985-AUG. 1986, at 1 (on file with The Georgetown Law Journal). The group, for
example, relayed information weekly to labor unions and groups like the Walnut Hill
Employables and the Mary Queen of Heaven Job Search Club and intervened in the
subsidy-granting process. Id.; see also the description of the multifaceted approach taken by
workers in the Simpson-Dura-Vent case in Redwood City and Vacaville, California.
Supra note 346.
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Direct Regulation of Plant Closings. Several state and local governments
have moved beyond attempts to assure and negotiate better deals to direct
regulation of plant closings.4 29 Any such regulations cut close enough to
the heart of what U.S. law has characterized as private managerial control
that they arouse strong reactions.4 3 °
At the national level, Congress has passed legislation that directly regulates plant closings irrespective of receipt of public subsidies, and the
resulting federal laws 43 ' will be the focus of some discussion below. A
number of state and local legislatures have also been active in this field
and have served as something of a laboratory (albeit a contested one) for
plant closing legislation,4 3 2 and their experiences and experiments are also

429. Some states have chosen instead to enter into tripartite "compacts" that stress
voluntary standards. See LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PLANT CLOSINGS, FINAL
REPORT (Mar. 1985) (leading to New York's decision to enter such a tripartite compact).
430. For an early sign of the Supreme Court's concern for this core of managerial control,
see Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of La., 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
431. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§
2101-09 (1985); Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1791 (1988).
432. Some opponents see state and local legislation as interference that is preempted by
federal law and generically subject to invalidation as violative of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. As to the latter, one observer noted: "[A] new form of protectionism.., will
require the courts to dust off this neglected doctrine and test its viability as a bulwark against
incursions into free interstate trade: the regulation of plant closings." Michael Abbey,
Note, State Plant Closing Legislation: A Modern Justification for the Use of the Dormant
Commerce Clause as a Bulwark of National Free Trade, 75 VA. L. REV. 845, 845 (1989).
Though I disagree with the author's conclusions, his invocation of the rhetoric of free trade
is apt. The issues involved with plant closings and with "free trade" are related. For more
on the constitutionality of state and local plant closing legislation, see David Huskey, The
ConstitutionalAspects of Restricting Business Closures, 14 PAC. L.J. 275, 277 (1983) (Commerce Clause not an issue because plant closing law did not discriminate and law would
meet balancing test); Peter Millspaugh, State and Local Plant Closings Laws Confront
Constitutional Hurdles, 1894 DET. C. L. REV. 615 (1984) [hereinafter Millspaugh, Plant
Closings] (problem of competing claims and their deleterious effect on interstate trade raises
Commerce Clause Issue); Peter Millspaugh, The Constitutionalityof Municipal Restrictions on
Plant Closings: The Pittsburgh Experience, 20 NEw ENG. L. REV. 199 (1984) [hereinafter
Millspaugh, Municipal Restrictions] (addressing constitutional issues raised by regulation of
plant closings).
Proponents of preemption also point to specific federal statutes. Section six of the WARN
Act provides explicitly that it does not exempt advance notice or other similar provisions of
state and local statutes. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102-09 (1988). But preemption under the NLRA or
ERISA is a possibility. Local regulation establishing minimum terms of employment is not
preempted under the NLRA, and most plant closing statutes would appear to fall within that
category. A Maine plant closing law was challenged on the ground that it was preempted by
both the NLRA and ERISA, but was upheld in both instances; the ERISA matter turned on
the Court's ruling that a one-time severance benefit was not the same as a "plan" that would
be covered by ERISA. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 428 U.S. 1 (1987). Maine's
statute was also upheld against other constitutional challenges in Shapiro Bros. Shoe Co,
Inc. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Ass'n, 320 A.2d 247, 257 (Me. 1974). For
other discussion on preemption, see Nancy Kubasek, State Plant Closing Legislation and
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of interest.433 Provisions proposed or adopted have required closing employers to undertake a number of different obligations, including the provisions
of notice, information, severance benefits, and certain kinds of interaction
with the public.
One of the recurring concerns voiced by those who have endured
plant closings in the United States is the inadequacy of the notice typically
given to workers and local communities to prepare for the event. Other
countries typically require that employees be given notice before an enterprise can legally close,434 and notice is the most common requirement in U.S. plant closing laws, both at the municipal43 5 and state
Preemption by ERISA, 17 STETSON L. REV. 319 (1988) (addressing possible preemption of
state plant closing statutes); James Douglas, State and Local Plant Closing Laws: The Case
Against Preemption, 21 GONZAGA L. REV. 603 (1985-86) (same); Joanne Guinan, Notice
Requirements: Federal Preemption of State and Local Plant Closing Statutes, 13 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 333 (1985) (same); Huskey, supra at 275 (same); James McDonald, State Plant
Closing Laws: Preempted by the NLRA?, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 241 (1984) (same).
433. For discussions from varying perspectives, see generally James Cline, A Legal,
Economic, and Normative Analysis of National Plant Closing Legislation, 11 J. LEGIS. 348
(1984) (discussing rights of employers and employees in plant closing situations); Peter
Millspaugh, The Campaign for Plant Closing Laws in the United States: An Assessment, 5
CORP. L. REV. 291 (1982) (same); Judith Gallo, Comment, An Analysis of Plant Closing Law:
How to Protect Workers from the Effects of Cessation in Business While Preserving Employer
Rights, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 565 (1988) (discussing rights of employers and employees in
plant closing situations).
434. See

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LAW LIBRARY, FOREIGN FACTORY CLOSINGS LEGISLA-

(Mar. 1987) (on file with The Georgetown Law Journal) (series of reports on notice
requirements of 28 countries prepared for Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio); Bennett
Harrison, The International Movement for Prenotification of Plant Closures, 23 INDUS. RELS.
387, 391-94 (1984) (describing notification requirements in Western Europe).
435. Cities have passed ordinances that require notice in different situations. The city of
Vacaville, California, for instance, had its industrial development plans challenged when it
was sued by workers who were going to be dislocated by the move of an employer from
Redwood City to Vacaville's new industrial park. The plaintiffs alleged intrastate job
pirating in violation of California law and questioned the city's declaration of the "blight"
necessary for carrying out the redevelopment plan. As part of a settlement of the suit, the
city passed an ordinance that required businesses that received more than $1000 in "financial aid" from the city to give three months' to one year's notice before closing. The
ordinance carried a sunset provision, however, requiring renewal after January 1, 1987; so its
significance was more in the example it set than in its local impact. See also Interview with
Jim Eggleston, Attorney representing the Plant Closures Project, in San Francisco, Cal. (July
19, 1989). For more on the Vacaville story, see supra note 346.
For other municipal notice requirements, see Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 21 (July 5, 1983)
(increasing notice from 100 to 270 days, not restricted to subsidized companies); Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance No. 1118 (June 17, 1982), (codified at Phila. City Code, Chap. 9-1500)
(requiring notice of 60 days, not restricted to subsidized companies). The Pittsburgh
ordinance was struck down as violative of Pennsylvania home rule law and as unconstitutional in a case brought at the behest of the mayor immediately after its passage. See Kevin
Forsythe, National, State and Local Perspectives on the Regulation of Business Dislocations:
Smaller Manufacturers' Council v. City of Pittsburgh, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 439 (1983-84)
(analyzing the court decision striking down the Pittsburgh ordinance); Millspaugh, Municipal
Restrictions, supra note 432, at 199, 200 (same).
TION
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levels. 43 6

It is the only prerequisite for plant closings mandated at the
437
federal level, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act (WARN),
and represents a necessary step, albeit a minimal one, toward a more
reasonable and humane industrial regime.
Prior to the adoption of notice provisions, it was not unusual for people
literally to be told upon arriving at work that their jobs had ended.4 3 8 The
severe emotional shock of such an announcement should be enough to
militate against the practice except in the most unforeseeable of circumstances and the impacts are more than emotional. In many instances
workers could do much to soften the other effects of a closing if given
adequate warning, but may be vulnerable in the extreme if they have not
had fair notice.4 39
During the 1980s, before passage of WARN, Congress repeatedly considered, and repeatedly failed to pass, plant closing legislation. 440 Notice
figured heavily in most of these proposals. There were, accordingly, numer-

436. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch.149, § 182 (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1-602 (1992); Wis. STAT. § 109.07 (1989-90). See generally FEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL
RETENTION & RENEWAL, STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES ON DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES AND
PLANT CLOSINGS (1989).
437. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988). WARN requires employers to give 60 days notice of a
plant closing or mass layoff to the union, each individual employee if there is no union, the
state "dislocated worker unit," and the local government. Specific provisions define and
refine these terms and requirements in ways that are fairly intricate and have sometimes led
to unexpected problems. There are also a number of loopholes and exceptions. But 60 days
notice is the basic requirement.
438. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PLANT CLOSINGS: LIMITED ADVANCE NoTICE AND ASSISTANCE PROVIDED DISLOCATED WORKERS (1985) [hereinafter LIMITED ADVANCE NOTICE] (noting that median length of advance notice given by 2600 establishments
surveyed was seven days, and that fully one third of those surveyed gave no notice).
439. Perhaps the most common example of avoidable problems involves the worker who
takes on substantial debt immediately prior to a plant closing. As Don Weaver said in
testimony before Congress, spilling out his words in a rush because he and the other rank
and file workers who had come to testify had been told that time was running short:
I am Don Weaver, Crown Zellerback, 14 years, papermaker, no job, no place where
I can find one. I do have a warehouseman's experience, but there is nobody who
wants to hire us. I have been hunting all over God's creation in Antioch. I am
moving to Minnesota. I paid $25,000 down on a house right after we came off
strike. I had to sell it 3 months ago. I had to take a third mortgage, which I will
have to eat, I got $15,000 out cash and that is it. I will have to eat $17,000. I do not
know what I am going to do.
Plant Closing Problems, Joint Hearing on H.R. 5040 Before the Subcomm. on LaborManagement Relations and the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm.
on Education & Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1980) (statement of Don Weaver, Paperworker).

440. For some earlier bills, see H.R. 1616, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 538, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1122, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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ous studies and assessments of the effects of notice,4 4 1 which raised basic
questions. Would notice make a discernible difference to the ability of a
community to organize retraining efforts, to smooth paper work, and to
brace itself for increased demand on social services? Would notice make a
discernible difference in the ability of individual workers to find reemployment at a level reasonably comparable to that of their previous jobs? Most
of the studies confirmed what common sense predicted-more notice
made for better services, a smoother transition, and a better final outcome.
Eventually, despite a presidential veto and vociferous opposition, Congress
required closing employers to give sixty days notice.
In retrospect, it is difficult to understand the heat of the controversy
surrounding notice requirements, given the simple logic of such requirements and the empirical data to support them. To have heard business
leaders talk during the debates, however, one would have thought they
save the free enterprise system and
were fighting a last ditch effort 4to
42
western civilization as we know it.
441. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PLANT CLOSINGS: INFORMATION ON
ADVANCE NOTICE AND ASSISTANCE TO DISLOCATED WORKERS (1987) (briefing report to the
Chairman of the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources;
LIMITED ADVANCE NOTICE, supra note 438; OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PLANT CLOSING: ADVANCE NOTICE AND RAPID RESPONSE, SPECIAL REPORT (1986).

studying the effects of notice);

442. For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce took the position that "H.R. 1616
represents an assault on our economic system, collective bargaining system, legal precedents,
and competitive way of doing business." Labor-Management Notification and Consultation
Act of 1985 Hearings on H.R. 1616 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-ManagementRelations and
the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1985) (statement of Mark de Bernardo, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce). The Clarksville, Tennessee Leaf-Chronicle similarly editorialized in 1988:
[Wlould the notice feature be fair and equitable to American companies? Or
would it saddle them with yet another intrusion by government into the business of
business?
Would they see their competitors swoop down during those last 60 days before
the plant's announced closing to steal customers away from them? Isn't it reasonable to expect that many employees who knew they were going to be laid off in two
months' time wouldn't do their best work, and some might be inclined to sabotage
production in an attempt to get even?
Plant Notice Lives On, LEAF-CHRONICLE, June 11, 1988, at 4A (on file with author).
Richard McKenzie, observed in a similar vein when voicing his dissenting views about a
Secretary of Labor's task force report on plant closing legislation: "If taken seriously by the
The Task Force is
legislative process, that report will set back social policy two decades ....
prepared to resurrect the 1960s delusion that social and economic ills can be readily
remedied by Washington paternalism." Report of Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation on Impact of Plant Closings, Mass Layoffs, 8 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Jan. 13, 1987).
On the other hand, Peter Millspaugh, a conservative and critic of plant closing legislation,
took a much more cosmopolitan, long-range, and nuanced view of the subject, predicting
that some legislation will emerge, but that it will simply represent a new and tolerable
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In fact, the provisions of WARN are so exceedingly modest, that the law
has produced little commotion since its enactment. As it went into effect,
employer and worker advisors alike began advising their clients how to use
and live with (or manipulate) the Act.4 43 There now seems to be a
consensus that the Act has not crippled the economy, nor has it created
much in the way of litigation.4 44
Perhaps for both supporters and opponents, WARN carried a symbolic
"foot-in-the-door" meaning beyond its immediate concrete significance.
Thus, while opponents of the legislation were warning that the Act posed
serious dangers despite its innocuous appearance," 5 supporters pushed
for its expansion, promising that despite its obvious weaknesses it might
lead to the eventual development of more meaningful protections.
Proposals for strengthening the law have included calls for a longer
notice period to better effectuate the purposes of the Act. WARN has
enabled many workers to find out about and take advantage of available
training programs, 446 but most worker and community advocates continue
accommodation of conflicting interests. See Peter Millspaugh, The ManagerialPrerogativein
Plant Closings: A Legal and Policy Perspective, 19 TOLEDO L. REV. 1 (1987).
443. See, e.g., Charles Carroll, Plant Closing Nuances, Avoiding Last Minute Compliance

Difficulties, 39 LAB. L.J. 637 (1988) (suggesting ways of complying with the WARN Act); T.S.
Lough, WARN: The Rights, Duties, and Obligations of Employers, Employees, and Unions, 42
LAB. L.J. 285 (1991) (same); Nancy Ryan, Complying with the WARNAct, 18 EMP. REL. L.J.
169 (1992) (same); R. Scott Savage & Terry M. Killmorgen, Limitationson Applicability of the
WARN Act: A Defendant's Strategy, 16 EMP. REL. L.J. 453 (1991) (same); Howard Weg,
Introduction to FederalRegulation of Plant Closings and Mass Layoffs, 94 COM. L.J. 123 (1989)
(same); Committee on Labor & Employment Law, Interaction Between the Worker Adjustment
and RetrainingNotification Act and the National Labor Relations Act, REC. OF THE BAR ASS'N
OF THE CITY OF N.Y., Mar. 1991, at 161, 161-71, 175-79.
444. See Stephen Nord & Yuan Ting, The Impact of Advance Notice of Plant Closings on
Earnings and the Probability of Unemployment, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 681 (1991)
(describing study confirming that 60 days is an appropriate and effective amount of time);
Terry Wagar, The WARN Act and Perceptions of Managers Concerning the Effect of Providing
Advance Notice, 43 LAB. L.J. 588, 591 (1992) ("[T]he WARN Act may be a non-event for
business."); Randall Samborn, Employers Lobbied Hard Against Last Year's Plant Closing
Law, But There Has Been No Explosion in Litigation-Yet, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 22, 1990, at 30
("National Association of Manufacturers ... agrees the law apparently is less burdensome
than many companies had anticipated.").
445. See MARK A. DE BERNARDO, THE NEW FEDERAL "PLANT CLOSINGS" LAW: WHAT
EMPLOYERS SHOULD KNOW 1-2 (1988) (warning that requiring notice is only a first step in
undermining management prerogatives).
446. See Greg LeRoy, Plant Closing Advance Notice Law Is Working Effectively, FIRR
NEWS (newsletter of Federation for Industrial Retention & Renewal, Chicago, I11.), Summer
1990, at 2 (Illinois estimates worker enrollment increases of between 50 and 75%). FIRR
was not without its criticisms, however. On the second anniversary of the effective date of
the Act, FIRR released its "First Annual 'Plant Closing Dirty Dozen' " list to point out that
compliance was still not uniform, and that problems remained. Press Release, FIRR Names
Its First Annual 'Plant Closing Dirty Dozen,' Feb. 1991 (on file with author). Those involved
in representing workers in WARN actions have pointed out also that many workers remain
unaware of their rights under WARN. One lawyer reported:
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to assert that sixty days is not a long enough period.44 7 If one aim is to
create a window of opportunity in which the workers and the community
might come up with an alternate plan to save jobs, then sixty days is barely
enough for them to get started, even when the workers have the advantage
of an existing union. When the workers are not organized, which will be
the case in most instances, sixty days is even more glaringly inadequate.
In addition to arguing that the notice period be lengthened, supporters
of plant closing regulation have suggested a number of other ways that the
basic notice requirement should be strengthened and enlarged. Congress
could extend notice rights to more affected workers by bringing more
employers within the coverage of the Act.44 8 Congress could also provide

For example, the Guild Law Center currently represents 54 former employees of
the New Delphos Manufacturing Company in Delphos, Ohio, which shut down in
October 1990, giving its 100 employees notice by announcing over the loudspeaker
in the plant that they had 45 minutes to clear out their personal belongings because
the plant was closing. The Law Center was contacted by one of the high-ranking
supervisors with the company, who had learned of the WARN Act by communicating with his Senator ... when I met with these employees and asked them, as a
group, how many had ever heard of the WARN Act, no more than 4 people raised
their hands.
Similarly, we also represent two locals of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
from Cleveland, Ohio, former employees of the RMI Titanium Company. When we
met with 10 or so of these dislocated workers, only 2 people had ever heard of the
WARN Act.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15, n.33 (statement of Julie Hurwitz, Executive Director of Sugar Law
Center for Economic and Social Justice) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings] (Detroit's Sugar Law
Center, a project of the National Lawyers Guild, has come to serve as the national think tank
and clearinghouse on WARN cases for plant closing plaintiffs and their pioneering counsel).
447. In February 1993, congressional hearings were held, timed to coincide with release of
a report on the Warn Act conducted by the GAO. One advocate of a stronger law
recommended that Congress lengthen the standard notice period to 180 days. 1993 Hearings,
supra note 446, at 10-11 (statement of Julie Hurwitz, Executive Director of the Sugar Law
Center for Economic and Social Justice).
In a survey of state "dislocated worker units" conducted by John Portz, political science
professor at Northeastern University, state staffers reported that 60 days left them with
inadequate time to put together the retraining programs and rapid response that are their
responsibility under EDWAA. John Portz, Plant Closings, Mass Layoffs and Advance
Notice Laws: Putting the Pieces Together, Paper delivered to the Meeting of the American
Political Science Association 16 (Sept. 1992) (on file with author); see also John Portz,
WARN and the States: Implementation of the Federal Plant Closing Law, paper presented
to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 4-5 (Apr. 1992)
(discussing other problems of the 60 day notice requirement as indicated by survey of states)
(on file with author).
448. WARN contains a complex set of numerical thresholds pertaining to the number of
employees an employer has, the number and percentages of employees affected and over
which periods of time, etc. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988). In my own experience it can prove
surprisingly difficult for a group of workers to make the initial determination whether their
layoff is even covered by WARN.
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for more meaningful compensation when those notice rights are violated,"' which some observers believe would also serve to increase corporate
compliance with the terms of the Act. The Government Accounting Office
(GAO) recently undertook a study of experiences under WARN to date.4 5 °
The report submitted to Congress in February 1993 contained pointed
criticisms of WARN. The agency found that sixty-four percent of closings
that met WARN numerical threshold requirements were nonetheless exempt for some other reason, that fifty-four percent of a sample group of
911 covered closings were not properly reported to the state dislocated
worker units, and that in twenty-nine percent of those that were duly
reported the employer failed to give timely notice. The study recommended lodging enforcement powers in the Department of Labor. Meanwhile, several
key Republicans have criticized the study and called for a
51
new one.

4

In testimony at the same hearing where the GAO report was submitted,
the Maurice & Jane Sugar Law Center proposed not only an increase in
the notice period, but also urged a number of other changes to WARN.
The Center argued that Congress should: reduce threshold coverage
requirements so that more employees are entitled to statutory protection;
close the "single site loophole" that has allowed some employers to evade
WARN responsibilities if their employees were spread out in more than
one physical location; eliminate or restrict the "good faith exception" to
the sixty day requirement; supplement and strengthen enforcement (currently left entirely to private actions) by providing for investigative, subpoena, monitoring, injunctive, and direct enforcement powers in a federal
agency such as the Department of Labor; increase sanctions for violation
449. Employer liability under WARN is limited to pay and benefits for the number of days
by which the actual notice given fell short of 60. They may also be liable for attorney fees.

29 U.S.C.A. § 2104. Some critics point out that this limitation on liability creates very little
incentive for companies to abide by the law, because the damages for noncompliance do not
exceed the cost of compliance.

450. In an open letter to the GAO in 1991, the Federation for Industrial Retention and
Renewal (FIRR) identified a number of problem areas that it felt the GAO should explore
in conducting its investigation. FIRR argued that compliance was more of a problem than
the relatively small number of WARN lawsuits would suggest, because there are factors that

deter suit. It mentioned that an unintentional loophole in the Act allows a careful and
manipulative company to gradually lay off its entire work force in properly calibrated
numbers without giving employees 60 days notice. It pointed out that some employers have
fraudulently used WARN to lend an official air to repeated empty threats of closing, that the

faltering business exception is too wide, and that there is a lack of uniformity from state to
state as to which WARN records are open to public inspection, an inconsistency that makes
it difficult for citizens to obtain a picture of what is actually happening in the country. Letter
from Greg LeRoy, FIRR, to Sigurd Nilsen, General Accounting Office (Mar. 11, 1991) (on

file with author).
451. See Randall Samborn, Report: Closing Law Ineffective,

NAT'L

L.J., Mar. 8, 1993, at 3,
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of the Act to allow for liquidated damages; and support and require public
education concerning the rights of workers and the duties of management
under the Act.45 2
Other suggestions for reform of WARN move well beyond bare notice
and its enforcement. They suggest a more comprehensive approach that
would treat workers and communities not as powerless outsiders to corporate decisions,45 3 but rather as legitimate parties with cognizable legal
interests at stake.4 5 4 State and local governments have on occasion experimented with some of these broader requirements, and such provisions are
common in other western industrialized countries.
Some local measures, for instance, have required employers who desire
to move facilities to reveal additional relevant information beyond the bare
date of closure. Other schemes link disclosure requirements not to plant
closings, but to applications for government subsidies.
The City of St. Paul, for instance, requires city-funded development
projects to submit "job impact statements," assessing the likely positive
and negative effects of their project on permanent jobs and on wage and
benefit levels. The impact statements are to be made available to the
public 5 before a decision is made on whether or not to grant the subsidies.

45

Disclosure requirements in other areas of the law support a right to
broad access to information4 5 6 when the need is great, especially when the
452. 1993 Hearings,supra note 446, at 7-20 (statement of Julie Hurwitz, Executive Director of Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice).
453. For discussion of employees as insiders or outsiders, in the context of different
theories of the firm, see supra notes 177-190 and accompanying text.
454. The Sugar Law Center, for instance, urged Congress to reintroduce management's
duty to consult and disclose information (provisions to this effect were proposed before
passage). Id. at 11. Greg LeRoy of the Midwest Center for Labor Research suggests that
WARN should also include a provision for a right of first refusal for workers interested in
buying out a plant that has announced a decision to close. Telephone Interview with Greg
LeRoy, Staff member of Midwest Center for Labor Research, Chicago, Ill. (Feb. 10, 1993).
For examples of relatively comprehensive proposals at the state level, see M. Thomas
Arnold, Existing and Proposed Regulation of Business Relocations, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 209,
209-14 (1980); infra note 456.
455. The ordinance requires Job Impact Statements to identify, inter alia, wage rates and
benefits, indirect job losses to be caused by the project, the "[c]haracter and demographic
characteristics of the affected workforce," skill levels required for the jobs lost and the jobs
gained, any record of those involved in the project in meeting past job projections, and a
public monitoring process. The ordinance also calls for unusually generous retraining and
relocation assistance for any worker who loses a job as a result of a publically assisted

project. St. Paul Ordinance, quoted in

FEDERATION OF INDUSTRIAL RETENTION & RENEWAL
STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES ON DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES AND PLANT CLOSINGS 60-61.

See St. Paul to Require Jobs Impact Statement, FIRR NEWS (newsletter of Federation for
Industrial Retention and Renewal, Chicago, Ill.), Summer 1989, at 1 (St. Paul became first
city to require job impact statements).
456. Model legislation developed by Professor Frank Askin's Constitutional Litigation
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"accessed party" has a near monopoly on the relevant information. Under
the NLRA, for instance, workers have rights to certain information, depending in part on the bargaining context.4 5 7 In a bankruptcy, members of the
creditors' committee have extensive access to information about the company and its plans, access that is considered equitable and efficient in light
of their prior investment in the company and their stake in the outcome. 458
In product liability cases plaintiffs can gain unusual access to a defendant
manufacturer's records, in part because the manufacturer is the only
source for much of the information necessary to the plaintiff's case. In a
personal injury suit, the defendant can require the plaintiff to submit to

and Labor Law Clinics at Rutgers, Newark in 1980-1981 would have required a closing
employer to provide information including the following: the business history of the departing entity; whether the entity owned any foreign or domestic subsidiaries or was owned by a
foreign or domestic parent; an economic profile of the entity, including its profitability and
future investment plans; a description of the economic state of its industry; the reasons for
its decision to move; the estimated job loss that would be caused by the move; any plans the
company had made to cushion the blow of its closing, including the possibility of a worker or
community buyout; the size of its work force by category; its payroll, pension, and taxes; and
an inventory of all pending litigation in which the entity was a party. Information contemplated by the model statute was extremely broad by U.S. standards, but proponents argued
that disclosure was fair and that the information would be invaluable to workers, unions, and
communities attempting to plan effectively to avert or cushion a plant closing, or to mobilize
for an alternative strategy. See Letter with enclosed Synopsis and Draft Legislation from
Professor Askin, Chairperson, Essex County Job Development Conference Committee, to
Selected Trade Union Leaders in New Jersey (Nov. 30, 1981) (on file with author). The
cited notice provisions outlining the required "impact statement" appear at p. 2 of the
Synopsis and pp. 11-12 of the Draft Legislation.
457. See NLRB v. Truitt, 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (employees entitled in some cases to
evidence of management's inability to pay increased wages); see also John D. Feerick,
Information-SharingObligations, in LABOR LAW & BUSINESS CHANGE, supra note 137, at 45,

45 (observing that the duty of an employer to share information with bargaining representatives relates to its relevance for mandatory subjects of collective bargaining).
458. One union service representative reported to me that through participation on a
creditors' committee in bankruptcy, his union was able to obtain as a matter of right much
more meaningful access to crucial information about a financially troubled employer than it
could ever have claimed during contract negotiations as part of its bargaining rights. This
staffer found it interesting (and unfair) that collecting creditors receive greater informational privileges than bargaining workers. Of particular interest to the union was information about various prospective buyers of the company. Different buyers had different
characteristics on matters of importance to employees, such as their avowed and apparent
commitment to stay in the area, and their position on collective bargaining. With this
information, the union was in a position to influence the decision of the company and the
bankruptcy judge about which buyer would be selected and approved. The plant involved in
that particular episode provides jobs to low and moderately skilled workers in a rural county
in East Tennessee with unemployment rates and a tax base so low the county has been
forced on more than one occasion to close schools. The judge approved the buyer favored by
the union, the sale was accomplished, and the plant is still open at this writing. Interview
with Doug Gamble, Staff Member, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, in
Knoxville, Tenn. (Feb. 26, 1993). For more on bankruptcy, see supra notes 363-366 and
accompanying text.
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the highly intrusive process of an intimate physical or mental examination.
In a plant-closing context, where the workers and communities in need of
the information have made such substantial contributions to the welfare of
the corporation that possesses or has best access to the information, the
reasoning and the equities supporting ample disclosure seem especially
strong.
In addition to notice requirements and other disclosure requirements,
some state statutes mandate particular severance benefits for workers
dislocated by a closing.4 59 In Maine, for instance, terminated workers
must receive a severance payment of one week's current wages for every
year they worked at the plant.4

60

In Connecticut, employers with over one

hundred workers are obliged to continue paying group health insurance
for employees
and their dependents for up to ninety days after the lay1
46

off.

"Community severance pay" to local governments has been proposed,
but is not yet required by any U.S. jurisdiction. 462 Such a requirement
would be just if properly drawn, because in most instances the municipality
has contributed significantly to the success of the enterprise over time.
459. Mandatory severance benefits are common in most other industrialized countries.
See supra note 61.
460. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (West 1992). The statute provides exceptions
for bankrupt employers, relocation within 100 miles, closings caused by a physical calamity,
transfer of workers, or collective bargaining agreements that mandate severance pay. Id.
For assessments of the Maine statute in operation, see Nancy Folbre & Melissa Roderick,
Plant Closings and Their Regulation in Maine, 1971-1982, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 185

(1984); Julia L. Leighton, Plant Closings in Maine: Law & Reality, in PLANT CLOSING
LEGISLATION 1, 8-11 (Antone Aboud ed., 1984).
461. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51 (West 1992). All workers are also entitled to some

protection of their interest in health insurance by a federal statute known as "COBRA." 29
U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (Supp. 1993). The statute requires that employees be allowed access to
the employer's group health insurance plan for 18 months after their termination. The
benefits in many cases seem little more than a cruel joke, however, because the dislocated
workers must pay their own premiums, and the rate is often wildly beyond the range of
resources which the worker is already trying to stretch to cover immediate needs. Boot
workers from Clarksville, Tennessee, who at this writing are bracing for a plant closure,
explained this dilemma in particularly vivid terms. Some at their plant are single mothers
with no other family coverage and a house still unpaid for. Others are old and uninsurable
on the private market due to health problems in part attributable to their jobs. One's
husband will take mandatory retirement within months of her layoff. Interview with Ann
Huggins & Ann Bishop, Employees of ACME Boot Co., in Clarksville, Tenn. (Apr. 17,
1993).
462. The Ohio Community Readjustment Act, proposed in 1977 but never passed, would
have required such payments. FIRR, STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES ON DEVELOPMENT
SUBSIDIES AND PLANT CLOSINGS 42 (1989); see also Antone Aboud & Sanford F. Schram, An
Overview of Plant Closing Legislation and Issues, in PLANT CLOSING LEGISLATION, 37 (Antone

Aboud ed., 1984) (reporting proposal in California for direct payment by closing employer to
affected community and other proposals for general funds established by regular payments
by covered employers).
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Further, the move of a large employer typically delivers a strong jolt to the
tax base while simultaneously increasing pressure on local social services
networks.
Another kind of plant closing provision supported by many worker and
community advocates is one that undertakes to encourage and require
substantive worker and community involvement when a plant closing is
threatened. Proposals include the establishment of a public body with
464
clearly delegated investigative powers46 3 and mandated public hearings.
465
unAn earlier version of WARN included a consultation requirement

management, and government would meet to examine
der which labor,
4 66
alternatives.
Advocates of community involvement also suggest requiring a departing
employer to give its workers and the community a right of first refusal on
the facility if they want to run it themselves. 467 Another possibility is to
impose a duty of cooperation on a departing employer, requiring that it do
whatever is necessary to help preserve productive capacity upon its departure, whether that means helping the local union or government find an
attractive third-party buyer or cooperating with them in their own efforts
to purchase.4 68
463. A Pittsburgh ordinance, which was struck down after passage, would have established
a "Bureau of Employee Protection" to implement its terms, in addition to an advisory body
called the Commission for Jobs and Commerce. See Millspaugh, Municipal Restrictions,
supra note 432.
464. One commentator draws on the cases involving public employees, to whom the
government must give due process, as well as drawing on European experiences to suggest
that a pretermination hearing should be the norm in both individual and collective dismissals, irrespective of whether the employer is public or private. Karen Paull, Employment
Termination Reform: What Should a Statute Require Before Termination? Lessons from the
French, British, and German Experiences, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 619, 621-22,
629-31 (1991). California Senate Bill 1160 would have required the employer to hold a
hearing before closure and "present ... reasons for the decision." In the alternative, the
Attorney General could have called such a hearing and could have enjoined closure for 30
days if the firm's presentation was inadequate. Calif. Bus. & Community Relations Act of
1987, quoted in FIRR, STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES ON DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES AND
PLANT CLOSINGS 46 (1989).

465. Compare the "obligatory consultation" of the British system, advocated for the U.S.
in Charles A. Ognibene, Plant Closings and the Duty to Consult Under Britain's Employment
Protection Act of 1975: Lessons for the United States, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 195,
209-23 (1982).
466. Greg LeRoy, Plant Closing Advance Notice Law Is Working Effectively, FIRR NEWS
(newsletter of Federation of Industrial Retention and Renewal, Chicago, Ill.), Summer 1990,
at 2.
467. FIRR reports that a bill to this effect was introduced in the Washington state
legislature in 1989. FIRR, STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVE ON DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES &
PLANT CLOSINGS 43 (1989).

468. For some sense of the ways in which an uncooperative employer can obstruct and
subvert worker and community efforts to preserve capacity, see supra notes 372-384 and
accompanying text.
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None of the legislative programs in place in the United States provide
much more than minimal protection for workers or communities. More
options are certainly available should Congress or a state or local legislative body decide to move toward a more comprehensive approach.46 9 In
western Europe numerous ideas have been tried and are worth examining.
If Congress wanted to move beyond bare notice in the governance of plant
closings and collective dismissals, it might, for instance, explore some of
the following measures implemented abroad:
(1) requiring that a closing employer's notice include detailed informa:

4 70
tion about the individuals slated for layoff;

(2) requiring that the employer's notice also include information about
the status
of the enterprise, its reasons for closing, and its plans for the
47 1
future;

(3) requiring that worker organizations be given an opportunity to
respond and comment on the alleged reasons for shutdown and to
472
suggest possible alternatives or plans for mitigation;
(4) empowering
government officials to prohibit layoffs in certain
473
circumstances;
469. For one hypothesis explaining the reluctance of U.S. lawmakers to take a more
comprehensive route, see Nancy Kubasek, The Inevitable Conflict between Individualism and
Plant Closing Legislation, 12 LEGAL. STUD. F. 141, 154-62 (1988).
470. The International Labor Organization's Legislative Series reveals that Portuguese
employers were to furnish the union and the state Secretariat for Employment the following
information about each employee to be terminated: "name, address, whether single, married or divorced, date of birth and date of entry into the undertaking, social welfare position,
number of dependents, level of occupational skill, abilities, section to which he belongs, his
category and class, and his present remuneration." Legislative Decree No. 372-A/75, §
14(3), Portugal, Jul. 16, 1975, translatedin ILO Legis. Series, 74, 79 (1977).
471. Id. § 14(4), at 801 reveals that Portuguese employers have been required to send "a
written document containing the economic, financial or technical reasons and all information necessary to the proper appreciation of the reasons alleged"; see also Announcement of
Collective Dismissals Act, § 4(1) Netherlands, Nov. 24, 1976, translated in 2 ILO Legis.
Series, 115 (1977) (similar for Netherlands). For more discussion of disclosure requirements
domestically, see Part II.D.2.
Disclosure requirements may give rise to a reciprocal obligation of confidentiality. See
Collective Dismissals Act, § 8, translated in 2 ILO Legis. Series, 115, 117 (1977) ("Any
person who, by reason of his duties in a workers' union ...learns of an announcement... shall be [temporarily] bound to secrecy with respect to the announcement and its
contents if the employer includes an express request to that effect.").
472. "To enable the workers' representatives. . . to submit constructive proposals, the
employer shall supply them with all relevant information." Act Respecting Collective
Dismissals, § 2, Luxembourg, Mar. 2, 1982, translated in 1 ILO Legis. Series 133 (1983); see
also Legis. Decree No. 372-A/75, § 515, translated in 4 ILO Legis. Series, 75, 80 (1977)
("[T]he body representing the workers shall pass to the State Secretariat for Employment its
views on the validity of the contents of the notification ... together with an indication of
adequate means of preventing or reducing the dismissals, training and classifying the
workers, transferring them to another section, staggering dismissals .... ").
473. Legis. Decree No. 372-A/75, § 17(a), translatedin 4 ILO Legis. Series, 75, 80 (1977).
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(5) requiring474a closing employer to transfer dislocated workers to

other facilities;

preferences regarding order of layoffs to re(6) mandating statutory
475

flect public values;
4 77
4 76
for
or severance benefits
(7) establishing statutory recall rights

dislocated workers;
(8) requiring that employers grant their employees time off with pay to
search for new employment; 4 78 and
(9) requiring employers to consult with worker organizations about the
shutdown.4 79

These are only some of the possibilities for governance of plant closings
that might be gleaned from the laws of other countries.480 But perhaps the
list will illustrate some of the ways our own relatively primitive system of
protection from and regulation of mass dismissals might be expanded and
deepened.
Affirmative Programs. In addition to demanding more reciprocity in their
dealings with industry and passing legislation that directly regulates plant
closings, governmental bodies in this country have also developed affirmative programs to aid in the retraining of dislocated workers, to support
existing industry, and occasionally to offer aid to employees who wish to
acquire ownership in a plant to help prevent its closure.
Congress's main contribution to training for dislocated workers thus far
is the Economic Dislocation Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (ED-

474. Id. § 17(b).
475. Portugal gave preferences, in the absence of a contrary collective bargaining contract, in the following order: handicapped workers, most senior workers, oldest workers,
workers with the most family responsibilities, and those most "capable, experienced or
skilled." Id. § 18. Spain had a similar provision that gave priority as follows: "handicapped
persons ... heads of large families; workers more than 40 years old; workers with long
service in the undertaking." Decree No. 2487, § (a)-(d), Spain, Nov. 2, 1972, translatedin 3
ILO Legis. Series, 1, 2 (1975).
476. Legis. Decree No. 372-A/75 § 19, translated in 4 ILO Legis. Series, 75, 81 (1977)
(gave one year's recall rights and extended the obligation to successor corporations).
477. Id. Section 20, for instance, gave Portuguese workers three months' pay as a minimum, and beyond that, a month's pay for each year of service . Id. § 20.
478. Id. § 21.
479. See Collective Dismissals Act, translatedin 2 ILO Legis Series 115, 116 (1977), §§ (4),
(5), (6); Act Respecting Collective Dismissals, § 2, translated in ILO Legis. Series, 133
(1983); cf National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988) (decision to close a plant is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining). As it was originally proposed, the WARN Act
(which applies to nonunionized as well as to unionized employees) would have required
consultation with employees and local officials. These provisions were dropped from the
statute as finally enacted.
480. For other references to comparative law materials, see supra note 61.
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WAA).4 8 1 Administered by the states as part of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA),4 82 EDWAA is targeted to victims of plant closings and is
intended to dovetail with the provisions of WARN. Under WARN, an
employer is required to provide notice of closure not only to the workers
and the local government, but also to the state's "dislocated worker unit"
(DWU), which is a creation of EDWAA.48 3 Once the DWU receives
notice, a "rapid response team" is supposed to evaluate the situation and
plan for the provision of services.48 4 The DWUs are also authorized to
grant money for the carrying out of feasibility and prefeasibility studies
regarding alternative uses for the threatened facility.48 5
The stories of workers who have experienced retraining, however, are
depressingly glum and similar. Too often the training is arranged by some
local "education provider" who is more interested in capturing the EDWAA funding for its general budget than in learning to serve dislocated
workers. Too often the "private industry councils" are burdened with
conflicts of interest and run their programs narrowly and without vision.4 86
Too often dislocated workers are faced with confusing and difficult choices
early on, while they are still disoriented and in shock from the news of the
plant closing, and therefore make bad initial choices about training that
are effectively irreversible within the time limits of the retraining programs
offered and funded.4 87 Too seldom do workers get counseling in an

481.
482.
483.
484.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1662c (1988).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1791 (1992).
29 U.S.C. § 1661 (1988).
Section 1661 of the Act provides:

(2) [T]he State will designate or create an identifiable State dislocated worker
unit or office with the capability to respond rapidly, on site, to permanent closures
and substantial layoffs throughout the State in order to assess the need for, and
initially to provide for, appropriate basic readjustment services;
(3) the State unit will-(A) make appropriate retraining and basic readjustment
services available to eligible dislocated workers through the use of rapid
response teams, substate grantees, and other[s] ...
(B) work with employers and labor organizations in promoting labormanagement cooperation to achieve the goals of this subchapter;
(C) operate a monitoring, reporting, and management system which provides
an adequate information base for effective program management ....
Id.

§ 1661; see EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION,

RAPID RESPONSE UNDER

EDWAA: ETA PERSPECTIVE AND EXPECTATIONS (Mar. 10, 1989) (document prepared for

workshop for state Dislocated Worker Units, on file with author) (rapid response a mandated responsibility of DWU).
485. 29 U.S.C. § 1661(c).
486. These councils play an important role in EDWAA and JTPA.
487. The Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network holds a workshop at which TIRN staff
and members take participants through a plant closing, starting with an unannounced pink
slip. Leaders take on roles of the different people the dislocated worker is likely to
encounter. When the mock dislocatees arrive at their first EDWAA encounter, they are
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individualized setting in which their particular interests and experiences
can be properly evaluated. Too often a worker must stop any retraining as
soon as her unemployment compensation runs out, because she must
produce immediate income to support her family and cannot afford to
continue with training even if it is free. Too seldom are people trained to
do jobs that pay an adequate wage and that actually exist in the job market
only to end
where they live. Many workers complete a training program,
job.4 88
wage
minimum
unskilled
an
but
alternative
no
up with
Training programs are essential, despite the fact that as presently administered they are so frequently inadequate to meet the needs of dislocated
workers. The programs must provide training for jobs that actually exist in
the local economy and that actual people can qualify to perform. Several
features of EDWAA point in positive directions and provide the potential
for a greatly strengthened overall scheme to address the difficulties facing
dislocated workers.
The first promising feature of EDWAA is that it requires the state
DWU to monitor for dislocation. This amounts to a kind of early warning
program for state governments and could serve as a foundation for worth48 9 Second, it allows states
while economic retention and renewal activity.
49 °
to extend federal funds received under the Act for prefeasibility studies
to look into alternative ownership. Third, it directs the state to encourage

subjected to a barrage of fast, pleasant, well-intentioned, and incomprehensible talk from
the podium and then presented with various choices they must make on the spot. "Nurse or
truck driver? You need to made this decision quickly, because our fiscal year runs out in
July and therefore we need to get all this started tonight." Even in a role-playing context, to
an employed person with a postgraduate education, it is hard to understand or grapple with
this phase of the simulated experience. Personal Recollection of Author.
488. Interview with Ann Huggins & Ann Bishop, Workers on notice of impending plant
closing, in Clarksville, Tenn. (Apr. 17, 1993); Telephone Interview with Tom Stillman,
Dislocated Worker and Former Local Union President, Duluth, Minn. (Feb. 5, 1993);
Interview with Shirley Martin, Dislocated Garment Worker, in Knoxville, Tenn. (Spring
1991); Interview with Don Miller, Private Industry Council staff, in Knoxville, Tenn. (Summer 1989); cf. Ralph T. King, Jr., Job Retraining Linked Closely to Employers Works in
Cincinnati, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1993, at Al (discussing success of cooperative education
linking job-related instruction in classroom with paid work experience at Cincinnati Technical College).
489. An Interview with Greg LeRoy, Research Director, MCLR, WARN and EDWAA: Use
'em or Lose 'em, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1992, at 99, 102. One reason it is hard for workers and
communities to respond effectively to plant closings is the fact that information is so spotty
and often surfaces so late. It is difficult for ordinary citizens, or even public officials, to get
an accurate, helpful picture of industrial trends in their area. If the DWUs began to pursue
an energetic monitoring and information-gathering role and began to cultivate open communication with local groups of workers and grassroots community members, they could
provide space and a growth medium for local democratic industrial policymaking and
debate.
490. 29 U.S.C. § 1661c(b)(2) (1992).
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closing employers to form labor-management committees to address questions of dislocation.4 9 1
In addition to EDWAA services and retraining, the federal Trade
Adjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (TAA) 4 9 2 may be able to provide
retraining assistance in a plant closing or mass layoff situation. This
statute provides benefits for workers employed in industries that have been
adversely affected by imports. It is superior to EDWAA because in
addition to subsidizing the cost of training, it includes, during a limited
time frame, a living allowance similar to unemployment compensation.4 9 3
To qualify for benefits, a worker (or group of workers or their representative) must petition the Secretary of Labor.4 94 Although workers and
unions report that the conflicting requirements and separate administration of EDWAA, TAA, and state workers' compensation funds can be
frustrating and confusing, some features of TAA are certainly worth
preserving and expanding should job training programs be revamped.4 95
Executive and legislative action on EDWAA, TAA, and other job training programs has been a centerpiece of President Clinton's economic
recovery plan generally, and a big part of his answer to labor's concerns
about the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement specifically.
A large question will continue to be "Training for what?",4 9 6 If appropriate jobs are not available, all the training in the world will do no good.
In addition to regulating shutdowns, governments can try to avoid them
by helping troubled industries. In addition to pursuing smokestackchasing recruitment of big-name, outsider firms, and in addition to orchestrating well-publicized bail-outs of large corporations in trouble,4 9 7 some
states and localities have worked to develop more quiet ways of targeting

491. 29 U.S.C. 1661(3)(b). Use of such a labor-management adjustment committee is
sometimes said to follow "the Canadian model" because Canadians have embraced and had
favorable experiences with such committees. See Ruth Fedrau & Kevin Balfe, Cooperative
Labor-Management Worker Adjustment Programs, 40 LAB. L.J. 138 (1989); William Batt,
Special Report: Canada'sGood Example with Displaced Workers, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug.

1983, at 6.
492. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (1988).
493. Id. §§ 2275-2298.
494. See generally Mary Anne Joseph, Note, Trade Adjustment Assistance: An Analysis, 6

L. 251, 258-59 (1990) (describing conditions under which Secretary of Labor
may certify a group of workers as eligible for adjustment assistance upon a petition).
495. Stories about the confusion and inefficiency of these overlapping schemes in practice
were gleaned primarily from personal interviews with Doug Gamble and Mark Pitt, staff of
the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, in Knoxville, Tenn. (Summer 1989).
496. The last dislocated worker I heard voice some version of this exasperated question
CONN. J.INT'L

was Tom Stillman, past president of his local union, and presently a dislocated worker,

Duluth, Minn. (Feb. 5, 1993).
497. Examples that come to mind are the federal bail-out of Chrysler and the New York

state package put together to shore up a GM facility threatening to move.
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and supporting locally based entities.49 8 They have discovered that locally
based businesses are statistically more stable than national or global ones,
and that the government may be able to help such a business stay afloat by
helping it to develop a more secure niche, by cooperating in the design and
implementation of training, by helping499complementary local businesses to
get together for better networking, etc.
One other affirmative governmental step that some states have taken is
the passage of employee ownership assistance acts. These statutes generally try to encourage and support the development of employee-owned
enterprises by offering technical assistance. Some also provide for loans
and other financial help from the state development agency. The concrete
help available has often turned out to be fairly pallid, leading one author
to observe that "this type of legislation ...functions merely as a policy
statement. ' 50 0 These statutes could certainly be strengthened as part of
the development of a broad industrial policy, but at present do not represent much help to workers faced with a closing.
The foregoing inventory of legal tools is not exhaustive, and the selection of stories was of course my own somewhat idiosyncratic and accidental
one. My hope is that the inventory has at least provided an introductory
picture of the terrain on which plant-closing advocates and activists have
been attempting to build a strategy. Perhaps it is misleading to use a
metaphor like "terrain," with all of its comforting connotations of solid
ground, because I think that in many ways the process is more like a
survival struggle at sea-with some in submarines and ocean liners, others
in dug-out canoes and rubber rafts, and every now and then a surfboardand all the while the unfamiliar tides are running hard, in ways the sailors
do not know how to anticipate or understand. Whatever the metaphor,
the inventory provides a glimpse of the human drama involved in present
economic trends. It also reveals the glaring inadequacy of present legal
rules to help ordinary Americans find a fair and humane response to the
498. See, e.g., Dan Swinney, Chicago's Family-Owned Manufacturing Faces Crisis of Succession, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 31, 1988, at 16 (advocating employee ownership and employee

stock ownership plans).
499. Massachusetts, for instance, took on as a special project the fate of its "mature
industries." See The Needle Trades Action Project: A Progress Report, 1985-1988, at 2 (on
file with author) (describing projects spawned by Massachusetts Mature Industries Act);
Industrial Services Program Report of FY '88 (report on activities of ISP in preserving
mature industries in Massachusetts). Compare Steve Early & Mike Schippani, A Model in

Massachusetts?, LAB. RES. REV., Spring 1987, at 111 (disagreeing with each other in assessing
the Massachusetts Mature Industries Act) with Michael Schippani, Massachusetts & Mature

Industries, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1986, at 79, 86-87 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks for
labor of the voluntary, trilateral compact approach advocated by Governor Dukakis).

500. Virginia L. Duquet, Note, Advantages and Limitations of CurrentEmployee Ownership
Assistance Acts to Workers Facing a Plant Closure, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 93, 107-08 (1984)

(reporting such statutes in California, Illinois, Michigan, and New York).
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tremendous economic insecurity so many are now being asked to bear.
Finally, I would be untrue to American legal history if I did not add to the
list of legal tools a reminder about the role of "extralegal" strategies in the
development of the rights and interests that come to be recognized or
ignored by the legal system. I have already mentioned the occupation of
U.S. Steel's local headquarters that was carried out by union members at
one point during the steel shutdowns in Youngstown." 1 In early February
1993, members of the Canadian Auto Workers occupied the Premium
Auto Parts plant in Nova Scotia after they learned that the company had
closed its doors (apparently in violation of Canadian prenotification laws)
and was planning to move south of the border, to New Hampshire. The
occupying workers succeeded in securing severance pay and other benefits. 502 Deep divisions in society over just entitlements in changing times
can be expected to produce extralegal actions of this kind unless the
divisions are ameliorated or the level of fear or repression is increased.
CONCLUSION

This is an important moment for antipoverty advocates. There are
economic changes at work that threaten to exacerbate and entrench disparities that are already a disturbingly salient feature of American society.
The erosion of the manufacturing base has thrown increasing numbers of
people into unemployment and driven others to take jobs at lower pay with
slenderer benefits. But those effects, despite their importance, are only
part of the story.
In a larger sense, America's most powerful corporations" are engaged
in an experiment to change the rules of the social game as it has been
played in this country since the New Deal. Over the past fifty years many
Americans had come to expect a number of things that were a far cry
indeed from utopia, but were nonetheless of great value, and that now
seem open to question: reasonable employment security; livable and steadily
increasing wage levels; neighborhood and community stability; relatively
predictable work schedules; the ability to effectuate workplace and environmental policy through local, state, and national legislative initiatives; and
501. See supra note 205.
502. This story is recounted in an op-ed piece by Peter Rachleff, Corporate irresponsibility
offers cause for concern, STAR TRIB., Mar. 15, 1993, at 3D.
503. American corporations are not the only ones, of course, who are changing the social
and economic landscape. Capital mobility and transnational investment are worldwide
phenomena, and foreign-based corporations with plants in the United States are certainly
taking part in this redefinition of our domestic rules. See, e.g., Laura Simmons, Union,
Philips Agree; Jobs Stay in ET, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, July, 5, 1992, at D1 (Dutch-

owned electronics firm wins major concessions from East Tennessee workers seeking to avert
threatened transfer of their work to Mexico).
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widespread existence of collective bargaining. Although the poor have
seldom participated fully in these expectations, their plight is only worsened, and their numbers are only increased, by this major shift in social
power between corporations and the employees and the communities that
both support and depend upon them.
While this shift is economic and technological, it is also profoundly
political. On the one hand, multinational firms are often uncertain and
vulnerable themselves, as the global market expands and capital movement continues to accelerate in a world filled with risk and uncertainty for
players at all levels. On the other hand, those corporations' bargaining
power relative to governments, unions, workers, and ordinary citizens has
been tremendously enhanced by the worldwide scarcity of jobs and investment capital, the lack of democratic political structures in the international arena, and the extremely primitive level of international exchange
and cooperation that presently exists among the people on the bottom or
even middle rungs of societies around the globe.
The advent of a new administration in Washington, while holding out
the hope of a welcome end to much that was brutal and wrong-headed in
our recent national economic policy, is hardly the end of the story.
President Clinton's campaign themes often demonstrated a gratifying concern for those most hurt by deindustrialization and disinvestment. But it
also assiduously avoided any serious recognition that there are deep conflicts
of interest between the majority of Americans and those who run and
control our most powerful corporations.
The vast majority of American people will not be well served by a
national economic policy that assumes an unproblematic commonality of
interest among all "Americans"-transnational corporations, assemblyline workers, and unemployed people alike. Nor will they be well served
by a policy that constantly invokes the need for American workers (and
would-be workers) to compete with, and strive to rank themselves "number one" against, the workers of other countries. Such nationalist rhetoric
tends to obscure from view both dangerous enemies and crucial friends. It
is not just UNICEF-postcard romanticism to say that in important ways
U.S. workers share more common interests with Mexican workers than
with U.S. based multinationals. °4 And U.S. workers need a government
willing to recognize and speak about that truth and to act upon it.
On the other hand, if a new U.S. industrial policy were to take the
values of democracy, inclusion, and empowerment seriously, then it could

504. For one set of concrete suggestions for a trinational wage policy that would undercut
the drive toward race-to-the-bottom wage wars, see Richard Rothstein, Low Wages in
Developing Countries = Poverty in the U.S., POVERTY & RACE, Mar. 1993, at 6, 6-7 (newsletter

of PRRAC, the Poverty & Race Research Action Council).
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produce exciting results. Those implementing such a policy would have to
invite to the table not only the corporate executives and bankers who
control so many important resources, but also people who work for a living
and who are unemployed-people whose daily lives are dependent in
direct and important ways on the health and stability of the manufacturing
base. More would be required than multicultural imagery and warm
references to reunion and inclusion. Instead of merely inviting public
participation in media events, policymakers committed to democracy must
implement national policies and programs to enhance the power, the level
of organization, and the degree of mobilization of the majority of people.
Part of what was good about many New Deal programs was that, at least
at their best, they helped mobilize and empower their own supportive
constituencies. The NLRA, for instance, did not simply make possible a
more just environment in the workplace, it offered significant legal protection for workers to create organizations that could defend past gains and

fight for additional ones. This kind of reform gave clout and voice to those
it aimed to benefit (a true hand-up, not just a hand-out!), and thereby
generated organized support for the next steps to be taken and for a real
shift in political power.
Measures for the nineties that could move in such a direction are
various. Serious labor law reform (including striker replacement legislation, but much more5 5 ) and aggressive executive appointments to the
NLRB and the Department of Labor could reverse the undertow that has
been helping to drag down the ability of workers to organize labor unions.50 6
Further, the Department of Justice, the Department of Education, and the
EEOC could stop fanning the flames of racial division in the workplace
and in academe.5 °7 Without the imprimatur of official approval and repetition, the ideology of reverse discrimination might have less power, and it
might become easier for workplace and academic constituencies to unite
505. See, e.g., Klare, supra note 109.
506. Signals thus far are mixed. On the one hand, the Clinton Administration has shown
some public appreciation for the value of unionization. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Labor
Secretary Sees a Vital Role for Unions in Economic Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at A13.
On the other hand, the nature of this appreciation and the type of unionization it envisions
are not so clear. For one inveterately skeptical view, see Alexander Cockburn, Clinton,
Labor and Free Trade, THE NATION, Nov. 2, 1992, at 489.
507. The subject of the Reagan and Bush Administrations' record on race in the workplace and in the academy is beyond the scope of this paper. For some entry points, see
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). For particular attention to racial

division in academe and for one look at the debate on what to do about them, see Lino A.
Graglia, Race Norming in Law School Admissions, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97, 101-02 (1992)
(discussing minority admission and scholarship); Michael A. Olivas, Legal Norms in Law
School Admission: An Essay on Parallel Universes, 42 J. LEGAL. ED. 103, 109-16 (1992)
(same); Anthony DePalma, Questions on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1992, at B8 (same).
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on other programmatic demands. Resistance to the reordering of racial
hierarchies is not solely a creation of the state, but the state is deeply
implicated in the hierarchies, and executive policy in the last twelve years
has certainly played an important part in nourishing and legitimizing the
resistance.
A recasting of NAFTA could be another important step in the direction
of encouraging popular organization. A more democratic approach to
hemispheric economic integration would insist on built-in, regular, institutional participation in trade decisions by groups of people most directly
affected in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Such people include
skilled and unskilled workers in affected industries, people living in
"colonias" on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border," 8 family farmers,
people knowledgeable about and committed to defending the environment, indigenous people, and more. 509
The agreement negotiated by the Bush-Salinas-Mulroney team provides
for dispute resolution panels on which multinational corporations, highlevel government representatives, and "experts" have input, but which
effectively lock out the very groups who may have the most at stake.
Democratic and institutionalized participation in the trade and investment
decisions that go along with global economic integration could provide an
impetus and a structure for many presently silenced and marginalized
sectors to become better mobilized, educated, and vocal around important
issues of trade and sustainable development. Such participation could
help this country and its North American partners to begin the brand new
task of inventing the forms of democratic participation and control appropriate to the new world order.
There are other ways that the new administration's economic policy
could empower those most directly affected by deindustrialization. Federal expenditures can be directed in ways that either reinforce or help to
change present hierarchies. If the rhetoric of the 1992 presidential campaign meant anything, there should be at least some federal resources
targeted directly at problems of deindustrialization. These appropriations
should help not only to cushion the blows currently falling on people at the

508. "Colonia" is a Spanish word meaning simply "neighborhood." In common parlance
along the U.S.-Mexico border, however, the word is often used to refer to the spreading
squatter communities now common on both sides. Their residents often bear the brunt of
border environmental degradation. See, e.g., The Texas Border, Whose Dirt?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 1990, at 20-21 ("Up to 300,000 people live in the Texas squatter settle-

ments .... [which] depend on shallow wells to tap underground water supplies that are
increasingly vulnerable to pollution from industrial wastes and raw sewage.").
509. A discussion of NAFTA, though exceedingly relevant to the topic of this article, is
beyond its scope. At this writing the much-discussed side agreements are still incomplete
and under wraps. See generally Ansley, PublicDebate, supra note 31.
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bottom, but also to mobilize those people and better enable them to
defend themselves.
Those of us interested in a democratic response to plant closings-a
response that empowers people at the grass roots and in the streets and on
shop floors-should ask searching questions about the Clinton Administration's plans for the economy. Who will design and implement the muchtouted programs for skill development and worker training, for example?
Will they be solely in the hands of local institutions already largely dependent on corporate largesse and favor, institutions that too often see displaced workers only as another way to increase grant revenues for the
support and enlargement of unimaginative, stagnant programs? Or will
there be a new kind of effort that seeks participation and leadership from
education staff in trade unions, volunteers and staff members of battered
women's shelters, multiculturalist educators working in inner cities and
rural areas, headstart parents, community-based literacy teachers, displacedworker job clubs, local housing reform groups, grass-roots leadership development institutes, local environmental justice organizations rooted in lowincome communities and communities of color, injured worker advocacy
groups, and organizers for the homeless? Such broad participation would
be invaluable, especially because many of these trainers are already highly
skilled in defining and developing a kind of education that empowers
people presently on the bottom to work together to take leadership,
challenge authority, and change their own lives. Such trainers have important expertise to share and would bring skills and credibility that might
even convince constituents that the training offered was more than a
routinized and callous joke.
Training programs are not the only anticipated federal expenditure
aimed at turning around the trend toward deindustrialization. There has
also been serious talk of public works projects. To the extent that federal
money goes directly into projects such as infrastructure development, it is
important to determine how that money will be spent. Will it be significantly targeted to small businesses whose loyalty to particular localities is
demonstrably higher than that of large corporations? Will it be targeted to
minority-owned enterprises with roots in and expertise about the minority
communities hit so hard by deindustrialization and capital flight? Will it
provide resources to credit-starved grass-roots economic development efforts run by individuals tied to and knowledgeable about affected localities?
Will a fair share of it end up in the hands of women and in a form
well-suited to their economic needs and dreams? Will it require livable
wage levels that do not undermine worker organizations already present in
the recipient area? Will it be conditioned on significant employment of
chronically unemployed people? Will it be designed to revive the urban
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and rural areas where most poor people live? 5 1° Or will it prove to be a
one-time injection that provides temporary jobs to some in need and major
opportunities for boondoggling by those who have private capital to contribute? The answers to these questions will make a difference.
The Clinton Administration could also move to empower groups whose
voices are absent from or diminishing in the current public dialogue by
adopting federal standards in various areas related to capital mobility.
Such standards could help to rectify the grossly uneven bargaining power
that now exists whenever workers or community members attempt to
interact with those who control private jobs in their communities. The
prior discussions of the NLRA and of plant closing legislation,5 11 for
instance, suggest ways that a meaningful plant-closing law could be devised.
It would include information-sharing obligations, longer notice provisions,
required bargaining with unions or employees about both the decision to
close and its effects, and minimum severance obligations.5 12 These kinds
of provisions could guarantee not just a consolation prize that each defeated worker would take home to stretch as far as she can toward the
bleak horizon of an underemployed future, but also what we might think of
as public participation rights-giving new groups a seat at the table-and
requiring political dialogue as part of an ongoing future decisionmaking
process.
The federal government should also explore the setting of national
standards for local economic development activity. Federal standards
would be appropriate, and could play an empowering role, in regulating
economic incentives offered by localities in the development game. Fixing
some outside national parameters for the terms of local industrial subsidies could go a long way toward limiting the destructive bidding wars that
now too frequently erupt between different localities. They could also give
state and local governments more breathing room to experiment with
different approaches to questions of corporate accountability, labormanagement cooperation, compensation structures, and the like. Standards could address the range of permissible incentives, set out minimum
performance requirements, insist on monitoring, and provide for public
recoupment in the event that the promised performance is not forthcoming.
If national standards existed, then the ability of corporations to play
localities against each other would be significantly curtailed.
510. Here I am suggesting that job training should be targeted not only toward the
deindustrialized, but also toward the poor generally, some of whom will be poor because of
direct and recent deindustrialization, and some of whom will not.
511. See supra Parts II.c.1. & II.D.2.

512. Minimum severance obligations would include provisions for wages, insurance, other
accrued benefits, payments to the local community, and a duty to cooperate in good faith in

attempts to preserve productive capacity in the affected community.
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Of course, for a politician or administrator, adopting collective empowerment of the less powerful as a criterion of program development entails
some risk. If the strategy works, it results in the introduction of additional
actors into a scene that may already seem to bode more chaos than is
comfortable. It unleashes new energies whose direction is not always
predictable or controllable. It calls forth new leaders whose primary
loyalties lie with their own constituents. It would be only natural for an
administrator to hesitate before opening such a box.
Nevertheless, the options for the Clinton-Gore Administration are not
"freedom to act as we think best" versus "subjection of our best judgment
to unpredictable pressures from subordinated groups too hastily
empowered." To the contrary, there are many powerful interests already
on board, mobilized, fully staffed, and ready to press their agendas. A
strategy that used the power of the executive to give traditionally unrepresented groups an effective voice would greatly increase the executive's
available options. The nation's new leadership currently faces a set of
exceedingly difficult constraints imposed by global competition, the worldwide recession, and the crippling debt burden inherited from the ReaganBush years, all situated in an impoverished political landscape dominated
overwhelmingly by corporate interests. The new administration does not
have the tools to change that landscape alone if it wanted to, but a number
of concrete steps that are within its power could help to unleash a popular
energy and motion that could move toward real democratic change. The
question is whether the Administration will have the courage and the
vision to follow such a strategy.
This country has had an industrial policy of one sort or another for a
long time. The wildly inflated free market rhetoric of recent years makes it
all too easy for people concerned about those on the bottom to believe
that their task is simply to justify government intervention in the "private"
economy in pursuit of humanity and justice. But that way of framing the
issue is profoundly misleading. It blinds us to the massive government
participation that built this national economy in the first place and that is
still taking place. It forces us to argue a false issue-"Should politics be
allowed to intervene in the economy?"-rather than the real one"Should government continue to participate in the economy in the same
way it has in the past, or should it begin to do so in a more humane,
democratic, and egalitarian way?"5'13

513. This argument has already been made-repeatedly and brilliantly-by writers far
better than I. See generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960 (1992); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Karl Klare, Workplace Democracy and Market Reconstruction:
An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 1 (1988). I believe it is nevertheless
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President Clinton was very tough on trickle-down economics during his
campaign, and rightly so. But those interested in eliminating poverty need
to be ready to work with others to demand that the Clinton industrial
policy not turn out to be just another form of the same old thing. Will a
Clinton policy take a seriously more democratic turn, or will it be only a
somewhat more humane version of the fundamentally corporatist strategy
already in place? Workers, the unemployed, local communities, small-tomedium-sized businesses, labor unions, grassroots coalitions, women's organizations, and racial justice groups need to be involved and participating in
the new industrial policy. They need to demand governmental and corporate accountability as the nation's attempts at reindustrialization and
sustainable economic development proceed.
Simply having the government admit to and talk openly about its active
role in stimulating the economy is not enough. The questions remain:
Whose interests will the government defend when interests are in conflict?
Which conflicts of interest will our government even acknowledge? What
will it do to empower those presently suffering most?
It is a wonderful improvement over the past twelve years to have
national leaders who speak intelligently and candidly about the public,
political nature of the economy. It is deeply heartening to have national
leaders who show concern and concrete knowledge about the condition of
life of Americans in economic trouble. It is a pleasure to see a leadership
team that wants to convey the image of unity and cooperation among
diverse Americans.
But sometimes I fear that this new leadership is thinking of its job
primarily as the implementation, from the top down, of a series of enlightened ideas developed by superior intellects. I am afraid that it believes
social change comes about through skillful engineering, guided from above
by intelligent, highly trained policy wonks possessed of savvy, brains, and
even heart.
My own understanding of social change is a quite different one. In my
view, social change is in large measure the result of social struggle.
Different groups have different tools they can call upon to aid them in
their attempts to direct resources and convince others of the rightness and
naturalness of their visions. Those with material resources at their disposal can deploy them. Those without such resources must resort to other
tactics, such as mass mobilization and social disruption of various kinds
and at various levels.

worth revisiting for purposes of the present discussion, because it may help antipoverty and
economic justice advocates to evaluate and participate in the coming ideological struggles
over industrial policy.
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Social change resulting from social struggle has implications for public
policy. No matter how well-informed, articulate, and intelligent the national leadership may be, the severely antidemocratic and polarizing economic trends that have been the focus of this article will not be fixed by
policy manipulations from above. The great "American Reunion" cannot
be restricted to media events, however heartwarming, but must start from
the ground up and penetrate the policy suites.
President Clinton should at the outset move to empower those most
dependent upon the vitality and democratization of the U.S. economy.
But workers and poor people, both displaced and employed, and their
advocates-myself included-had best not wait around for the President
to do so. We must take our own initiative. We need to be busy learning
and observing how these issues of job loss and deindustrialization are
affecting people's lives. We need to be busy making noise, wielding facts
and arguments, and sharing stories at all the multiple levels at which those
with power are making decisions and crafting policy relevant to these
developments.
One of the great challenges I see in this period is that of figuring out a
way to combine an appropriate and deeply felt sense of urgency about
these matters with an equally deeply felt humility about our own primitive
and emergent understanding of the new global economic environment.
Success will require a commitment to the long haul5 14 and a more internationalist perspective and agenda than U.S. labor organizers, community
activists, or poverty advocates are accustomed to taking.5 15 For example,
members of the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC), a twenty-five
year-old organization of farm workers based in Toledo, Ohio, have begun
a pioneering project of cooperation with their counterparts in Mexico.5 16

514. 1 can't speak or write the phrase "the long haul" without hearing the voice of Myles
Horton, southern popular educator and activist. Those interested in reading some of what
he had to say could begin with MYLES HORTON, THE LONG HAUL: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1990) or with the book he "talked" with Paolo Friere, MYLES HORTON & PAULO FRIERE,
WE MAKE THE ROAD BY WALKING:

CONVERSATIONS ON EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

(Brenda Bell et al. eds., 1990). Myles also spoke explicitly about "the long haul" during a
talk to assembled supporters at the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the Highlander Center
he helped to found, and was caught on film doing it. See You GOT To MOVE (Independently
produced by Lucy Phenix & Veronica Selver 1985).
515. Signs of more internationalist activity already exist. The United Steelworkers recently mobilized support from the International Chemical and Energy Workers Federation,
a Dutch bank workers' union, the International Food Workers, a group of Romanian hotel
workers, and Czechoslovakian metal workers in order to bring pressure to bear against
global commodities trader Marc Rich, who, the union claimed, had the power to cause the
Ravenswood Aluminum Co. to end its lockout, due to various connections between Rich and
the company. They were successful. David Moberg, Lock-Out Knock-Out, IN THESE TIMES,
June 24-July 7, 1992, at 12, 13.
516. Baldmar Velasquez, Meeting the Transnational Corporate Challenge, BEYOND BOR-
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Campbell Soup, the buyer of the vegetables many FLOC members pick,
and an agribusiness multinational, threatened FLOC that it would switch
from U.S. to Mexican tomato paste if FLOC continued to press for wage
increases and other improvements in the work life of U.S. tomato pickers.
When FLOC set to work to investigate these threats, it sought out Campbell's "paste shops" in Mexico and found that farm laborers south of the
border were extremely interested in mutual cooperation with their U.S.
counterparts and in exchanging information on such topics as relative wage
levels.5 17 In reflecting on the current period for U.S. workers and unions,
Baldemar Velasquez, FLOC's president and founder, observed:
In many ways, we organizers have to think of the new challenges
before us in the global economy as a time of analysis and restrategizing.... An organizer has to accept that there is a long process involved in building international ties from the grassroots level. In many
respects, one has to view it as starting over again.
With the Free Trade Agreement and further internationalization of
economies around the world, organizers must look at reorganizing their
entire union's structures to accommodate the inclusion and participation
of workers further away from where they are used to operating. Starting
over may be a worst case scenario, but it is a potential eventuality that
one must prepare for. A lot of ways of doing things are being shaken
right now, and when things are shaken, they also fall apart, and our job
as organizers is to ensure there is a structure in place to rebuild. 5 18
Finally, it seems appropriate to recall again what an extraordinary time
of economic change and redefinition we are confronting. It is a time of
great difficulty and suffering, but also a time when people may, if they
dare, redefine themselves and break the mold of old ideas. Because I am
of the view that there are some molds that need breaking, I find this time
heady and fraught with possibility. I was puzzling over how to end this
article, how adequately to convey my sense of both the possibilities and the
challenges ahead, when I received by fax a copy of a Michigan trial court's
decision in Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp.5 1 9 Judge
Shelton's words in that case provide a fitting conclusion, despite the fact
that the case is still pending and may well have changed before this article
reaches print. The opinion highlights a number of the themes that have

Winter 1992, at 8, 25.
517. Id.; Interview with Fernando Cuervas, elected official of FLOC, in Atlanta, Ga.
(Sept. 25, 1992).
518. Velasquez, supra note 516, at 25.
519. Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK (Cir. Ct.
County of Washtenaw, Mich. filed Feb. 9, 1993) (opinion and order).
DERS,
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run throughout the article, and it also demonstrates that new times can
bring new understanding and new responses, even from those who have
been entrusted with "the rules" and who one might therefore expect to be
most thoroughly steeped in old, entrenched approaches.
The case arises from an attempt by the township of Ypsilanti to prevent
General Motors from moving jobs to Texas. In the first portion of the
opinion excerpted below, Judge Shelton held that no contract was created
between Ypsilanti and General Motors based on the mere fact of GM's
application for tax abatement under Michigan's Plant Rehabilitation and
Industrial Development Districts Act. The judge announced that he felt
constrained by the statutory language and the legislative history of the Act
and found that the legislature had not intended to create binding obligations between municipalities and the recipients of their tax abatements.
He went on, however, to reflect on what he saw as the improvidence of
Michigan's legislative policy in this context:
This Court's conclusion that the legislature did not, when it enacted
Act 198, intend to impose contractual obligations on subsidized industries is not something of which the State should be proud. The relationship of government and industry in this country is necessarily one of
conflict, for it is the purpose of government to provide for the common
welfare of all and it is the antithetical purpose of an industry to strive
solely for the profit of its owners. For example, contrary to the approach
of the defendant in this case that "what is good for General Motors is
good for the country," the truth is, as this case demonstrates, that what is
good for General Motors may only coincidentally help, and often hurts,
many of our people. Industry is the source of many of the jobs in our
nation and it may well be that our nation needs a new relationship of
trust and cooperation between government and industry in order to
compete with heavily subsidized industries from other, perhaps less
democratically and socially sophisticated, countries. But such an effort
must be national in scope and must be a real partnership with industry,
not one in which industry simply views government as part of its "business climate" and another opportunity to increase profits. The tax
abatement statutes in this State and others are not the product of a well
thought out effort to forge such a new partnership. This tax subsidy
policy results in pitting state against state and municipality against municipality in an inter-governmental bidding war. The local governments of
this State are placed in a position where they feel that they have no
choice but to give taxpayers' resources away under a statute which does
not mandate that they receive anything in return for those foregone
taxes ....
Unfortunately, however, this Court cannot interpret a statute to have
other than its intended meaning because the legislature chose to act
unwisely or improvidently. It is for the State legislature to attempt to
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undo what it has done, or perhaps for the federal government to finally
intervene in this area on the basis that a national industrial policy
regarding tax subsidies is needed.52 °
Having found that Michigan's tax abatement legislation gave Ypsilanti
no help, Judge Shelton did not stop. He went on to find that during the
course of a public hearing at which GM made its case for an abatement,
the GM plant manager for Willow Run had made a promise to the town of
Ypsilanti that "if the township granted the abatement, General Motors
would make the Caprice at Willow Run and not just transfer that work
somewhere else. ' 5 21 Importantly, GM had stipulated that economic necessity was not the reason for its move. In light of that fact, the court ruled
that the corporation was obligated to stay in Ypsilanti for the life of the
abatements it had received.5 22 Judge Shelton acknowledged that two
other federal courts had rejected similar claims, 5 23 but he distinguished the
earlier cases on the ground that in those instances GM had claimed
economic necessity,524 and pressed on:
[T]his Court ...simply finds that the failure to act in this case would
result in a terrible injustice and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
should be applied. Each judge who dons this robe assumes the awesome,
and lonely, responsibility to make decisions about justice, and injustice,
which will dramatically affect the way people are forced to live their
lives. Every such decision must be the judge's own and it must be made
honestly and in good conscience. There would be a gross inequity and
patent unfairness if General Motors, having lulled the people of the
Ypsilanti area into giving up millions of tax dollars which they so desperately need to educate their children and provide basic governmental
services, is allowed to simply decide that it will desert 4500 workers and
their families because it thinks it can make these same cars a little
cheaper somewhere else. Perhaps another judge in another court would
not feel moved by that injustice and would labor to find a legal rationalization to allow such conduct. But in this Court it is my responsibility to
make that decision. My conscience will not allow this injustice to

520. Id. at 20-21.
521. Id. at 24.
522. See supra note 267 (discussing Ypsilanti's promissory estoppel claim).
523. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, at 26; see supra note 275.
524. Ypsilanti is distinguishable from the cited cases on other grounds as well. The other
reported cases were ruled upon by federal courts, which meant that the decisionmakers were
bound to be more cautious in their interpretation of state common law precedents than was
Judge Shelton, a state court judge. Further, those cases turned on the particular facts at
hand and did not hold that promissory estoppel was a theory inapplicable to all plant
closings by definition.
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happen.5 25 Order: General Motors is hereby enjoined from transferring
the production of its Caprice sedan, and Buick and Cadillac station
wagons, from the Willow Run plant to any other facility.
I hear the voices of more people than Judge Shelton speaking in this
opinion. I discern the voices of his neighbors in Ypsilanti. I hear the
auto-worker parents of Doug Winter, the lawyer who represented the
township, and all the autoworkers they knew and learned from in their
turn. I wonder whether Judge Shelton ever saw the movie Roger and Me or
ever saw Poletown Lives, and which characters might have stayed with him
if he did. I think of Staughton Lynd litigating an incredibly creative bloom
of steel shutdown cases like a man possessed, despite the fact that one loss
after another kept piling up for workers and for local communities, and I
wonder what ripples he may have created that lap at the edges of Judge
Shelton's opinion. I think of Judge Lambros who spoke so eloquently
about the Mahoning Valley before giving up on finding a law he felt he
could safely lean on. I think of legal scholars who have worked to craft
legal theories to protect those affected by plant closings or to debunk legal
theories that would declare such protection illegitimate. I think of people
who built the autoworkers union and the steel workers union in the first
place, those who are trying to save them still, and of others who are
working to build new unions for a new time. I think of people who have
been organizing in communities to build coalitions that might resist plant
closings, to get people out for one more difficult meeting when things
looked bleak, to raise seemingly impossible demands, to devise at least
partially winnable strategies in the face of tremendous odds, and to reenvision and respeak the law.
Having seen the maquiladores, I also know that the relevant stories and
voices are not all here at home. I think of disenfranchised and plundered
people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America who have worked for years to
obtain just treatment from superpowers and from multinational corporations and from international financial institutions. These are people whose
efforts are invisible and unknown to most of us in the United States, but
who have developed expertise that could be of great value to American
workers and poor people only now realizing that they must learn to deal
with a new global environment.
Judge Shelton's opinion reminds us that the work of all these people is
bearing fruit and will continue to do so. That work will continue also to be
thwarted, hidden, and defeated. But the work, the visions, and the many
voices that have been raised in the past are all part of a long story whose
chapters continue to unfold.
525. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, No. 92-43075-CK, at 27-28.
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It is not only the voices of past prophets and figures I want to invoke
here. New voices will help to write the chapters ahead. I think of the
teenage girls I saw working in a GM plant in Mexico, bringing home less
than thirty dollars for a forty-eight hour week, and of all they have to teach
us here in the United States. I think of U.S. children in the rising
generation, the first within living memory who doubt whether they will fare
economically as well as their parents did. I think of children born all over
the globe next week, who will begin their lives in a biosphere vastly more
toxic than the one in which I drew my first breath. There is a long process
ahead for the people of the earth who find themselves embroiled in this
new world order. We must learn new rules and develop new skills and
understandings to go with the new realities we are only just beginning to
comprehend.
This is not a matter of noble resolve. However dizzyingly global and
inflated these aspirations may seem, there is actually very little choice,
given the finite nature of the planetary ecosystem, the velocity of change,
and the widening disparities between the rich and the poor. Moments of
insight, victory or advance are always possible. But they are likely to come
in bits and pieces, a strand here and a strand there, and never final or done
with, often unexpected or even unrecognized at first, provisional, contingent.
But small strands will sometimes weave a surprisingly strong cable, or
reveal an emerging pattern of great beauty, or leave a trace found years
later by someone greatly helped or inspired by the finding.52 6

526. Sometimes a person will stand up, a Shirley Reinhardt or an Ed Mann or a Rosa
Parks or a Maria Guadalupe Torres, and refuse to accept being bossed or lied to, and will
push on despite feelings of powerlessness and isolation and despite the threat of cynicism

and despair. And sometimes, rarely, but so happily for those of us in the law, that person
will even turn out to be a judge.

